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ABSTRACT 
 
Reed Morrison Wood: Competing for Control: Conflict Power Dynamics, Civilian Loyalties 
and Violence in Civil 
(Under the direction of Mark Crescenzi) 
 
Rather than an arbitrary decision, civilian victimization represents a strategic choice made by 
armed actors.  The theory presented herein argues that violence strategies are largely shaped 
by fluctuations in the power dynamics between armed political actors.  Insurgents and states 
actively compete over civilian loyalties because loyalty and support shape war outcomes.  
Civilian loyalty is largely contingent on the population's expectations of the benefits 
provided by each side as well as the probability of its victory.  Both the credible provision of 
benefits by a side and civilians' expectations regarding war outcomes are determined by the 
relative capabilities of the actors.  As insurgents weaken, civilians' evaluation of the 
likelihood of the group's victory declines, as do their expectations of receiving sufficient 
benefits to offset the risk of supporting the group.  Declining capabilities and weakening 
civilian loyalty encourage insurgents to escalate violence in order to deter defections.  A 
similar dynamic applies to states.  As the regime weakens in the face of rising insurgent 
threat and declining civilian loyalty, it is increasingly likely to resort to higher levels of 
violence against civilians in an attempt to reassert control and enforce loyalty among the 
population.  The statistical results presented here provide support for the thesis that changes 
in actors' relative capabilities influence the frequency and types of violence they employ 
against civilians. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Introduction
 
One morning in late December in Bapu, a village on the border of the Democratic Republic 
of Congo and Uganda, an elderly woman watched several men in military uniforms approach 
her hut.  She assumed (based on their uniforms) that they were Congolese soldiers, and she 
waved and greeted them.   The men approached the hut and called back to her.   The leader of 
the attachment asked where the local children studied, and if there was a school in the 
village.  The old woman answered that the village school was not really functioning so there 
were no pupils in class that day.  The man in uniform then asked if there was a church nearby 
where Christians might be praying, to which the woman replied that there were no services 
that day, so the church would be empty.  The man in military uniform then asked for 
directions to the market or anywhere else nearby where many people might be gathering.   To 
this, the woman responded that there was a market at Mabanga Ya Talo, not too far away, 
and she pointed in the direction of the small, bustling weekend fishing market.   She later 
recounted to a human rights worker that at that moment she thought to herself that the 
questions seemed strange, and the men spoke Lingala (the local dialect) with a foreign 
accent.  
After she answered their questions, the men in uniform pushed the elderly woman 
into her hut and begin to ransack it.  She realized then that these were not government 
soldiers, but fighters with the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA).  The LRA soldiers stole 
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everything of value among her meager possessions and then forced her to carry the looted 
goods as they pulled her along the dusty road.  They marched her toward the water and in the 
direction of the fishermen’s market.  
When they reached the water she saw another group of LRA tying up villagers they 
had captured.  She recalled that they were brandishing guns and shouting at the people.  They 
tied cords around the waists of their captives; among them she noticed her son and several of 
her neighbors.  The man giving the orders was tall and muscular and had one eye, she 
remembered, and he gave orders with gestures and sometimes punched the bound villagers. 
While the soldiers turned their attention to the crowd of scared villagers, the woman escaped 
into the forest.    When she emerged days later, she discovered that the LRA had killed her 
son along with several other villagers. 
The soldiers continued on to Mabanga Ya Talo.  When they neared the market several 
men stayed behind to guard the bound peasants.  The second group entered the busy market.  
According to survivors, the soldiers told them that they were Congolese soldiers and that 
they were there to protect them.  The leader of the local fisherman's collective validated the 
story and told the merchants and shoppers not to be afraid.  A few days before he had told 
people that the Congolese army would arrive and urged them to collect rations for the 
soldiers.  The villagers were therefore not surprised when men in green fatigues and 
shouldering weapons arrived in the market.  They did not realize at the time that the leader of 
the collective had been employed by the LRA. 
The LRA soldiers surrounded the market, and began to capture and kill the shoppers 
and merchants.  They abducted dozens of people, including 30 young women and 10 boys.  
A number of the villagers were killed, most hacked to death by machete.   After the attack on 
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the market, the soldiers and their captives continued to the next village a few kilometers 
away.  Along the way they killed many of the adults among the captured group as well as 
other peasants they passed on the road.  Over the next several days villagers found dozens of 
bodies scattered along the roadside. 
The contingent of soldiers repeated this scenario in the next village.  Other LRA 
contingents conducted similarly brutal operations throughout the region.  According to 
Human Rights Watch's figures, between December 14 and 17 the LRA killed more than 300 
people in the Mokomo area and over the course of the next month massacred upwards of 
1,000 peasants in the region, captured hundreds of children and women, and displaced as 
many as 30,000 persons.  The violence and displacement rendered the region largely 
ungovernable and created a humanitarian catastrophe for the governments of Uganda and the 
DRC.1 
While the LRA are among the groups perhaps most notorious for their use of 
violence, they are far from the only insurgent organization to target civilians during a civil 
war.  Moreover, both state forces and guerrilla movements kill thousands of civilians around 
the world each year.  Much of the violence that befalls civilians is unintentional — for 
example, the "collateral damage" that U.S. forces inflict on civilians in Afghanistan when 
precision bombs miss their marks or when military intelligence mistakes wedding parties for 
insurgent encampments.   
Other violence falls into a more nebulous category of unintentional yet largely 
negligent violence.  This type of violence is nebulous in the sense that is hard to determine 
the motives behind the civilian deaths—that is, did the perpetrator explicitly target civilians, 
                                                
1 This example is largely adapted from a recent Human Rights Watch report on the incident, which was 
compiled from interviews with a number of survivors of the LRA attacks (see Human Rights Watch, 2010). 
4 
or were they simply indifferent to the effect of the attack on the civilian population?  The true 
motive is largely unknowable or would be extremely difficult to ascertain in most 
circumstances.  What is clear, however, is that this type of violence occurs frequently, and a 
great many civilians are killed in such cases.  The 2008-2009 Israeli offensive in Gaza, which 
resulted in the deaths of hundreds of Palestinians, is replete with many examples of this type 
of anti-civilian violence.  Israel has categorically denied that they explicitly targeted 
civilians; yet, the fact remains that artillery fire and missiles targeted densely populated areas 
and often with Israeli knowledge of the presence of schools, hospitals, or even United 
Nations facilities in very close proximity to the target sites.  By some accounts, such facilities 
were the target of Israeli attacks because insurgents were had positioned themselves in those 
areas in the hope that the location would deter Israeli targeting.  In any case, it did not, and 
civilians paid a heavy toll.  Insurgent groups are often guilty of similar violence.  For 
example, many of the suicide bombings committed by Taliban and Al-Qaeda insurgents in 
Afghanistan target explicitly military targets such as troop convoys, guard posts, barracks, 
etc.  However, the blasts frequently kill and maim civilians in addition to the targeted troops 
— often leading to many times more civilian causalities than military ones. 
The violence described in the LRA example detailed above represents a class of 
violence referred to in some literatures as one-sided violence (see Eck and Hultman, 2007).  
This violence is directed expressly at civilians with the intention of causing their death or 
injury.  This violence often occurs outside of combat situations and the victims are typically 
unarmed.  This is perhaps the most egregious type of civil war violence.  As with other types 
of violence, one-sided violence is employed frequently in civil wars.  While victims of one-
sided violence represent a relatively small proportion of the overall causalities that accrue 
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during a civil war, they represent an unquestionably large human cost associated with 
intrastate conflict.  Figure 1.1 compares the number of total battle-related deaths with the 
number of one-sided deaths occurring annually in the global sample of civil conflicts for 
which relevant data is available.   
Figure 1.1 Battle-related Deaths & One-Sided Deaths, 1989-2007 
Battle-deaths data are taken from Lacina and Gleditsch (2005).  One-sided violence data are from UCDP 
(2009).  
 
Also like other types of violence, both states and insurgent forces make frequent use 
of one-sided violence.  Worldwide, with the exception of the 1994 Rwanda genocide, rebel 
groups and states were responsible for similar numbers of intentional civilian killings over 
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the past two decades.2  Figure 1.2 compares annual state-sponsored and insurgent one-sided 
violence for civil conflicts between the 1989 and 2007.  
 
Figure 1.2: Government & Insurgent One-sided Deaths, 1989-2007 
Data from UCDP (2009). 
 
The relative frequency of intentional violence against civilians during war (and the 
much more frequent negligent violence) begs the obvious question of why armed actors 
resort to the intentional killing of civilians during civil conflicts.  It would be easy to assume 
that a few bad apples commit violence or that it arises from bloodlust piqued in the heat of 
                                                
2   The value for 1994 far exceeds the values for other years because of the more than half a million intentional 
deaths resulting from the Rwandan genocide.  As such, the y-axis is condensed in order to show the more 
general trend.   
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battle.  Indeed, a number of historical accounts of civil wars suggest that the frustrations and 
stress of combat and the sometimes-daily experience of watching comrades fall in battle 
leads troops to "snap" and target civilians.  This stress is compounded in guerrilla conflicts 
because combatants often cannot accurately judge the loyalties and sympathies of an often-
fickle civilian population. While this reasoning probably explains some portion of violence 
against civilians during civil wars, it is a largely unsatisfactory answer.  Numerous analyses 
conducted in recent decades strongly suggest that rather than "madness" or temporary, 
combat-induced rage, violence and terror are calculated, well-planned actions.  The narrative 
of the LRA presented above, for example, shows quite plainly that the violence was 
premeditated — the LRA combatants sought out populated areas in which they could 
efficiently abduct and kill, even asking for directions to schools and markets, they entered 
villages under the guise of being protective government soldiers, and they repeated the 
process in one village after another.   
More than just intentional, violence perpetrated against civilians by states and 
insurgents alike demonstrates a certain perverse logic.  While theories differ regarding the 
specific motivations for such violence, recent studies such as Kalyvas' (2006) "Logic of 
Violence" research agenda, Pape's (2005) analysis of the logic of suicide terrorism, and 
Valentino's (2004) threat-based theory of state-sponsored mass killing articulate arguments 
that strongly suggest that violence is a strategic choice.   These works therefore echo Arendt's 
(1970) assertions about the rationale of violence — it is rational to the extent that it achieves 
given objectives.  The core objective of violence in civil war, according to much of the extant 
literature on insurgency and counterinsurgency, is the alteration of the behaviors of a target 
group.  States and rebels use violence and terror to control the population, force it into 
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compliance, scare it into flight, or breakdown the social and political relationships between 
civilians and the perpetrator's adversary.   Given these objectives, the violence illustrated in 
the LRA case is perhaps not as surprising as it is an appalling example of this rationale.  
Lacking resources, support and territorial control the group resorted to mass killing and 
abduction to feed its resource needs and terrorize the population into submission.  Indeed, 
many recent analyses of the LRA strongly suggest that the group employs this kind of 
perverse logic — violence allows the group to acquire resources and the instability violence 
creates allows the groups to survive (see Branch, 2005; Bevan, 2007; Vinci, 2006).   
 
Figure 1.3: LRA One-sided Deaths, 1989-2008 
 
 
Includes only direct, intentional killings.  Data from UCDP (2009). 
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What is surprising — but has so far been largely overlooked by most analyses — is 
the timing of the killings.  During the previous three years the group had killed only a few 
dozen civilians.  While even this comparatively low number reflects the unabated willingness 
of the LRA to employ terror against civilians, the period between roughly early 2006 and late 
2008 marked a notable lull in the violence inflicted by the group.  The number of persons 
killed by the LRA fell from nearly 1000 in 2004 to 300 in 2005 and then to only a few dozen 
each year between 2006 and the end of 2008.  The group then rapidly escalated the number 
of killings to almost 1000 in the final weeks of 2008 and early 2009.  A survey of the history 
of LRA violence shows that the group has markedly varied its level of killing at different 
periods.  Figure 1.3 shows the variation in LRA violence over the past two decades.   
The notable variation in LRA violence illustrated by Figure 1.3 provokes a key 
question, which is not so much why the LRA — or any guerrilla group — chooses violence, 
but rather, why do they at certain times resort to violence against the population while at 
other times de-emphasize violence as a war strategy?  To frame the question in terms more 
specific to the case: Why did the LRA choose to return to mass violence in the final months 
of 2008 and the beginning of 2009 when it had acted with relative restraint for the previous 
three years?  Existing theories of civil war violence have largely ignored its temporal aspects 
and have instead focused on the explanations for why one group is more disposed to violence 
than another.3  Hence, they focus on initial conditions, patronage networks, resource 
endowments, ideology, ethno-political cleavages or other largely static factors to explain a 
group's general disposition to violence against civilians.  Such works, while useful, ignore 
the often-sizable variation in the any given group's use of violence over time.   
                                                
3   Though see Bevan (2007), Hultman (2007), and Kalyas (2006). 
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This manuscript begins to provide an explanation for this variation.  It departs from 
theories focused largely on static factors and instead examines the dynamics factors within 
the conflict environment that contribute to the formation of strategies among the relevant 
actors.  It also acknowledges the interdependence of actor strategies within this environment 
and attempts to integrate this aspect of conflicts into the theory of violence.  I argue herein 
that violence is largely a function of changes in the power dynamics between the state and 
insurgent groups.  As power asymmetries and resource disparities fluctuate over the course of 
the conflict, the levels and types of violence adopted by armed groups change as well.  More 
specifically, I model the conflict as a competition over the nominal loyalty of the civilian 
population.  Both the state and the insurgent group attempt to entice civilian loyalty by 
providing a mixture of benefits and sanctions.  The outcome of this competition largely 
structures the strategies of violence the group adopts.  Put simply, when civilians respond 
positively to insurgent demands, collaborating with insurgents and/or providing them with 
resources, insurgents have little incentive to target the population.  By contrast, when 
civilians withhold loyalty, collaborate with regime forces, or otherwise support the 
government and resist insurgent demands, the group has an incentive to use violence to 
restore deterrence and enforce loyalty.   
Civilian loyalty, however, fluctuates over the course of the conflict, and therefore 
leads to changes in the strategies of violence the armed group employs over time.  All else 
equal, civilian loyalty is predicated on the ability of the insurgents to provide material and 
non-material benefits to supporters in order to offset the risk of collaboration with or 
participation in the rebellion.  Consequently, the side that provides civilians with the largest 
credible level of goods compels the loyalty of the target population.  Civilians' subjective 
11 
assessment of the likely outcome of the conflict represents an additional factor in 
determining loyalty and support.  Civilians prefer to "back a winner," largely because of the 
fear of retribution should they support the loser and because with victory comes the credible 
promise of benefits.   
The ability of the insurgents to provide sufficient benefits to the target population 
depends on the capabilities of the group relative to the regime.  Civilians' beliefs in the 
likelihood of insurgent victory are likewise largely determined by the extant balance of 
power between the insurgents and the government.   In addition, changes in the in the power 
dynamics of the conflict contribute to changes in the level and depth of civilian loyalty to the 
insurgents.  Civilians are sensitive to shifts in the balance of power in the conflict and update 
their strategies in response to changes in them.  This occurs because such shifts signal likely 
changes in the credible delivery of resources and the likelihood of a given conflict outcome.  
As such, when insurgents face battlefield setbacks, when foreign powers intervene on the 
behalf of the government, or when other factors cause a decline in the insurgents' relative 
capabilities, civilians become more likely to defect and support the government.  The 
increased threat of defections and a general decline in civilian loyalty creates an incentive for 
insurgents to use violence against the population as means to deter collaboration with the 
government and to enforce civilian loyalty.  Consequently, the incentive for violence is 
driven by the shifting loyalties of the civilian population, which are in turn responsive to 
fluctuations in the relative capabilities of the conflict actors.  The general prediction, then, is 
that when a group is declining in power it becomes more likely to escalate violence as a 
means to enforce loyalty among civilians and prevent them from defecting to the adversary. 
12 
The actions of the LRA again provide a useful, brief example of these dynamics.  
When the group first emerged in the late 1980s it attempted to market itself as the defender 
of the Acholi ethnic group against the abuses and discrimination of the Ugandan government.  
During its first years the group committed relatively few abuses and enjoyed the nominal 
support of at least some portions of the population (Bevan, 2007: 348).  However, in the 
early 1990s the government launched a major counterinsurgency offensive against the group, 
which severely weakened the LRA's strength.  During this period the group also saw a steep 
decline in its level of popular support (Bevan, 2007: 439), which further reduced its resource 
base.  In response to the group’s declining power and its perceived betrayal by the Acholi 
people, the LRA's leader, Joseph Kony, made a significant shift in the group's war strategy, 
resorting to mass violence against the population (Branch, 2005; Gersony, 1997).   
Following a lull in the fighting, during which time the LRA was able to recoup its 
losses and slowly rebuild its military capabilities, the LRA resumed its campaign of violence 
in 1995, including large-scale massacres of civilians.  Military gains on the part of the 
government as well as Kony's perception of betrayal by the local population — they largely 
supported the peace process and had grown closer to the regime — once again contributed to 
this shift in violence strategy (UCDP, 2009).   In the late 1990s the government of Sudan 
provided a major boost to the capabilities of the LRA by supplying them with military aid as 
well secure strongholds from which it could launch attacks against the government and 
expand its control in the region (Bevan, 2007: 351).  During this period (1998-2001), LRA 
violence declined relative to the previous period.   
The de-escalation of violence reversed in a dramatic way in 2002, however, as the 
group killed more than 1000 persons that year.   This was the same year that the Sudanese 
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government (who had agreed to stop supplying aid to the group the previous year) gave the 
Ugandan government permission to launch a major offensive against the LRA's bases in 
Southern Sudan (UCDP, 2009).  Operation "Iron Fist" left the LRA battered but was unable 
to completely dislodge them from Southern Sudan and Northern Uganda, and in the several 
months that followed the group committed some of the worst atrocities of the conflict.  The 
scene depicted in the example above follows very closely to a situation that occurred in late 
2002 following operation "Iron Fist."  Following the collapse of mid-year peace talks, the 
combined forces of Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) launched 
operation "Lightning Thunder" against the LRA.  Much like the earlier offensive, the 
campaign dealt a forceful blow to the group, nearly destroying it.  However, the surviving 
remnants of the guerrillas then undertook a campaign of mass violence against peasant 
villages along the Uganda-DRC border, killing as many as a 1000 people and abducting 
hundreds or thousands in an attempt to rebuild the battered rebellion. 
The brief example presented here is not intended to elucidate the causal mechanisms 
driving insurgent motivations for violence against civilians.  Rather, it simply shows that 
violence fluctuates over the course of a conflict and, more importantly, that changes in 
violence strategy correspond to changes in the strategic environment in which armed political 
actors compete for control and loyalty.  In the following chapters I tease out these 
relationships in greater detail.  Chapter 2 outlines the assumptions about the civil war 
environment and actor preferences that underlie the theory.  Principally, it asserts that civil 
wars take place in dynamic environments, which are subject to rapid shifts to which actors 
must respond by updating their short-term strategies.  As a result, while initial conditions 
may impose some constraints upon the strategies available to groups, static factors can only 
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go so far in explaining insurgent and state behaviors.  Accounting for variations in war 
strategy over time requires the incorporation of the more dynamics aspects of the conflict 
environment.   Thus, the chapter sketches the competitive model that forms the base of the 
theory.  As mentioned briefly above, a group's success in competing for loyalty largely 
structures its incentives for violence.   
Chapter 3 looks more closely at this theoretical model by examining the behavior of 
civilians during civil war.  Specifically, it looks at the factors that contribute to the provision 
of civilian loyalty to one group or another during the conflict.  It argues that civilian loyalty 
is conditioned by the ability of insurgents to provide significant resources that offset the risk 
of state sanctions as well as on the population's expectation regarding the likely outcome of 
the conflict.  Thus, more capable insurgent organizations attract greater levels of civilian 
loyalty as proxied by the incidence of insurgents within the conflict populations.  In addition, 
when the power dynamics shift toward the insurgency, greater numbers of civilians are 
willing to support the insurgents.   
Chapter 4 explicitly engages insurgent violence against civilians.  In line with the 
theoretical model presented in Chapter 2, it argues that when insurgents face declining 
capabilities they are increasingly likely to escalate violence against the population.  Building 
from the propositions and results presented in Chapter 3, I argue that the increase in violence 
is driven largely by the negative effect that waning military capabilities exert on civilian 
loyalties.  I further argue that declining capabilities and waning support lead insurgents to 
broaden their application of violence as well as to increase its frequency.  That is, as the 
conflict power dynamics increasingly shift against the insurgents, they become more likely to 
apply violence more frequently and in a more indiscriminate manner. 
15 
 Chapter 5 turns the focus to the causes of state violence during civil war.  This 
chapter incorporates existing arguments about the role of regime threat perception into the 
theoretical model outlined in Chapter 2.  It argues that as rebel strength increases, deterring 
civilian collaboration with the group becomes both more difficult and more costly, making 
civilian victimization a more appealing option.  It further asserts that indiscriminate 
repression is more effective than commonly asserted in the literature; put simply, scorched 
earth and mass killing strategies sometimes work.  Thus, depending on the costs associated 
with buying off civilians through resource provisions, reform, or selective counterinsurgency 
policies, political elites may view mass violence as a reasonable gamble under certain 
conditions.  Rising insurgent capabilities increase the demands imposed by insurgents and 
their civilian supporters, thereby increasing the cost of the benefits or concession that must 
be provided by the regime.  As the expected costs associated with "buying them off" exceeds 
the expected effectiveness of mass violence, regimes are more likely to adopt killing as a 
strategy.  The final chapter reviews the theoretical arguments and recounts the empirical 
findings of the previous chapters.  It also offers some remarks about the applicability of these 
findings to policy formation and efforts to protect civilians during civil war.  
 
 CHAPTER 2 
 
Making War in a Dynamic Environment 
 
 
Violence committed intentionally against civilians during civil war is often as brutal as it is 
frequent.  Journalists often focus on the seemingly "irrational" acts of ultra-graphic violence 
committed by insurgents and government security forces during their campaigns — mass 
rapes, mutilations, and the murder of Bosnian children and the elderly by Serb paramilitaries 
received tremendous attention in the 1990s.  More recently, news reports have broadcast 
graphic images of the grisly aftermath of suicide bombings in Baghdad markets or the 
crumbled housing blocks and corpses following Israeli air strikes on Gaza.  Intentional 
civilian deaths and violence directed against non-combatants occur in all wars; yet, as such 
reports illustrate, some wars are simply more brutal than others and some warriors more 
willing to use extreme acts to accomplish their goals.   
 Explaining such violence has become a popular endeavor among social scientists, 
historians, and anthropologists who have offered a wealth of theories to account for what 
often seem to be inexplicable acts.   Notwithstanding a handful of theorists and the seemingly 
popular belief that violence is the product of irrational ethnic hatred or simmering bloodlust, 
recent theories of mass violence and the intentional killing of civilians during conflicts 
converge on the notion that such acts are chosen strategically.  As Hannah Arendt (1970) 
asserted and later scholars have provided disturbing evidence, violence — even mass killings 
and terrorism — is rational to the extent that it achieves a desired outcome (e.g., Kalyvas, 
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2004; 2005; Pape, 2005; Valentino, 2004).  If violence is rational, actors are expected to 
choose it over other strategies when it appears more advantageous given the specific context 
at a given time.  The challenge that remains for scholars of violence is to determine the 
factors that preference violence against civilians over other war strategies at a given time.  
The critical component in this process is accounting for the contextual features relevant to 
insurgent or state decision-making in the context of civil war and what role civilians play in 
the processes of civil war.  A complicating, though critical, factor in explaining violence is 
that violence varies, often significantly, over the course of a conflict.  While some conflicts 
are most likely just more brutal, the level of violence in all conflicts rises and falls at various 
time points.  Hence, if scholars are interested in explaining the dynamics of violence during 
wars, it is important to directly engage the causes of changes in violence from one moment of 
a conflict to another.    
Civil wars are complex; rather than single events they are dynamic processes (e.g., 
Balch-Lindsay & Enterline, 2000; Balch-Lindsay, Enterline & Joyce, 2008).  Within this 
dynamic system, insurgents face the difficult tasks of mobilizing popular support, recruiting 
volunteers willing to risk death for the cause (whether profit or politics), acquiring resources, 
launching offensives against government forces, and defending from government reprisal.  
Similarly, states recruit or conscript citizens to fill the ranks of its security force, devise 
policies to deter civilians from collaborating with insurgents, and mobilize resources that can 
be transformed into wartime capabilities.  The most effective strategies for accomplishing 
these tasks often vary over the course of the conflict.  The conflict environment is in a state 
of constant flux: states employ and then adapt counterinsurgency policies, incumbents 
undertake political reforms, foreign states intervene and depart, and resources are depleted 
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and new streams of resources found and exploited.  In order to accomplish their goals in this 
dynamic environment, insurgents (and states) update and revise their war strategies given 
different contexts (Goodwin, 2005; Pape, 2005; Price, 1977) and alter their strategies in 
response to changes in the conflict environment (see Bapat, 2005; Bennett, 2008; Byman, 
2008).  This logic also extends to the use of violence against civilians (Bevan 2007; Hultman, 
2007; Kalyvas, 1999; 2006).  Violence against non-combatants — a more or less constant 
feature of many conflicts — varies depending on the conditions created within the conflict 
environment. 
This chapter begins to explain the causes for the variations in anti-civilian violence 
committed by insurgents over the course of conflicts.  To do so, it outlines the basic 
assumption of the theory discussed in the following chapters and presents a basic model of 
insurgent-state competition in the dynamic conflict environment that helps unpack the 
motivations for resorting to violence against civilians. It likewise identifies the factors that 
contribute to changes in the violence strategies adopted by the insurgents.  In brief, changes 
in the conflict environment lead insurgents to update the strategies they employ to achieve 
their intermediate-term goal of population and territorial control.  Insurgents compete with 
states in a zero-sum game over civilian loyalty and they construct, implement, and update 
strategies that help attain it.  Changes in the dynamic environment — namely shifts in the 
power dynamics — affect the feasibility of employing some strategies and likewise affect the 
willingness of civilians to provide loyalty and support to insurgents.  As the ability of non-
violent strategies to maintain or gain control diminish, insurgents are likely to substitute more 
violent strategies.  Consequently, conflict power dynamics, particularly shifts within the 
relative capabilities of the actors, lead insurgents to employ more or less violent strategies of 
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control.  As the power balance favors insurgents they are expected to reduce their reliance on 
violence; however, when power shifts away from them they are more likely to resort to more 
frequent and more indiscriminate attacks on civilians as a means to deter collaboration with 
the regime and enforce their control over the population. 
This chapter proceeds as follows.  First, I review two broad sets of theories regarding 
insurgent violence in civil wars and argue that theories that root violence in initial condition 
or group "type" are inadequate for explaining violence dynamics.  Rather, explanations of 
changes in violence require more dynamic theories that treat civil wars as processes and 
actors as responsive to changes in their conflict environments.  I then present some 
underlying assumptions regarding the motivations of insurgent groups.  Principally, I argue 
that insurgents (as well as states) desire to control populations and territory during civil wars.  
Civilian loyalty and support, however, are closely related to the ability of actors to achieve 
these objectives.  Moreover, civilian support and loyalty for insurgents have implications for 
the willingness of the group to employ violence against it.  This is the subject of the third 
section.  The final section provides a brief introduction to the model of insurgent-state 
competition, which is elaborated more fully in later chapters.   
 
"Type" versus Strategic Response 
What factors explain the manner in which insurgents conduct war, particularly with respect 
to their treatment of civilians?  On the one hand, some theorists have argued that some 
conflicts are simply more brutal and some insurgent groups more predisposed to violence 
towards non-combatants.  Such arguments typically organize insurgent groups into "types" 
based on the nature of the conflict, the structure of the group, or their stated goals.  Thus, 
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terrorism or brutality is symptomatic of the type of insurgent that emerges in the conflict and 
not strategically chosen by the group at some points and eschewed at others.  A set of 
alternative theories suggests that civilian victimization results not from any latent or inherent 
quality of the insurgency but instead represent a strategic logic.  Insurgents, regardless of 
their organizational structures, cultural values, or political aspirations, modify their strategies 
(including treatment of civilians) in line with changes in the conflict environment.  Shultz 
(1978: 84-85), in analyzing the rationale of National Liberation Front (NLF) violence in 
South Vietnam, asserts that the degree and extent of terror and coercive repression depended 
heavily on the nature of the political environment.  Consequently, depending on multiple 
contextual factors insurgents may at times conduct terrorist-style campaigns that result in 
significant numbers of civilian deaths while at other times adopt more conventional combat 
strategies that intentionally kill few civilians.  Not surprisingly, these two approaches 
produce quite different theories of the motivations for insurgent war-making and different 
predictions regarding when insurgents are likely to use violence against civilians. 
 
Typecasting  
Journalistic accounts of insurgent movements frequent classify insurgent groups according to 
basic typologies, breaking them into distinct categories such as "warlords," "revolutionaries," 
"secessionists," or "extremists."  These "types" are often intended to convey information 
about not only the aspirations of the group but also the behaviors it adopts.  The assumption 
they make is that the nature of the group defines the war tactics and the strategies that the 
group pursues are inextricably linked to the nature of the group and to its overall goals.   
According to this logic, warlords in Liberia and Afghanistan and groups like Revolutionary 
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Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) that engage 
in drug or diamond trafficking are likely to use more violence because they are motivated by 
profit rather than ideology (e.g., Kaldor, 1997).  Alternatively, ethnic militants like the Serb 
paramilitaries in Bosnia are likely to engage in violence and terror against civilians from rival 
ethnic groups because of long simmering hatreds and ancient enmities (Huntington, 1996; 
Kaplan, 1993; Kaufmann, 1998).  In a similar manner, religious extremists like Jemaah 
Islamiyah rely on indiscriminate terror because they believe that their traditional structures 
are threatened by the rise or existence of antithetical belief systems or cultures (e.g., 
Jurgensmeyer, 2000).  By contrast, freedom fighters, "true believers," and other classical 
political revolutionaries like the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El 
Salvador or the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) in Ethiopia refrain from using 
violence that intentionally or unintentionally harms peasants (even though they may target 
members of the political elite, landed gentry, or other class enemies for violence) because 
they view themselves as champions of the people. 
More recent analyses have focused less on ideology as the motivation for either 
restraint or violence toward civilians and have instead sought to explain insurgent behaviors 
by categorizing groups based on their methods of organization and resource acquisition 
(Beardsley & McQuinn, 2009; Weinstein, 2005; 2007).  Weinstein (2007), for example, 
asserts that many (if not most) insurgent organizations portray themselves as on the side of 
the people and articulate some political ideology that included arguments about the 
insurgency's goal of bettering the lives of citizens.  Ideology is therefore not likely to predict 
a group's war strategies or its treatment of civilians because the group's true commitment to 
"the people" would only be observed ex post.  Yet, while downplaying the role of ideology in 
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informing the strategies of armed groups, these analyses assert that group type still plays a 
fundamental role in determining the behaviors of groups.  Such theories do not necessarily 
assume that the type of the group is given or is ascribed from the outset of the conflict, yet 
they often treat the group's type as static — at least once the operating procedures and 
institutional arrangements of the group have become established.  Hence, while various 
initial conditions may contribute to a group's type, that type becomes more or less fixed once 
basic organizational structures are conceived and implemented.   
In this view, insurgent behavior is more the result of the organizational structures 
adopted by the insurgent leadership early in the conflict than reactions to the dynamics of the 
conflict or changes in the strategic environment (Weinstein, 2007:21).  Weinstein (2007), for 
instance, argues that insurgents with access to lootable resources or foreign patronage are 
more likely to use violence against civilians because they are more likely to recruit profit-
oriented and more brutal war entrepreneurs than supporters vested in the cause.  In a similar 
manner, Hovil and Werker (2005) assert that anti-civilian violence is often rooted in the 
relationships between insurgents and foreign financiers.  Specifically, the contracting 
relationship and insurgent dependence on foreign support encourage them to use violence as 
a means to signal their loyalty to their patrons. 
While such theories reflect a strategic logic, they fail to account for any meaningful 
temporal variation in the strategies of violence used by insurgents.  According to such 
theories, changes in insurgent strategy are likely only brought about major exogenous shocks 
and are not generally responses to more routine shifts in the strategic environment.  
Beardsley and McQuinn (2009), for instance, argue that the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami led 
Free Aceh Movement (GAM) rebels to restart negotiations with the Indonesian government 
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while it led the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to escalate violence in Sri Lanka, 
including terror against civilians.  According to their argument, the effect of the natural 
disaster on the strategic calculus of the group was largely determined by the group's type.  
Because the GAM was, based on their typology, a predatory "community champion" 
organization whose method of resource extraction focused on the local community, they 
were responsive to their constituency.  The group therefore used the arrival of foreign 
disaster aid as a public good and the media exposure surrounding the event as an opportunity 
to achieve a more favorable settlement from the government and to provide resources to their 
constituents.  By contrast, the Tamil Tigers were "war entrepreneurs" whose primary 
resource base was a large Tamil Diaspora.  Because the LTTE were less reliant on the local 
community, the arrival of foreign assistance represented a potential threat to the insurgents 
who sought to co-opt and control aid flows.  Moreover, because of their limited reliance on 
the local population, the tsunami and ensuing aid provisions did not create an incentive to 
negotiate or alter strategies but instead led to a renewal of the conflict and an escalation of 
terror.  Between the renewal of the conflict and the collapse of the insurgency the group was 
responsible for the intentional deaths of more than 400 civilians (see UCDP, 2009).   
While these arguments do not deny that groups alter strategies during a conflict, they 
make the strong (and I argue incorrect) assumption that the type of group that emerges early 
in the conflict defines the strategy sets available to the group.  With respect to violence 
against civilians, these types of arguments largely ignore variations in behavior over time or 
simply assume that such variation is unrelated to the specific choices made by the insurgent 
group.  Yet this argument seems odd given the often-significant variation in the levels of 
violence employed by groups from one time point to the next.  Violence is not a binary 
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outcome; rather, the frequency of its use and its targets vary significantly over time.  
Accounting for this change requires a more dynamic explanation and attention to the 
theoretical relationship between insurgents and changes in the conflict environment. 
  
Conflict Dynamics 
A second, more dynamic set of literature acknowledges that civil wars take place in 
constantly evolving environments and that conflict actors respond to changes in their 
strategic environments by updating their war strategies.  The strategies adopted by dissident 
and armed groups change from one time period to the next based on changes in the strategies 
imposed by adversaries or other shifts in the strategic environment (McAdam, 1983; Moore, 
1998; 2000; White, 1989; Ron, 2001; Tarrow, 1998).  For example, Hizballah (the Party of 
God) and the LTTE began as small bands of terrorists but over time took on the trappings of 
guerrilla armies (Byman, 2008: 166).  The Chechen resistance to Russia underwent 
significant changes over its lifespan as well, moving from one coherent organization in its 
early stages to three loosely affiliated factions in its later stages (Findley, 2008: 23).  This 
observation is consistent with the evolutionary theories of guerrilla warfare put forth by Che 
Guevara (1969) and Mao Zedong (1961).  According to these theorists, insurgencies move 
through distinct stages from hit-and-run tactics launched from remote areas to the 
construction and expansion of base areas to more conventional styles of warfare.  Indeed, 
General Vo Nguyen Giap's Vietminh insurgency against the French in Indochina followed 
this model of insurgency very closely.  The later NLF insurgency against the GVN and its 
US allies in the 1960s and 1970s initially followed the same model.  However, the dramatic 
changes in the conflict arena wrought by the influence of North Vietnam and its allies as well 
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as the massive US intervention beginning in 1965-1966 led the leaders of the insurgency to 
revise their strategies rather than follow the patterns established by earlier Asian Communist 
insurgencies (Pike, 1969: 121-126).  While the NLF fought a traditional guerrilla insurgency 
in the early and mid-1960s, by the end of the decade, with the growth of NVA forces, they 
had moved toward more conventional combat strategies.  By the 1970s, however, they had 
again returned to more traditional guerrilla warfare strategies (Clodfelter, 1995: 153-154). 
 A dynamic model of insurgent behavior incorporates various factors of the dynamic 
conflict environment in which insurgents exist and fight.  Capturing the dynamic nature of 
the conflict and evolution of insurgent decision-making necessitates the inclusion of other 
strategic actors, principally government forces, intervening foreign powers, and civilians.  
The decisions made by these actors affect the conflict environment and help to shape the 
strategies adopted by rebels.  As such, these strategies are largely interdependent.  Moore 
(1998) argues that dissident groups alter their strategies depending on the types of repression 
employed by the government. When incumbents apply violence against peaceful dissent, 
groups substitute violent strategies; when regimes respond violently to violent group 
behaviors, these groups are more likely to substitute violent tactics with more peaceful 
behaviors.  The Irish Republican Army (IRA) escalated terror tactics and guerrilla war 
shortly following the brutal British suppression of peaceful dissent (White, 1989).  Past 
studies have shown that insurgents reciprocate state violence by escalating their own levels 
of violence (Bohara, Mitchell & Nepal, 2006; Heger & Salehyan, 2007; Holmes, de Piñeres 
& Curtin, 2007).  Furthermore, other less violent changes in regime strategies (both political 
and military) can also prompt insurgents to adopt new strategies in order to achieve their 
goals.  Sendero Luminoso, for example, launched its insurgency immediately following the 
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political liberalization of Peru in 1980; moreover, it escalated violence against its leftist 
competitors and other civilians during the same period (mid-1980s) in which the military was 
beginning to adopt more selective counterinsurgency tactics (Ron, 2001).  
Strategic interactions with the civilian population likewise structure insurgent 
behavior.  For instance, a high level of latent support from the population should ease 
recruitment for the insurgents and reduce the need to apply coercive violence against 
civilians while resistance from the population may increase the reliance on violence (see 
Chapter 4).  Similarly, high levels of passive support from civilians should also facilitate the 
conduct of guerrilla war against the government since insurgents will likely find a ready 
support base and easy cover from a sympathetic population.  Indeed, the behaviors of the 
civilian population toward the insurgents may even structure the organization of the 
insurgency.  As organizational theories suggest, the extent to which insurgents are reliant on 
the population largely determines the strategies the group adopts (Beardsley & McQuinn, 
2009; Weinstein, 2007).  However, the level of reliance, and therefore the structures adopted, 
are also largely the result of the level of sympathy and support that civilians give to the group 
during its formative stages.  For example, it is likely that insurgents turn to looting and rely 
on mercenaries because other strategies failed to mobilize popular support (Bevan, 2007; 
Regan & Norton, 2005).  Consequently, there is likely to be significant endogeneity between 
the behaviors of insurgents and the strategies adopted by civilians.   
Moreover, insurgent treatment of civilians is likely to vary over the course of the 
conflict.  At some points insurgents may find it useful to incorporate civilians into their 
movement, to protect them from government violence, or to implement policies that benefit 
civilians (e.g., land tenure, social welfare, etc.).  At other times, however, they may ignore 
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civilians or attempt to expel them from conflict areas.  Under some conditions insurgents 
may actively target civilians for violence as a means to punish perceived disloyalty, create 
instability, or send a strong signal to other segments of the population.  A cursory review of 
most conflicts suggests that insurgents vary their relationships with civilians over the course 
of the war. For instance, in Uganda Museveni’s National Resistance Army (NRA) altered its 
relations with civilians repeatedly during its 5-year conflict with the Obote regime (Kasfir, 
2005).  During the early days of the conflict the resource-deprived group engaged primarily 
in hit-and-run guerrilla activities.  In order to signal its intentions to the regime and to 
peasants it targeted local political leaders and used violence against civilians suspected of 
collaborating with the government (see for example Bevan, 2007; Kasfir, 2005).4  As its 
capacity grew relative to the regime the NRA actively encouraged civilian participation by 
establishing governmental institutions and rudimentary services in “safe zones” liberated 
from government control.  However, the escalation of the conflict and collapse of its safe 
zones led the rebels to largely abandon civilians and expel them from the conflict zone in 
order to divert resources to combat.  During the last phase of the conflict the insurgents’ 
military capabilities grew and they were able to re-establish a large safe zone and resume 
their commitment to civilian participation (Kasfir, 2005). 
As this example suggests, changes in behavior are at least partly related to the 
dynamic processes that go on within the conflict environment.  Factors such as the 
intervention of foreign forces, technological evolution by one side, changes in leadership, or 
other factors lead to changes in the dynamics of the conflict, the probability of victory, and 
                                                
4  The extent of NRA violence against civilians is contested.  Former NRA members insist that the rebels 
avoided violence while former Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) politicians and supporters contend that the 
NRA engaged in massacres of UPC activists, politicians, and other collaborators (see Kasfir 2005, especially fn. 
18). 
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facilitating or impeding insurgent ability to hold territory and compel loyalty from the 
civilian population.  Figure 2.1 gives an indication of the dynamic nature of conflict 
environments and the sometimes-significant shifts that occur therein.  The figure illustrates 
changes in the NLF's control over the population as well as changes in the number of 
Communist troops and political cadres that defected to the government per year.  As the 
figure demonstrates, control and allegiance fluctuated notably over the course of the conflict.  
As the conflict progressed and US involvement increased (particularly after 1966), the NLF's 
control of the population consistently slipped.5   During the late 1960s Communist casualties 
mounted as the previously weakening and ineffectual Government of Vietnam troops were 
supplemented by increasingly large numbers of better-trained and -equipped US forces.  The 
rate of Communist defections generally increased through the end of the decade, particularly 
in 1969 as a result of increased US military success (Thayer, 1985: 198).  However, the rate 
of defections began to decline as US troops began to withdraw in large numbers in the early 
1970s.  Such changes should correspond to changes in the strategies employed by insurgents, 
both with respect to combat engagements and their relations with civilians. 
During insurgencies rebels attempt to mobilize civilian support through political 
campaigning and other types of propaganda works; they likewise undertake acts of violence 
that are intended to punish civilians for disloyalty as well as to terrorize the target population 
into supporting them (or at least into withholding support from the government).   Insurgent 
groups typically mix both tactics during a conflict, but, as seen in Figure 2.2, the balance of 
these tactics often shifts from year to year.  The NLF acted with comparative restraint toward 
the population earlier in the conflict, using propaganda activities such as the distribution of 
                                                
5  There is some notable criticism of the reliability of data produced by US forces with respect to control and 
casualties during the war.  See Shultz (1985) for a discussion of the data connected to the Hamlet Evaluation 
System (HES). 
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party literature, political meeting and rallies, and other demonstrations as a means to recruit 
support in villages.  However, as the war dragged on and public sympathy fell, the Front 
increasingly substituted coercive violence and terrorism against the population for political 
activities.  Indeed, the rate of civilian killings escalated dramatically in the mid- and late-
1960s, particularly following the US intervention and major deployment of US troops in 
1966-1967.6  Moreover, during this period the use of propaganda activities plummeted.   
 
Figure 2.1: NLF Defections & Unsecured Population, 1964-1972 
 
 
Bars represent annual estimates of defections from Communist insurgents to GVN (includes both political and 
military defections).  The line represents annual estimates of the number of persons in either Communist-
controlled or contested hamlets (as identified by the Strategic Hamlet Program and Hamlet Evaluation System 
coding rules). Data are taken from Thayer (1985). 
 
                                                
6  Earlier data from different source suggests that levels of violence were much lower for the period 1961-1964.  
According to Pike's (1967) tabulations, NLF killing increased from approximately 1300 in 1961 to over 2000 in 
1963 before declining to approximately 1000 in 1964.  If these figures are accurate they suggest an even steeper 
escalation of violence during the later period and show a more radical shift in the strategies employed by the 
Front. 
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Figure 2.2: Annual NLF Civilian Killings & Propaganda Activities  
 
 
Bars represent the annual number of civilians intentionally killed by NLF insurgents.  The line represents the 
number of propaganda activities conducted by the Party.  Killings include civilian administrators, petty 
officials, and other civilians.  Propaganda activities pertain to meetings, political activities conducted in 
villages, parades, etc.  Propaganda data are taken from Thayer (1985). Annual killing data are median values 
taken from multiple sources: Fall (1966), Hillsman (1967), Pike (1967), Thayer (1985). 
 
While these graphs provide only a superficial accounting of variations in insurgent 
strategies over the course of the war, the information suggests that complex changes in the 
conflict environment are likely to relate to changes in insurgent behavior toward civilians.  
But why do changes in various factors within this environment contribute to changes in 
civilian-insurgent relations?  In order to explain this relationship it is necessary first to 
unpack insurgent objectives, which often directly involve interaction with or manipulation of 
the civilian population.  Civilian-insurgent relationships figure prominently in civil wars; 
moreover, they vary in some predictable ways.  In short, control of the population and the 
acquisition and maintenance of civilian loyalty is a central goal of insurgents (Scott et al., 
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1970: 74).  Thus, to the extent that changes in the environment either facilitate or impede 
insurgent control and civilian loyalty, they are likely to affect the levels of violence the 
insurgents choose to employ.  In the following section I discuss control and loyalty as 
insurgent war objectives as well as the methods insurgents employ to compel loyalty and 
enforce control.  
 
Objectives in War 
While secession or revolution maybe the ultimate goals of most insurgencies, imbedded 
within civil wars are series of immediate and intermediate objectives.  Insurgents seek to 
overcome state forces and realize their long-term goals, but doing so typically requires the 
accumulation of smaller victories such as the expulsion of government troops and civilian 
loyalists from specific areas and the establishment and maintenance of control over both the 
physical territory as well as the population residing within it.  In the traditional model of 
insurgency, victory is eventually attained through the establishment, maintenance, and 
expansion of zones of control (Guevara, 1969; Zedong, 1961).  These often begin as base 
areas in remote swamps, jungles, or mountains from which insurgents launch clandestine 
"terror" attacks or stage guerrilla campaigns, but over time the expectation is that insurgents 
will attempt to extend their control over significant portion of territory and command the 
nominal allegiance (or at least the acquiescence) of substantial swaths of the population.  In 
Vietnam, for instance, the "liberated areas" in which the Viet Cong enjoyed almost exclusive 
control were a major source of recruitment for the insurgents, both for their military and 
civil-political apparatus (Pike, 1969: 113-114).  In this sense, civil wars and insurgencies are 
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in reality as much about the building of control and loyalty as the military defeat of 
government forces (see Kalyvas, 2006).   
Control in civil wars is often premised on the presence of a largely sympathetic or at 
least neutral population (Hunt, 1981: 31).  To that end, theorists of revolution and insurgency 
have often argued that insurgents succeed by establishing parallel ideological and political 
structures and attempting to destroy existing ones.  The goal of these institutions is to 
increasingly separate peasants from extant social and political systems — insurgents win by 
creating and then exploiting the alienation of the population from the regime (Shultz, 1978: 
74-75; 1981: 53).  Often, they accomplish this goal by succeeding in out-administering the 
regime, or providing (or creating the illusion of) superior alternatives.  The NLF, for 
instance, sought to enmesh the population in an overlapping network of social movements, 
organizations, and administration that would develop support for the revolution and keep 
dissenters in line (Pike, 1970: 6-7).   Violence is employed at times exert a similar effect, 
alienating the population, and separating it physically and psychologically from the state.  
Terror can be used quite effectively to detach and isolate peasants from the structures of 
government, thereby opening an avenue through which insurgents can begin to build control 
(Pike, 1970: 8, 28; Thayer, 1985: 49).  Thus, insurgents employ both constructive and 
destructive strategies to undermine regime authority and build up their own support and 
control over the population. 
Scholars often connect the viability of an insurgency to the depth of civilian support 
(Leites & Wolfe, 1970; Mason, 1989: 467; 1996; Scott et al., 1970: 95-97; Valentino, Huth & 
Balch-Lindsay, 2004).  Bernard Fall (1964: 371), following his experiences in Vietnam 
during both the insurgencies against the French and South Vietnamese governments, 
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postulated "no revolutionary war can be won without a measure of popular support."  
Surprisingly, however, there has been relatively little systematic empirical investigation of 
the conditions that shape civilian-insurgent relations, how this relationship varies over time 
or how this variation affects violence.  As Kalyvas notes (2004: 121-122), while it is 
reasonable to assume that insurgents care about civilians because they rely on civilian 
collaborators, the strength of the ties between rebels and civilians may be overestimated.  Not 
all insurgents necessarily depend on positive relations with civilians as a means of acquiring 
resources.  Warlords, for instance, often show little interest in establishing positive 
relationships with civilians while liberation movements explicitly attempt to integrate them 
(Kasfir, 2005: 272).  Yet, revolutions are ultimately fought over and often decided by the 
support of non-elites (Mason, 1989: 467). Thus, the strategic goal of insurgency is the control 
of and influence over the population (Thompson, 1966: 29).  
Control over the civilian population is a central goal of both insurgents and states 
because the distribution of civilian loyalty potentially shapes war outcomes (Hultman, 2007: 
207; Scott et al., 1970: 95-97; also Kalyvas, 2004; 2006). The importance of civilian loyalty 
is three-fold.  First, to at least some non-trivial degree, the distribution of civilian loyalty 
shapes war outcomes: the greater the degree of control over a greater amount of both territory 
and population the more likely it is for a side to emerge from the conflict victorious.  Second, 
and related, insurgents rely on civilians to provide resources, recruits, and cover from 
typically more powerful government forces.  And third, the maintenance of control (and 
therefore resource extraction and policing) is facilitated by the support of the civilian 
population.  That is, when civilians actively support the insurgents they are more easily able 
to acquire necessary resources and to identify and punish potential and actual collaborators. 
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Much of the literature assumes that civilians are either largely indifferent to or, just as 
often, nominally supportive of the insurgents' efforts.  Indeed, classical theories of 
insurgencies suggest that rebellion is born of underlying dissatisfaction with and resentment 
for the incumbent regime based on oppression, inequality, and deprivation (e.g., Davies, 
1962; Gurr, 1970; Midlarsky, 1988).  In such cases, it follows that the population would be 
largely sympathetic to the insurgents as they represent a possible avenue for the redress of 
grievances.  Similarly, insurgent "bandits" have traditionally been idolized in developing 
societies. Peasant bandits have been seen as champions, avengers, and defenders of the lower 
classes who fight for justice and liberation of the common peasant from an oppressive or 
disconnected ruling class (Desai & Eckstein, 1990: 451-453; Hobsbawm, 1969).  Moreover, 
"banditry" often forms something of precursor to the later development of rival orders and 
systems of government as "stationary bandits" adopt the trappings of states and seek to 
extract loyalty and resources from the local population (Mampilly, 2007).   
In these models, the rebel movement acts to at least some degree as the proponent and 
protector of peasants.  In their writings on insurgent strategy Mao (1961) and Guevara (1969) 
even advise revolutionaries to maintain positive relationships with civilians.  As such, there 
exists a symbiotic relationship between insurgents and local populations, the former 
receiving resources, intelligence, and camouflage from the latter while providing them with 
some credible promise of future payoffs.  Overtime, this relationship may evolve and 
strengthen.  As insurgents gain ground relative to the government, they in turn are better able 
to provide benefits to the community such as internal security, protection from government 
violence, social welfare structures, and parallel political and judicial systems.  In this sense, 
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classical insurgents reinvest in the community with the expectation that doing so improves 
their ability to extract loyalty over time.   
However, the greed-based model of insurgency posits that rebels essentially function 
as war entrepreneurs and warlords who give little consideration to the general plight of 
peasants (see Collier, 2000; Collier & Hoeffler, 1998; Kaldor, 1999).  The logic that flows 
from this model of insurgency therefore predicts that loot-seeking rebels are more likely to 
use violence against civilians because they are less likely to rely on civilians for resource 
extraction (see Weinstein, 2007).  Rather, they attract violent, mercenary entrepreneurs who 
are likely to behave badly toward civilians.  This argument, though, ignores the likely order 
of events that lead rebels to turn to looting rather than community organization as means to 
sustain the rebellion. Rather, it is likely that rebellions turn to looting and the recruitment of 
mercenaries when peasants fail to respond to their appeals for support or offer some 
resistance to their rebellion (Regan & Norton, 2005).  As a result, the distinction between 
greed- and grievance-based insurgencies is hardly clear-cut, and modern civil wars rarely (if 
ever) fit the dichotomy (Sanin, 2004: 258).  Yet even if some rebellions are primarily focused 
on loot-seeking rather than political reform or the redress of grievances, this does not exclude 
them from the necessity of attracting civilian loyalty or controlling territory and populations.  
Even insurgents who seek to exploit natural resources must recruit troops to wage war, gather 
information about the activities of government forces, control territory (from which to extract 
resources), and mobilize peasants (to extract resources).  As a result, their demand for loyalty 
and their desire for control are likely to parallel that found in more "traditional" grievance-
based wars.  
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Given this relationship, while insurgents may at times eschew civilian involvement, 
rational rebels should desire and seek some level of support from the local population if they 
are to achieve their goals.7  This proposition suggests the potential for civilians to determine 
(in some nominal way) certain aspects of their relationship with rebels (Kalyvas, 2004; 
Zahar, 2001: 117; Schafer, 2001: 231).  The previous literature on insurgent mobilization and 
civilian support suggests that something of a bargaining relationship exists between 
insurgents and non-combatants (Mason, 1996; Tullock, 1971).  Civilians place pressures on 
rebels to provide them certain benefits in exchange for remaining nominally loyal (Mampilly, 
2007: 21).  Thus, insurgents offer some basket of public goods and selective benefits as well 
as the threat of sanction in exchange for extracting a certain level of loyalty of support (taxes) 
from the population.  The level of "loyalty" that insurgents can extract from the population is, 
in the simplest terms, based on the civilian population's expected level of benefits plus their 
belief in the probability of being targeted by insurgent sanctions (Mason, 1996).  As such, the 
extraction (or provision) of loyalty is fundamentally related to two features of the conflict: 
the ability of insurgents (and the state) to provide goods to potential supporters and the level 
of credible violence they can impose on that population.   
In a more complex manner this observation suggests that insurgents must in some 
way compete for the loyalty of the civilian population.  Because governments seek to deter 
civilian support for the insurgency, they also offer a set of incentives and threatened 
punishments for disloyalty.  This creates a competitive environment in which incumbent 
regimes and insurgents both attempt to capture the nominal loyalty of the civilian population.  
                                                
7  The level of civilian support necessary to achieve insurgent goals is related to the goal itself.  Successful 
secessionist conflicts would arguably require comparatively less civilian support than would insurgencies aimed 
at toppling the regime.  Buhaug (2006) offers a largely state-centered theory of the relationship between relative 
capability and insurgent objectives during civil war. 
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Yet the willingness of civilians to support one side or the other (or either) varies over the 
course of the conflict.  Civilians are notoriously fickle (Kalyvas, 2006: 101-102).  They 
respond to changes in the relative resource flows provided by either side, to the threat of 
death or injury, to the likelihood of one side's victory over the other, to the incentives 
provided at refugee camps or other designated "safe areas," to the level of control exerted by 
belligerents in the specific geographic area, and they adjust their strategies accordingly.  
These factors are not static over the course of the conflict and, as a result, both the level of 
civilian support as well as the strategies employed by states and insurgents to compel loyalty 
are likely to vary during the course of the war.  The following sections address the 
relationship between the provision of benefits or the imposition of sanctions and civilian 
loyalty.  I then return to the competitive model in the last section. 
 
Loyalty, Control, and Violence 
Before addressing the strategies of support employed by insurgents it is useful to begin to 
unpack the relationship between civilian loyalty and insurgent violence.  There exists a basic 
tension between civilian loyalty and insurgent violence — insurgents are unlikely to act 
violently toward communities that support them and more likely to use violence where and 
when they find little support.  Regardless of the insurgency's motivations, rebels seek some 
nominal form of loyalty from the civilian population — at the least their acquiesce but 
preferably their outright support.  Yet the population is not always supportive of the 
insurgents' goals and, even where broad sympathy from the population exists, civilians may 
be reluctant to provide loyalty and support to the insurgents for fear of punitive response 
from the government (e.g., Mason, 1989; 1996).  
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The level of support or resistance on the part of civilians has important implications 
for the strategies adopted by the insurgents, particularly with respect to violence.  In simple 
terms, there is an intuitive relationship between support and violence: insurgents are less 
likely to act violently toward a population that willingly provides support.  The reasons for 
this are two-fold.  First, the level of latent support in the community and the ex ante 
willingness of civilians to offer loyalty means that insurgents need to offer comparatively 
fewer benefits to civilians.  By contrast, when civilians are either resistant or indifferent 
insurgents must compel loyalty by providing higher levels of benefits or more severe 
sanctions.  Second, loyalty influences control, and control is significant in predicting levels 
of violence (Kalyvas, 2006).  While the relationship between control and loyalty is complex, 
it is reasonable to suggest that higher levels of loyalty from the population facilitate control 
by the insurgents.  Consequently, loyalty, control and violence interact in important ways.    
 
Loyalty  
An interdependent relationship exists between civilian behaviors and the strategies of 
violence adopted by insurgents.  Principally, insurgents desire the support or acquiescence of 
the civilian population, at least to the extent that they collaborate with insurgent forces rather 
than defecting to the government.  The extent of civilian loyalty and the ease with which 
insurgents can compel support has implications for insurgent strategies of violence against 
civilians.  Strong community ties or close networks between potential supporters and 
insurgents facilitate loyalty and increase civilians' willingness to support the insurgents 
(Denton, 1968: x; Humphrey & Weinstein, 2008; Wood, 2003).  Moreover, when insurgents 
can rely on these existing structures and latent loyalties to draw support, they are less likely 
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to resort to violence against the population compared to insurgent groups that must use 
pecuniary benefits or coercion to attract support (Weinstein, 2007; see also Humphreys & 
Weinstein, 2006).  The intuition here is that when insurgents enjoy the loyalty of the 
population they are relatively unlikely to direct violence against it because doing so would 
simply be counterproductive, accomplishing little but driving away their support base. 
However, when civilians resist insurgents, perhaps by challenging the rebels directly, 
joining self-defense groups, or otherwise offer support to the government, insurgents are 
more likely to use violence liberally as a means to deter cooperation with the regime's forces.  
For instance, many urban-based, African insurgencies turned to violence against the civilian 
population when rural peasants failed to support the rebellion (Mkandawire, 2002).   The 
LRA's failure to mobilize popular support among the Acholi contributed to its leader's 
(Josephy Kony) use of collective punishment against the population (Bevan, 2007; Branch, 
2005).  Faced with dwindling recruits and declining popular support to carry on the 
insurgency and a population unwilling to support the continuation of the conflict, Kony's 
LRA turned violence back upon the community from which it had expected support (Bevan, 
2007: 348-349).  Thus, the "LRA's anger at its perceived betrayal" contributed to its wanton 
violence (Gersony, 1997).  Similarly, Anderson (2004: 164) reports that in Afghanistan, 
when a segment of the population opposed the Mujahadeen the guerrillas used coercion and 
terrorism against them. 
 Often, overt support for the government is not a precondition for insurgent violence.  
Targets may be "selected" based on actions that insurgents perceive as tacitly supporting the 
status quo or as "disloyal" to the insurgency.  Other key examples are insurgent attacks on 
government-run (or at least non-insurgent-run) public services such as medical and 
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educational facilities.   During the conflict in South Vietnam the NLF occasionally targeted 
students who attended GVN schools.  Pike (1970: 21) recounts an instance in which the Viet 
Cong stopped a government school bus, removed a young girl, and cut off her fingers.  The 
message was quite clear: if parents send their children to government schools they may 
become targets of violence.  In Afghanistan and Pakistan the Taliban and allied militias have 
increasingly killed and maimed pupils and teachers in acid attacks, bombings, assassinations, 
and public beatings (especially against female students) to terrorize the public out of utilizing 
state-run schools (Coughlan, 2010).   The Front likewise deemed peasants who complied 
(often involuntarily) with government relocation into its strategic hamlets as guilty of 
collaboration and targeted them indiscriminately (Hosmer, 1970: 28).  Similarly, during the 
Algerian rebellion against the French, many peasants refused to use government schools or 
clinics for fear of insurgent punishment (cited in Leites and Wolfe, 1970: 128-129).   
 The intuition herein is that there is an inverse relationship between insurgent violence 
and civilian loyalty.   However, the level of loyalty necessary to reduce the risk of being 
targeted by insurgents is often above simply remaining "neutral".   Indeed, past analyses 
suggest that both sides often use violence a means to undermine the option of neutrality in a 
conflict environment (Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007a).  Rather, attaining the level of loyalty 
needed to avoid insurgent violence may entail civilians actively avoiding government 
services, abstaining from the (government controlled) political processes, or, perhaps, 
actively partaking in the insurgents' resistance effort.  Yet, for civilians, the option to voice 
active support is contingent on the ability of the insurgent group to provide alternatives.  At 
the least, it would require that insurgents provide some nominal level of security for active 
supporters and sympathetic civilians.  Consequently, civilian loyalty to insurgents is created 
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by the joint process of punishing civilians for betrayal and providing alternatives to 
government systems and resources.   Importantly, the provision of high levels of the latter is 
likely to preclude or reduce the need for the former. 
 
Control 
Control is a central objective of insurgents, and variations in loyalty and control are linked to 
strategies of violence.  However, loyalty and control are endogenous to the conflict 
environment. Kalyvas (2006: 119-121) argues that loyalty follows control.  That is, all else 
equal, civilians obey whichever side exerts dominance in a given area. This implies that 
control is the better part of support.  However, even if collaboration generally follows both 
temporal and spatial variations of control, the ability of an insurgent group to achieve and 
sustain control over the population should be, in some substantial part, based on the 
willingness of the population to support the armed group.  Conflict environments are 
inherently competitive (Tullock, 1971; Mason, 1989; 1996).   Moreover, recruitment occurs 
not just in areas of control but also in areas apart from the center of insurgent command and 
control (Gates, 2002).  These factors suggest that while loyalty and collaboration are 
facilitated by control, insurgents attempt to both maintain the support of the civilians within 
the areas they already control as well as expand control and support into contested areas.  In 
this case, the level of benefits necessary to accrue new and sustain existing supporters may 
not necessarily be the same (see Gates, 2002).  However, both the expansion and 
maintenance of control and loyalty should be related to the resource streams (as well as 
coercion) insurgents devote to civilians.  Put simply, even if insurgents can exert military 
control over an area, the provision of benefits should enhance the level of loyalty they 
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receive from the population, allowing them to devote military resources to other areas of the 
conflict.  Similarly, while insurgents may be able to force control upon an area, the level of 
latent support within an area could either complicate or facilitate that effort.   
Given this relationship, the power dynamics of a conflict not only determine the 
ability of an insurgent group to exert military control over territory but also influence the 
perceptions and behaviors of civilians with respect to the level of support and loyalty they 
offer to the insurgents.  As such, unpacking strategies of insurgent violence requires the 
explicit incorporation of civilian strategizing — that is, identifying the conditions under 
which civilian loyalty for insurgents is likely to increase.  These strategies are specifically 
linked to the sets of recruitment strategies employed by insurgents (as well as states) in the 
competitive environment in which they operate. 
 
Competing for Loyalty 
A recurrent wisdom within both the academic and policy literature is that insurgents often 
rely (some times extensively) on civilians to survive (Leites and Wolfe, 1970; Mason, 1989: 
467; 1996; Scott et al., 1970: 95-97; Valentino, Huth & Balch-Lindsay, 2004).  Moreover, 
counterinsurgency is often in part formulated with an eye to "hearts and minds," suggesting 
that winning the nominal support of the non-combatant population is somehow fundamental 
to the success or failure of government efforts to thwart revolution.  Without trivializing the 
complexity or gravity of domestic conflict, the theory constructed here assumes civil 
conflicts generally, and revolutions specifically, resemble the competition over market share 
between opposing firms (DeNardo, 1984; Leites & Wolf, 1970; Mason, 1996; Tullock, 
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1971).  Insurgents (and governments) thus have an incentive to entice civilian loyalty and to 
employ sanctions to prevent and punish collaboration with the enemy.   
Insurgents have multiple potential strategies for compelling or enforcing loyalty 
among the population.  The use of one strategy does not necessarily preclude the use of other 
and insurgents frequently mix among various mobilization techniques.  The NLF in Vietnam, 
for example, adeptly combined terrorism, coercive violence, ideology, organization, and 
substantive policies and programs in various combinations throughout their conflict with the 
GVN (Shultz, 1978; see also Pike, 1967).  The mixture of strategies chosen by the group is 
determined by a number of factors, a point I return to in more detail in Chapter 4.  Moreover, 
this balance is subject to revision and change over time as the context of the conflict changes.  
Thus, a strategy set deemed prudent and effective at one time point may be rejected and 
replaced at another point.   
Insurgents may also vary the strategies they employ for enticing support over the 
course of the conflict.  Violence against civilians represents one of the possible strategies and 
its use varies depending on the specific context at a specific time.  Indeed, the process of 
rebellion entails both constructive and destructive components to achieve their goals.  Above 
I argued that violence is likely to be employed when civilians are reluctant to support 
insurgents or when they actively withhold loyalty, attempt to remain neutral or remain loyal 
to the government (actions that are often viewed by insurgents as synonymous).  Hence, 
violence should vary with fluctuations in civilian loyalty and with the ability of insurgents to 
exert control over territory.   
If violence is contingent on the level of civilian loyalty, it is necessary to explain 
when and why civilians chose to become or remain loyal to insurgents as opposed to 
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remaining uninvolved or collaborating with the government.  A partial answer is located in 
ability of insurgents to employ non-violent strategies in an attempt to compel civilian loyalty.  
In the competitive conflict environment, both sides attempt to woo civilians with a mixture of 
benefits and sanctions.  Civilians then support the side that can credibly provide them with 
the largest balance of benefits relative to the likelihood of being punished by the opposing 
side (Mason, 1989; 1996).  Consequently, insurgents are likely to resort to violence when 
they are unable to provide a sufficient level of positive incentives to offset the benefits 
provided by the state as well as the threat of government sanctions.  For the rational peasant 
it simply makes more sense to withhold support from the insurgents when there is a low 
likelihood of insurgent victory or when they are presented with few credible benefits.  In turn 
insurgents may adopt violence, compelling loyalty and cooperation and gunpoint because 
they are simply unable to compete with governments over the support of civilians.  That is, 
lacking other options, they turn violent.  
A second question, then, is why do insurgents fail to provide civilians with a 
competitive offer with which to counter the government?  The answer to this question, and 
therefore an explanation for why insurgents use violence, is that they are often unable to 
compete with governments in terms of positive incentives because of their limited material 
and organizational capabilities.  Put simply, weak insurgents simply cannot muster sufficient 
resources to compel civilian loyalty voluntarily.  As such, the level of violence against 
civilians that insurgents employ is likely to be closely related to the disparity in the degree of 
capability between the insurgent forces and the government.  The larger the capability gap, 
the greater the extent to which insurgents are likely to rely on violence as opposed to positive 
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incentives as a means to enforce civilian loyalty and deter collaboration with government 
forces.   
This observation, however, is not fully satisfactory because it only partly accounts for 
the dynamic nature of the conflict environment.  As such, it is necessary to explicitly account 
for the manner in which changes in the disparity of capabilities between belligerents affect 
changes in the comparative levels of resources the groups can provide and how, in turn, these 
changes in relative resource provision alter civilian decision-making.  As the streams of 
resources provided by both sides fluctuate over the course of the conflict, civilians should 
update their strategies of support and loyalty.  As insurgents are able to provide greater, more 
competitive levels of benefits to civilians, civilians should be increasingly likely to offer their 
nominal support to the insurgency.  In turn, the increase in civilian support should allow 
insurgents to reduce their reliance on violence because they are able to effectively substitute 
non-violent recruitment tools for coercive violence.   
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has detailed some of the core assumption regarding civil war dynamics, 
insurgent motivations and objectives, and civilian behaviors from which the theory follows.  
It begins by demonstrating the limitations of static explanations of civil war violence or those 
that seek to explain insurgent behavior as a produce of initial conditions, pre-existing 
cleavages, or other factors that inform group "types".  While the conditions, structures, or 
relationships that pre-date the conflict or emerge during its early days likely inform the 
strategic options and trajectory of an insurgency, they cannot explain variation in the 
strategies adopted by groups are different points in the conflict.  Some groups are likely 
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predisposed to greater levels of violence, but as the example of the LRA provided in the 
introduction points out, even the most notorious of insurgent organizations vary their use of 
violence over the course of the conflict.  As this example suggests and the model sketched 
above predicts, violence varies as a result of shifts within the strategic environment.  Changes 
in power dynamics and civilians loyalties alter the incentives for insurgents (as well as states) 
to use violence against civilians as a strategy of population control. 
The model presented in this chapter assumes that civil wars are dynamic processes in 
which armed political actors attempt to maximize their level of control over populations and 
territory.  In order to achieve their intermediate-term goal of control, belligerents require a 
nominal level of loyalty from the population.  This is especially true of insurgents who, as 
much of guerilla warfare and revolutionary theory argues, are dependent on civilian for 
resource mobilization and cover from numerically and technologically superior government 
forces.  However, government forces also desire the loyalty of the civilian population, at least 
to the extent that they can prevent them from collaborating with insurgents and can rely on 
them to provide information regarding insurgent activities. 
 Civilian loyalty is closely related to the levels of violence adopted by the actors, 
particularly insurgents.  When popular loyalty is forthcoming there is little incentive for 
armed political actors to target civilians; however, if civilians continue to support the regime 
or resist insurgent requests or demands for resources, the group may use violence to compel 
their loyalty by force or terror to cow civilians into collaboration.  The level of civilian 
loyalty is not typically predetermined in a conflict; nor is it necessarily static over time.  
Consequently, violence and loyalty should fluctuate in relationship to one another over the 
course of a conflict.  All else equal, during periods in which civilians support the rebels, 
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violence should decline; by contrast, it should escalate when civilians resist the insurgents or 
support the regime. 
Civil wars are a competitive environment in which both sides offer both the promise 
of benefits and the threat of violence as a means to elicit the support or nominal loyalty of the 
population.  The mixture of benefits and sanctions is largely determined by the balance of 
power in the conflict such that weaker groups, because they are less able to provide positive 
incentives in exchange for loyalty, are more likely to use violence against the population as a 
means to secure control.  However, the power balance within the conflict is not static and 
shifts in the power dynamics alter the relative ability of the groups to provide benefits to 
supporters.  Consequently, shifts in the power dynamics lead to changes in levels and types 
of violence.  More specifically, declining capabilities reduce flows of resources to civilians 
and reduce their expectations of insurgent victory.  This in turn reduces their willingness to 
support the insurgents.  Facing declining capabilities and declining civilian support, 
insurgents have a greater incentive to substitute violence as a means to either undermine 
government control or to enforce loyalty among the civilian population. 
These dynamics require examining in greater detail the decision-making processes of 
civilians within the context of active conflict as well as an evaluation of the effect of changes 
in conflict power dynamics on the willingness of civilians to remain loyal to one side or the 
other as such dynamics impact the perceived utility for violence on the part of the insurgents.  
To that end, I address them more explicitly in subsequent chapters.  
 
 
 
 CHAPTER 3 
Defection & Loyalty: Non-Combatant Strategies in Civil War 
 
As the last chapter discussed, civilians play a critical role in the process of insurgency.  The 
distribution of their loyalty and support can be critical to the outcome of the conflict; as such, 
insurgents and states both compete to compel their nominal loyalty and prevent them from 
collaborating with the enemy.  Despite their apparent centrality to conflict, the strategic 
interaction between armed actors and civilians has been ignored in models of violence.  This 
omission is especially surprising given the wealth of literature focused on insurgent 
collective action and mobilization (e.g., DeNardo, 1985; Mason, 1989; Popkin, 1979; Wood, 
2003).  Much of the earlier work on collective action focused expressly on the process of 
getting the insurgency started.  These analyses and theories frequently conclude after a core 
group of peasants or political activists manage to overcome the collective action problem and 
take up arms against the regime.  They stop short of explaining how the insurgency sustains 
itself or what strategies it adopts to expand beyond a core group of highly motivated 
individuals.  Civilians provide the fuel by which an insurgency grows, survives, and can 
present a meaningful challenge to the state.  As such, any discussion of civil war dynamics 
should consider the role of civilian actors and how they devise strategies of survival and 
profit during conflict.  
During civil conflict civilians face a number of possible options.  For example, they 
may take up arms with one of the belligerents, provide subtler types of assistance short of 
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armed participation, become refugees or internally displaced persons, or simply do nothing 
and remain neutral.  While civilians are strategic and play an important role in conflicts, few 
studies have specifically addressed the interactions between insurgents and civilians in any 
systematic manner (though see Mampilly, 2007; Wood, 2003).  Rather, most have assumed 
that civilians are simply pliable, neutral entities who follow whichever side exerts control 
(Kalyvas, 2006) or who play no significant role other than as victims (Hultman, 2007; 
Valentino et al, 2004; Weinstein, 2007).  However, as established in the previous section, 
insurgents and states both desire the loyalty of significant portions of the civilian population 
because commanding that loyalty facilitates the control of territory and increases the 
probability of victory.   
This relationship suggests that to some degree civilians do have the capacity to 
negotiate their relationship with insurgents (Schafer, 2001: 231; Zahar, 2000: 117).  Recent 
research has shown that insurgents do at times respond to "pressures from below" in a 
manner not altogether different from states (Mampilly, 2007).   This intuition is key to the 
theory presented herein.  If the assumption that insurgents desire civilian support holds, then 
identifying the factors that predict civilian support and loyalty are central to explaining the 
dynamics of violence in civil wars.  This chapter therefore focuses on the determinants of 
civilian support for the insurgency.  Civilian decision-making is closely connected to civilian 
perception of the relative capabilities of the group because this perception influences their 
expectations regarding both the long-term and immediate benefits for remaining loyal to the 
group.  In brief, civilians are likely to support the side that can credibly offer them security 
and other benefits and whom they believe is most likely to emerge victorious in the conflict.  
Civilians' beliefs regarding resource streams and the probability of victory are largely 
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informed by power dynamics within the conflict.  Consequently, they are likely to support 
insurgents when the power dynamics favor the group and reduce that support when power is 
shifting against them. 
 
Competition & Strategic Choice in Civil War 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the conflict environment is competitive, and both sides 
compete for the nominal loyalty of civilian by offering various goods and services as well as 
the threat of sanctions.  All else equal, civilians are more likely to support whichever side 
offers the more competitive "deal."  While some analyses have asserted that civilian loyalties 
and behaviors are more likely a function of the threat of violence (Leites, 1969; Pike, 1970) 
or simply follow patterns of control (Kalyvas, 2006), the empirical record suggests that the 
balance of benefits provided by the group can motivate public support. Shultz (1978: 80), for 
example, argues that despite assertions by his contemporaries, the success of the NLF in 
mobilizing support was its combination of social-political and economic strategies, not its 
use of terrorism.   Similarly, Race (1972: 184) observed that in Long An province, the high 
incentives offered by the Front led to a large influx of people to the movement in spite of the 
heavy risk it posed.  In this case, the great strength of the Party and its success in acquiring 
and maintaining civilian support was its ability to enmesh civilians in dense, well-organized 
network of control that included social, political, and economic components (Pike, 1969: 
147).  Support was therefore crafted to a large extent by the interactions between insurgents 
and civilians and not simply by the threat of violence, though this threat was constant 
(Berman, 1974: 198). 
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As also discussed in the previous chapter civilian-insurgent relationships vary over 
time.  Civilian preferences with respect to loyalty are not necessarily stable over time.  The 
dynamics of the conflict play a large part in determining the willingness of uncommitted 
civilians to join a revolution (Kuran, 1989; Van Belle, 1996).  Moreover, within the context 
of an active conflict both the depth and direction of civilian commitment to a side can vary 
(at times significantly) over its course (Kalyvas, 2006: 100-101).  As an extension of the 
basic capabilities-support argument mentioned above, I posit here that variations in the 
relative capabilities of insurgents over the course of the conflict contribute to the changes in 
the aggregate level of support and loyalty provided by the population in the conflict zone.  In 
turn, as will be discussed in the subsequent chapter, this change in relative capabilities 
structures the level of violence employed by the insurgents. 
Civilians evaluate the "offers" proposed by insurgents and states and decide on a level 
of "loyalty" they are willing to extend to the insurgents.  Insurgents rely on a variety of 
factors in an attempt to compel loyalty from civilians: ideology, communal ties, loot and 
physical resources, protection, and the promise of a better life after the cessation of the 
conflict.  The specific factors that motivate individuals in conflict environments may be 
idiosyncratic or related to the nuances of the conflict.  However, the extant literature and 
anecdotal evidence provides some general trends in the factors and strategies that succeed in 
mobilizing civilian support. 
 
Material Benefits 
Much of the research on insurgent collective action and insurgent support has focused on 
selective incentives in the form of tangible benefits (e.g., Mason, 1989; Lichbach, 1995).  
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According to this logic, in a competitive conflict environment civilians are more likely to 
support the side that offers them the best set of resources.  Thus, for insurgents, access to loot 
or other forms of combat wages are among the most common selective incentives.  Recent 
literature on the economic motivations of "new wars" suggests that greed and profit may be 
the primary motivations for individuals to rebel against their governments (Collier, 2000; 
Collier & Hoeffler, 1998; Kaldor, 1999).  Weinstein (2007), for examples, argues that loot or 
other types of resources are effective tools for attracting mercenary-minded individuals when 
social and political appeals fail to motivate the population.  Similarly, media reports have 
given much attention to the use of looting in modern insurgencies, especially by African 
warlords such as Charles Taylor in Liberia and Foday Sankoh in Sierra Leone who largely 
paid their armies with goods plundered from civilian populations.  Historically organizers of 
insurrection have often paid participants with cash, food and drink, drugs, or pillaged goods.8   
Warlords in early 20th century China even developed extensive patronage systems for the 
distribution of goods acquired in raids and sieges (Skocpol, 1979: 237). 
Yet, the real motivational properties of cash and loot seem questionable and vary 
depending on group and context.  While few scientific studies of combatant motivations 
exist, those that have been conducted find loot's effectiveness in motivating combatants 
somewhat inconsistent or at least suggest that other motivations are at least equally 
important.  RAND Corporation interviewers conducted hundreds of interviews with prisoners 
and defectors from the Communist insurgency in Vietnam in an attempt to systematically 
evaluate the motivations for participation in the rebellion.  The data suggest a variety of 
motivations for an individual to join the revolution, yet the acquisition of loot or the 
                                                
8  Lichbach (1995, chapter 6) provides a wealth of historical examples. 
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expectation of payment is not among the reasons supplied by former guerrillas (Denton, 
1969: 10-12).  Interestingly, while former insurgents cited a belief in limited economic 
opportunities under the GVN as a reason for joining, the economic situation of the insurgents 
prior to their mobilization did not seem to predict recruitment.  Volunteers were evenly 
distributed across social classes and volunteers clustered around both the lowest and highest 
categories of land ownership.  While this does not explicitly address the economic 
motivations for recruitment it suggests that loot-seeking was not a primary motivator for the 
majority of NLF recruits.   
On the other hand, Humphreys and Weinstein's (2008) survey of ex-combatants in 
Sierra Leone found a marginally significant relationship between an individual's decision to 
(voluntarily) join the RUF and the promise or expectation of diamonds or cash.  In contrast to 
the NLF case, they found that wages were a significant factor in the decision of persons who 
joined the Civil Defense Forces (CDF), a pro-government tribal militia.  Recruitment in the 
Colombian conflict shows a similar trend.  While approximately 20% of demobilized 
National Liberation Army (ELN) and FARC combatants reported that the promise of 
payment or other material benefits was a major factor in their recruitment, 46% of 
collectively demobilized former paramilitaries reported that such rewards motivated their 
decision to join the pro-government groups (Arjona & Kalyvas, 2006: 33).   
While material benefits are sometimes a motivator for individuals to join a rebellion, 
it appears that pro-government groups are better able to attract supporters using such 
benefits.  Arguably, this relationship is driven by the superior financial capabilities of most 
states over insurgent forces.  It could also suggest that other factors are just as likely to 
resonate with individuals considering whom to support in a conflict.  As these and other 
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analyses of predictors of mobilization and support suggest, individual motivations are varied 
and not mutually exclusive, and many supporters may seek to exploit both political as well as 
economic opportunities.  Indeed, the two are not necessarily incompatible. In "liberated 
areas" or other zones of insurgent control rebels may couple political ideology and material 
benefits in a mutually reinforcing manner designed to promote popular support. 
 
Identity & Ideology 
Insurgents may also appeal to the political sympathies of the population or tap into social or 
cultural networks as a means to rally support.  Ideological strategies have been commonly 
employed among Leftist insurgents who have attempted to transform apolitical peasants into 
active supporters of the revolution.  For example, the NLF in Vietnam conducted propaganda 
activities in rural villages, which often included parades, political classes, social events, and 
the distribution of communist literature (Berman, 1974; Leites, 1969; Pike, 1967).  FMLN 
insurgents in El Salvador employed similar tactics with nominal success (Anderson, 1992: 
Ch. 2).  More recently, Maoist insurgents in Nepal skillfully used political propaganda 
campaigns as a low-cost recruitment tactic.  The guerillas staged mass gatherings in which 
they conducted skits that publicized the guerillas' victories over the state and taught songs 
and dances to villagers that narrated war stories and illustrated the courage and sacrifices of 
the insurgents (Eck, 2009a: 16-17).  Such strategies were reportedly quite effective in 
mobilizing for the Maoists among the peasantry.  Similarly, appeals to civilians' identity or 
communal affiliation also work to mobilize support and promote loyalty to the rebellion.  
Eck (2009b) argues that mobilization strategies focused on group identity can be effective in 
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growing and expanding an insurgency and her results suggest that insurgents who mobilize 
along these lines grow more rapidly than insurgents who rely on other types of mobilization. 
 While such efforts may attract some true believers, in general the record suggests that 
ideology and political sympathies are poor predictors of support.  While civilians may hold 
preferences for one side or other, these seldom translate into active support (Leites & Wolfe, 
1970: 8-16; Kalyvas, 2006: 101-102).  Indeed, conflicts create incentives for preference 
falsification — few peasants have ideological or political preferences profound enough to 
become martyrs for the cause.  Rather, ideology appears to only play a notable role in support 
behaviors ex post.  That is, ideological identification and its role in spurring peasants to 
action typically result from wartime socialization and indoctrination (Kalyvas, 2006: 45-46).  
Thus, ideology is frequently endogenous to the conflict as rebels and states both seek to raise 
the consciousness of the populations or educate them about political ideologies that may be 
quite foreign.  Eck's (2009a) discussion of Maoist propaganda efforts is a case in point; 
similarly, the Viet Cong made extensive use of this sort socialization process (see Berman, 
1974: 75; Pike, 1969: 121-132).  The same can often be said for ethnicity as well.  While 
identity is often taken as permanent or ascribed, ethnic defection is fairly common in war and 
the depth of ethnic identification is often directly related to the processes of civil war 
violence (Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007b; Fearon & Laitin, 2000).  The process of ideology 
construction and indoctrination are often closely associated with and improved upon by other 
recruitment strategies conducted by rebels, namely the construction of local institutions and 
the provision of benefits.  
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Institutions & Non-pecuniary Resources 
To the extent they are capable, insurgents often construct parallel political and social 
institutions that compete with or supersede those controlled by the state (Shultz, 1978: 74-
75).  These institutions serve multiple functions in the process of mobilizing civilian support 
and promoting recruitment.  On the one hand, the establishment of quasi-states in liberated 
areas or other rebel-held territories is designed to construct a belief in the legitimacy of the 
movement and to demonstrate that insurgents are not simply bandits but take active interest 
in governance, stability, and the well-being of the population (at least those who support 
them) (Mampilly, 2007: 20; Wickham-Crowley, 1987: 482-483).  Guevara (1969: 81-83) 
asserted that a functioning system of law and the assurance of stability were important 
features of authority in rebel-controlled areas as they helped allow civilians to normalize and 
accommodate themselves to life under insurgent rule.  For example, within their zone of 
control the TPLF implemented land reform, constructed judicial and political systems, and in 
1978 established the Relief Society of Tigray, which coordinated relief programs and 
humanitarian assistance to peasants (Young, 1998).  Such institutions mimicked or improved 
upon state services and provided a level of normalcy to civilians. 
On the other hand, the development of institutions and the implementation of policies 
that alter the economic or political status quo are often important components in the 
insurgents' political agenda.  Popular education programs, land redistribution and reform 
policies, elections, and systems of justice serve both as benefits extended to supporters as 
well as tools to promote and reinforce the political ideology of the insurgents.  For example, 
land reform employed by the NLF in their liberated zones helped both to attract support by 
literally providing land to poor peasants, but it also tangibly demonstrated to them the goals 
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of the Communist political agenda (Davison, 1968: 17, 95, 161; Leites, 1969: 172-173). It 
also used its freedom and power in these areas to establish educational systems that helped 
educate the population about the struggle as well as providing them basic literacy and other 
skills (Pike, 1967: 281-283).  Similarly, the FMLN's rural education cooperatives provided 
the benefit of teaching peasants basic literacy and other skills, but these programs also 
included the use of leftist political literature and exposure to Catholic Liberation Theology 
(Hammond, 1999).  Both of these were intended to help transform the political consciousness 
of the peasants as well as feed their basic desire for education, land, political access, and 
other benefits denied to them by the state against which the insurgents rebelled.   Because 
ideology and political sympathies are not often predetermined but rather endogenous to the 
conflict, as mentioned above, rebels have incentives to socialize peasants to their political 
views by imbedding politics within the resources they offer to peasants. 
Where insurgents have the organizational capacity and material capabilities, the 
establishment of quasi-state institutions and the implementation of policies that collectively 
benefit civilians often prove successful in mobilizing popular support.  The Eritrean People's 
Liberation Front (EPLF), for example, established a judicial system, provided education and 
medical services, and carried out land reform in order to encourage civilian support (Poole, 
2001: 105-130).  The FMLN's ability to organize community government, educational 
programs, and civic cooperatives in their "liberated zones" appeared to garner support from 
peasants (Binford, 1997; Hammond, 1996).  In areas held by the Sudan People's Liberation 
Army/Movement (SPLA/M) in southern Sudan and, particularly among the non-Dinka 
inhabitants within its zones of control, the construction of civil administration and the 
provision of benefits through insurgent institutions helped to construct a feeling among 
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peasants that the "movement was their movement," thereby increasing their loyalty to the 
rebels (Johnson, 2003: 108).  
The provision of these goods and services often influences the level of loyalty 
provided by the population.  For instance, the TPLF had to credibly demonstrate their 
commitment to making positive contributions to the lives of the Afar through the provision of 
these benefits before the skeptical peasantry was willing to engage in the risky business of 
providing sustained support (Young, 1998: 149-151).   Similarly, in Vietnam, the provision 
of alternative institutions and pro-peasant political reforms in areas liberated from the 
government significantly improved relations between the NLF and the peasants.  Race (1972: 
123-128) reports that under areas of NLF control in Long An province, there was a rapid 
shift in land ownership.  As a result, large numbers of peasants rallied behind the NLF in 
areas in which they implemented these policies (Davison, 1968: 94-95).  Moreover, those 
peasants that received land from these programs became the most enthusiastic supporters 
because the saw themselves as "vested" in the NLF's success (96).  The programs and 
institutions constructed by SPLM/A served the purpose of "endearing" the population to the 
group's broader political goals (Mampilly, 2007: 150). 
 
Security 
Beyond the provision of material benefits, civilians appear to respond most effectively to the 
provision of security.  Indeed, the existing evidence suggests that for the average peasant, 
avoiding violence and limiting damage is the foremost concern (Leites & Wolfe, 1970: 127; 
Mason, 1989; Migdal, 1974; see also Goodwin, 2001).  As a result, support for the insurgents 
increases when the group can provide them credible security guarantees and a reduced risk of 
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exposure to government reprisals (Kalyvas, 2006: 114-116).   Without some form of credible 
security degree from the rebels, there is likely insufficient incentive for a civilian to risk 
supporting the insurgents.  The "better deal" offered by the insurgents in the context of civil 
war competition only needs to be a nominally better probability of survival than they could 
expect from remaining neutral.  Thus, the rebels can overturn any increase in support for the 
government prompted by rising state coercion by providing some measure of protection to 
civilians (Mason, 1989: 477).  During the Chinese revolution one of the primary factors 
contributing to the mobilization success of Mao's rebellion was its ability to protect civilians 
from the indiscriminate violence committed by Japanese forces (DeNardo, 1984: 26).    
  Anecdotal reports and survey data largely bear out this relationship.  Humphrey's & 
Weinstein (2008), for example, report that security was a prime motivator for civilians to join 
either the RUF or the CDF during the civil war in Sierra Leone.  In Vietnam, Communist 
forces (particularly the regular forces) acquired respect and support when they could provide 
security for rural hamlets (Gurtov, 1967: 24).  Moreover, changes in security provision 
correlate to changes in the levels of civilian support.  Interviewees in Rand studies in 
Vietnam repeatedly "made it clear" that security and control largely determined peasant 
attitudes and support (Goure, 1965: 18).  Indeed, these surveys suggests that while material 
benefits helped gain the NLF a measure of popularity among peasants, support and 
perceptions of "good and bad" ultimately boiled down to which side could better protect 
them (Leites, 1969: xi) It follows then that support for the Communist forces in many 
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hamlets began to waver in 1965-1966 because the Front was not longer able to provide the 
security it once had (Gurtov, 1967: 24).9 
 
Expected Outcomes 
While short-term benefits and security concerns have a significant impact on civilian 
decision-making, civilians also develop strategies of support or defection based on 
intermediate and longer-term evaluations of likely war outcomes.  Principally, civilian 
support is correlated with civilian expectations about the likelihood of a conflict or the 
probability of insurgent survival.  When civilians gauge a high likelihood of insurgent victory 
or perceive that the group has the ability to survive and effectively challenge government 
control they become more likely to offer the group their loyalty.  Wood (2003: 237-238, 272-
273), for example, shows that peasants were more likely to support the FMLN guerrillas once 
the group was able to demonstrate its capabilities relative to the government.  In a similar 
manner, the NLF insurgents in South Vietnam enjoyed broad public support in the 1960s 
largely because the population viewed their victory as inevitable (Herrington, 1997: 29; 
Leites, 1969: ix-x).  This suggests that mobilizing support and maintaining loyalty is closely 
tied to the ability to demonstrate capabilities to the pool of potential recruits (Gates, 2002: 
123).   
 
 
 
                                                
9 This change is largely based on the increased capabilities of the anti-Communist forces (US and GVN).  It is 
also largely a function of increased US air power, which to some significant degree negated the ability of the 
NLF to provide security to the villages they controlled.  I discuss this in more detail in the next chapter. 
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Control 
As discussed in the previous chapter, civilian loyalty is often closely related to the ability of 
insurgents to exert effective control over territory. Indeed, control is the progenitor of loyalty 
(Kalyvas, 2006: 124-125).  Control is critical in developing civilian support because it both 
informs beliefs about likely outcomes as well as functions as an initial condition for the 
provision of benefits such as material resources and protection.  Control over territory is 
indicative of strength and should be a strong signal that insurgents can provide promised 
benefits to supporters.  Moreover, it is a precursor to the provision of other resources — 
parallel institutions and services often only materialize following the liberation of territory 
from government control.  
Territorial control also allows insurgents to shield supporters from government 
violence and to provide them a nominal level of stability (Mason, 1996: 74; Kalyvas, 2006: 
124).   For example, in the early 1960s the Viet Cong were able to attract an influx of civilian 
supporters to the areas they controlled because they had significantly eliminated the GVN's 
presence and thus improved civilian security (Race, 1973: 116).  Similarly, the Chinese 
Communists were able to increase their level of civilian support because they were often 
better able to control territory and provide security for civilians than the Kuomintang during 
the Japanese occupation (Migdal, 1974: 254).  Territorial control likewise facilitates the 
provision of tangible benefits, which further reduces the barriers to attracting and 
maintaining civilian loyalty.   Consequently, territorial control should further promote 
civilian loyalty. As noted above, when insurgents are capable of providing these goods and 
services and when civilians' beliefs about the likelihood of insurgent success increase, 
civilians are increasingly likely to be more supportive of insurgents. However, negative 
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changes in these conditions are likely to lead to deleterious changes in civilians' willingness 
to remain loyal.  As control collapses, insurgents are less able to provide goods and services 
to civilians, reducing and further weakening their loyalty to the insurgents.  As such, if 
military power shifts against insurgents to the extent that they lose territory, they are likely to 
face the double blow of military defeat and declining civilian loyalty.   
 
Violence 
Insurgents may also rely on coercive violence to elicit support and prevent collaboration with 
the government.  Violence against civilians helps insurgents overcome their collective action 
problem in two ways.  First, it compels cooperation — quite literally — at gunpoint.  Second, 
violence alters civilians' expected returns for loyalty to the government or for remaining 
neutral (Kalyvas, 1999; Kalvas & Kocher, 2007a; Mason, 1996; Restrepo & Spagat 2004).  
In this sense, violence — or, more specifically, the opportunity to escape violence — is used 
as a selective incentive.  Marks (1994: 219-220), for instance, asserts that Sendero Lumino 
used terror against civilians and assassinations of leftist leaders as a recruitment tool and a 
means to expand its infrastructure. Civilians may collaborate with insurgents when 
compelled by violence because there is no practical benefit to resistance and because doing 
so helps them avoid insurgent violence.   
In a related manner, violence directed against civilians underscores the government's 
inability (or unwillingness) to protect vulnerable civilians and may increase civilians' 
perception of the likelihood of insurgent victory (Lichbach, 1995: 58).  In this sense violence 
may — in a perverse manner — create the conditions necessary for insurgents to acquire 
civilian support because it breaks down the expected relationship between the state and the 
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masses.  NLF violence in the early 1960s severed the relationship between the people and the 
government by effectively eliminating the GVN's presence in many rural areas.  The Party 
therefore became the de facto ruler and provider for the people (Race, 1872: 116).  Insurgents 
also benefit from creating a Hobbesian environment from the Weberian state (Millen, 
2006/2007; Vinci, 2006).  The Frente de Libertaçao de Moçambique (FRELIMO), for 
example, initially shelled villages and used other violence against civilians to demonstrate 
that the Portuguese forces could not protect civilians (Henriksen, 1983: 77, 121).  Pike (1970; 
28) states that terror is intended to disorient and increase insecurity, thereby undermining the 
control of the regime.  If civilians perceive that their government either lacks the capacity or 
the will to prevent guerrilla attacks or if they perceive that the insurgents might just pull off 
the rebellion, their expected utility for resistance against the insurgents declines.  In Vietnam, 
while NLF violence did not endear the Front to civilians, it created a deep-seated apathy to 
the Saigon regime (Hunt, 1981: 38).  This apathy is often sufficient for insurgents to expand 
their control and put in place institutions and programs that further drive a wedge between 
the people and the regime. 
 
Capabilities & Strategic Options 
While appeals to political, communal or ideological preference may gain some support for 
the insurgency, such approaches often fail to garner sufficient loyalty for the insurgents.  
Two principal factors undermine this strategy.  First, the average civilian, at least in terms of 
political behavior, is largely apolitical and driven by more immediate survival and security 
concerns (Migdal, 1974).   Even when civilians are sympathetic to the goals of the 
insurgency, popular appeals and promises of political change and social justice often fail to 
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mobilize support because the risk to an individual for supporting a rebellion typically 
outweighs the probability of attaining the goods promised by the rebels (Mason, 1989; 
Tullock, 1971).  Second, even politically motivated civilians are likely to weigh the risks of 
participating versus the credibility of the promise of change.  Weak insurgencies are unlikely 
to convince peasants that they can actually provide the goods that they promise.  As a result, 
few civilians will risk joining an insurgency if they perceive ex ante a low probability of 
insurgent victory.10  Rebels must therefore typically rely on other strategies to encourage 
civilian support. 
The extant literature on the impetus for insurgent recruitment and popular 
mobilization11, as well as anecdotal accounts of civilian decision-making in civil war, 
suggests that in general apolitical civilians are principally concerned with three things: 
tangible benefits, security, and conflict outcomes (see for example Humphrey & Weinstein, 
2008; Lichbach, 1995; Migdal, 1974; Mason, 1996).12   With the notable exception of loot-
oriented rebels, the material and non-pecuniary benefits mentioned above require significant 
outlays of resources on the part of the rebels.  Not only is the provision of state-like 
                                                
10  There are, of course, also the joint issues of civilians' beliefs about the insurgents' will to make good on their 
promises even if they do succeed in ousting the regime. In addition, the basic inexcludability of the public 
goods generated from a successful revolution leads many would-be dissidents to let someone else do the work.  
See Mason (1989; 1996), Lichbach (1995), and Tullock (1971) among others.  
 
11  Herein I focus on voluntarily recruitment rather than coerced mobilization.  Indeed, it is often difficult to 
assess ex post the dynamics of individual decision-making with respect to joining or supporting an insurgency.  
In many cases, individuals have an incentive to reconstruct history in a way that paints their decision as more 
politically or socially justifiable.  For example, many former RUF soldiers claimed they were forcibly 
conscripted or abducted but this may simply be an attempt to distance themselves from the violence committed 
by the group.  Furthermore, insurgents (as well as states) frequently employ a mix of carrots and sticks, making 
it difficult to distinguish those who joined voluntarily from those who joined because they had not other choice 
(Denton, 1968: 6-7; Humphreys & Weinstein, 2008: 448). 
 
12  This does negate the individual-level importance of norms, ideological preferences, family connections, etc.  
Rather, this simple model assumes risk-aversion and generally weak preferences among civilians in the 
aggregate, which is consistent with most literature on the subject.  The items listed herein reflect those that recur 
frequently in the academic literature, the journalistic accounts, and survey data. 
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institutions and services costly, but it also requires significant material capabilities and, as 
discussed above, often necessitates the effective control of territory.  The same is true with 
respect to the credible provision of security and stability. Civilians are only willing to offer 
their loyalty when the insurgents have been able to amass sufficient power to exert control 
over territory, thereby credibly signaling their ability to provided desired benefits as well as 
the likelihood of their eventually victory.   
This suggests that the relative capabilities enjoyed by the insurgent organization 
underlay the provision of these resources and therefore the ability of insurgents to recruit 
supporters and command the loyalty of civilians.  Specifically, stronger insurgent 
organizations should be able to provide larger collections of resources.  Moreover, shifts in 
the relative balance of capabilities should change civilians' beliefs about the credibility of 
promised resource streams as well as their expectations about the outcome of the conflict.  In 
turn, civilians are more likely to support the insurgency when insurgents can signal robust 
capabilities relative to the government and/or when they perceive that the balance of power 
in the conflict is shifting toward the insurgents and away from the incumbent regime.    
 
Relative Capabilities 
In order to credibly and consistently deliver sufficient incentives to encourage and maintain 
large-scale civilian support insurgents must possess some extant ability to control land, 
markets, or resources.  Strong rebel organizations may be able to provide parallel political 
systems, public services, and similar incentives, but such goods exceed the capabilities of 
most rebel organizations.  As stated above, for the provision of many of these goods — 
namely security and non-pecuniary resources — insurgents must first control territory, which 
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itself often requires substantial material resources and the organizational capability to 
administer the territory and distribute resources among civilian supporters.   
For this reason, weak insurgents are likely to be outbid by the government.  Even in 
the context of high repression and low state capacity, incumbent regimes are likely able to 
offer a more competitive deal than are insurgents.  The limited social welfare provisions 
offered by the state and the basic resources it can provide are likely to outmatch those 
provided by weak insurgents.  In addition, the threat of punishment by state security forces is 
likely to deter collaboration unless the insurgents can promise a reasonable degree of 
protection from government reprisals.  As a result, it should be more difficult for weaker 
groups to muster civilian support, recruit fighters, and otherwise maintain the loyalty of the 
population.  By contrast, relatively strong insurgents who can provide political institutions, 
social services, security, and other benefits mentioned above, should more easily attract and 
maintain civilian loyalty. 
Strength in and of itself is not necessarily predictive of the provision of benefits.  
Some large insurgent organizations with significant military power may choose to divert their 
material capabilities to strictly military needs and largely neglect the demands of the civilian 
population.  The RUF along with the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), for 
example, grew powerful enough to overtake the government in 1997.  However, they failed 
to provide substantial resources to the population (even during their brief period in power).  
Yet, military capabilities are often a precursor to the provision of other benefits.  Rebels must 
be able to defend territory in order to provide security to civilians, to establish quasi-state 
institutions, or otherwise take on the trappings of government.  Not all insurgent groups are 
capable of undertaking such endeavors; however, those that do need to establish significant 
67 
military capabilities prior to doing so.  Small bands of guerrillas may successfully harry and 
frustrate government forces, but it is unlikely that they can successfully build institutions or 
provide significant social services to peasants in the areas in which they operate.  Such 
groups should find it more difficult to attract support from peasants because the benefits they 
can provide (redress of grievances, participation, adventure, etc.) may not be sufficient to 
offset the risk of capture or death at the hands of the government.  However, once the group 
has been able to establish liberated zones or other areas nominally free from government 
interference it should be able to provide the streams of resources necessary to attract civilian 
support on a broader scale. 
This discussion leads to the first hypothesis: 
H1: The greater the capabilities of the insurgent organization relative to the  
       government the greater the level of support and loyalty they are likely to receive  
       from the population. 
 
Power Dynamics 
The discussion and related hypothesis above address the relationship between the relative 
capabilities of insurgents and their ability to muster support among the population.  Civilians' 
assessments of the balance of power should inform their decision-making with respect to 
loyalty because it signals both the likely benefits the group is able to provide to them 
(relative to the state) but also the likely outcome of the conflict.  It therefore influences 
expectations regarding future benefits.  However, because conflicts are dynamic processes, 
the changes observed in the conflict environment should likewise structure insurgent 
decisions. 
Civilian decision-making is heavily influenced by the balance of power in a conflict 
environment.  In a competitive, zero-sum environment in which all gains (power, territory, 
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resources, etc.) for one actor represent a loss for the adversary, changes in the balance of 
power are important signals of expected changes in the streams of resources flowing to 
civilians and of the direction in which the conflict is moving.  For example, when insurgents 
suffer a major military defeat, losing troops, territory, and exhausting resources, civilians 
(even those not in the immediate vicinity of the losses) are likely to judge that the flows of 
benefits they are currently receiving from the insurgents are likely to diminish as the 
insurgents redirect resources to other areas.  Moreover, if such losses are large enough or 
occur repeatedly, civilians' faith in eventual insurgent victory is likely to decline as well.  
Civilians are often acutely aware of changes in the power dynamics of a conflict; as a result 
they are likely to update their support strategies when new information is uncovered (see for 
example, Wood, 2003: 270-273).13  
As the power balance in a conflict shifts against insurgents, maintaining the nominal 
loyalty of the population becomes increasingly difficult.  As insurgents become less capable 
of distributing resources to civilian supporters and as they appear less likely to successfully 
oust the regime or more likely to be quashed by it, civilian loyalty and support are likely to 
decline (Mason, 1989; 1996; Tullock, 1971).  Conversely, the rapid expansion of the 
insurgent organization and successes on the battlefield, particularly if they occur in proximity 
to the community targeted for recruitment, encourages participation (Wood, 2003: 272; see 
also Race, 1973: 40). Rebellions therefore undergo what Wood (2003: 238-239) refers to as a 
recursive process in that as the group grows, survives, and demonstrates capacity relative to 
the regime, a greater portion of the population is willing to support it.  During periods of 
rising insurgent power or if insurgents have been able to credibly demonstrate a high 
                                                
13  It is for this reason that insurgents often devote so much energy to propaganda and information control. 
 
69 
probability of defeating the government, civilians are more likely to support them in hopes of 
ending up on the "right" side of the war.  Thus, as relative military power shifts in the 
direction of insurgents, they are likely to attract greater levels of loyalty from the population 
because peasants revise upward their beliefs about the streams of resources they are likely to 
receive as well as their subjective assessment of insurgent victory. 
 The expected relationship between changes in insurgents' capabilities relative to the 
state and the process of strategic updating involved in civilian decision-making provide the 
second hypothesis in this chapter: 
 
H2: Shifts in material capabilities that benefit the insurgents relative to the  
       government contribute to greater levels of insurgent support and loyalty from the 
       population. 
 
Research Design 
The theory presented above illustrates a dynamic relationship between the capabilities of the 
insurgent group and ability of the group to garner the loyalty of the population.  In the 
models presented below, the dependent variable is the loyalty or support of the population is 
proxied by calculating the incidence of insurgent among the conflict population.  Insurgent 
incidence is a continuous variable reflecting the number of insurgents per 10,000 persons 
within the conflict area (see below).  While the ratio of insurgents to the local population is 
not a perfect measure of recruitment or popularity it is one of the few cross-national proxy 
measures that exist or can be easily constructed which capture the general support that a 
population has for an insurgency.  The limitation of the variable is that it only counts active 
fighters while it says nothing specifically about the latent support of non-combatants in the 
conflict region.  However, it is reasonable to believe that active and latent support correlate 
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quite highly even if the latter is significantly more common than the former.  That is, the 
greater the latent support for insurgents within the community, the greater the likelihood that 
more civilians convert to active participants.  The theory also assumes that recruitment is 
closely related to support.  Indeed, active participation is simply one point on the spectrum of 
loyalty and collaboration.  As such, the variable, as constructed, is likely to reflect the 
underlying level of loyalty among the population of the conflict area. 
The variable is constructed by dividing the estimated number of combatants in the 
insurgency in a given year by the number of persons (in 10,000s) living in the conflict area.  
The estimated number of insurgent troops is taken from the UCDP database (UCDP, 2009).  
The conflict area population is constructed from two sources.  First, the conflict area is 
measured in square kilometers and is constructed from geo-referenced conflict site data 
available from the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) (Raleigh et al., 
2006).14  Population data for the conflict area is constructed using gridded population data 
available from Columbia University’s Center for International Earth Science Information 
Network (CIESIN, 2005).15  I then divide the number of insurgent troops by the total 
population (in tens of thousands) within the conflict area to produce a measure reflecting the 
"incidence" of recruitment.  
Because insurgent incidence is constructed as a continuous variable, linear regression 
is a suitable estimation technique.  However, the dynamic nature of the theory indicates that 
consideration should be give to temporal processes.   Additionally, in analyses of data 
                                                
14  The area variable is constructed from PRIO estimates of the maximum radius from the center of the conflict. 
Radii are cropped at international boundaries and the area of the remaining polygons is summed to produce the 
area in square kilometers. 
 
15  The population measure is constructed by summing rasterized country population data for the area within the 
conflict zone. 
 
71 
structures that include observations over various time points, statistical models must also 
account for temporal dependence in the predictors.  Given these considerations, I first 
estimate a time-series cross-sectional analysis including correction for first order 
autocorrelation (AR1) to test the relationship hypothesized above.16  
.  I rely on the UCDP Dyadic Dataset (Harbom, Melander & Wallensteen, 2008) to 
define the relevant dyads.  The temporal range for this analysis includes the years 1997-2006.  
This sample used here includes 323 dyad-year observations containing 73 insurgent groups 
involved in 49 conflicts in 35 countries.17  The main independent predictors in the statistical 
models are the relative military capabilities of the insurgents as well as the change in the 
power balance from the previous year to the current.  The measure of relative capabilities is 
taken from Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan's (2009) recent dataset.  They provide a 5-
point categorical measure that captures the aggregate level of insurgent capabilities relative 
to the regime.  In order to account more directly for the dynamics of the conflict I also 
construct a variable (∆RCi) capturing the change in the relative capabilities of the insurgent 
group over time.  This measure is constructed by first generating a simple ratio of insurgent 
to government troops (RCi) in a given year using the troop levels reported in the UCDP 
database (UCDP, 2009).  I then construct a change variable by simply subtracting the value 
                                                
16 The inclusion of a lagged dependent variable is also useful and appropriate alternative to correcting for AR1 
distrubances.  One important difference, however, is that the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable explicitly 
models the change in the dependent variable from t-1 to t; thus the results reflect the expected change in the 
value of the dependent variable rather than the expected level of the dependent variable.  In order to capture this 
effect, I also test models using a one-year lag of the dependent variable (see below). 
 
17  The temporal range is constrained by two of the independent predictors used in the analysis: the frequency of 
state and rebel violence against civilians.  These variables are discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.  In 
addition, a number of observations are lost due to missing data on one or more of the key variables. 
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of RCi at t-1 from the value of RCi at time t.18  Thus, positive values reflect a growth in the 
insurgents' capabilities relative to the state while negative values reflect a loss of relative 
military strength. 
The control variables included in the regression analyses represent relevant state, 
conflict, and group level factors that should influence civilians' decisions regarding loyalty 
and recruitment during a civil war.  Summary statistics for the variables included in the 
regression analyses are presented in Table 3.1. 
Previous studies have argued that high levels of regime repression lead to a 
perception among civilians that there is "no other way out" save for taking up arms 
(Goodwin, 2001; see also DeNardo, 1985; Klayvas & Kocher, 2007a).  In line with this 
argument, greater levels of regime violence should result in broader support for the 
insurgency.  Yet, as Moore (1995) has pointed out, massive regime violence does not 
necessarily make civilians more supportive of the insurgents but should rather simply make 
them indifferent between support for the insurgents or neutrality (or perhaps even supporting 
the regime).  While regime violence may provide a push factor for survival-minded civilians, 
mass repression and violence in conflict areas are likely to signal to uncommitted civilians 
that insurgents are not able to provide security to their supporters.  This dynamic may in turn 
reduce the willingness of civilians to remain loyal to insurgents. As a result, the relationship 
between regime violence and popular support for the insurgency is not fully established.  
However, given the weight of previous research, I anticipate a positive relationship. 
                                                
18  I employ the Cunninham et al. (2009) measure in this analysis because it is further removed from the 
dependent variable than the alternative RCi measure.  Both RCi and the dependent variable use the rebel troop 
level variable as their numerator, and as such could present issues of collinearity.  The change variable presents 
fewer problems since it is differenced.  In fact, the correlation between the two variables is only 0.11.  Ideally, a 
separate measure would be employed as with the capabilities measures.  However, few alternative measures of 
rebel capabilities exist and to my knowledge RCi is the only measure taken on an annual basis, and therefore the 
only one suitable for testing the relationship between annual changes in the power dynamics and insurgent 
support. 
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Table 3.1 Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min       Max 
Insurgent Incidence 13.67 31.857 0.050     177.271 
Δ  Insurgent Capability 
 
Rebe 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.004 0.099 -0.693    1.063 
Military Strength 
H 
 
0.517 0.588 0             4 
Govt. Range(t-1) 2.216 0.551 1             3 
Insurgent Range(t-1) 
 
2.220 0.823 1             3 
Ethnic Mobilization 0.738 0.44 0             1 
Conflict Severity(ln) 5.719 1.981  0             10.779 
Age 12.92
2 
1.141 0             57 
Democracy(t-1) 0.398 12.528 0             1 
GDPpc(ln)(t-1) 0.864 1.0318 -1.243     3.567 
Lootable Resources 0.581 0.494 0             1 
 
The theory likewise suggests that insurgents may use violence as a means of cowing 
the population, undermining social and political order, or enforcing loyalty at gunpoint.  As 
such, it anticipates a positive relationship between insurgent violence and the level of popular 
support.  That said, it is also plausible that insurgent violence and indiscriminate terror 
against the population may unify the population against the rebels.  This is particularly likely 
if the government responds in a manner that signals willingness and ability to protect the 
population from insurgent violence.  Consequently, just as in the case of state-sponsored 
violence there is likely a complex relationship between insurgent use of violence and civilian 
responses.  That said, it is still important to control for both state and insurgent violence 
perpetrated against civilians.  The overall severity of the conflict should influence support for 
the insurgency.  As conflicts intensify and violence spreads civilians are likely to find their 
options increasingly constrained.  The spread of conflict-related violence reduces the 
viability of remaining neutral and forces previously uncommitted civilians to pick a side in 
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the conflict or to flee the combat zone, becoming either an internally displaced persons (IDP) 
or foreign refugees.   
The primary data source for violence against civilians is the Political Actor Violence 
Index (PAVI), which captures the range as well as frequency of both insurgent and state 
violence. In order to limit the number of variables included in the regression, I only employ 
the range variable, which captures the targets of violence as opposed to simply the frequency 
of violence.  Theories that argue regime violence can motivate civilian support generally 
focus on the most extreme and indiscriminate forms of violence as the motivator for support; 
as such, this measure better captures this proposed dynamic.19  Violence measures are lagged 
by one year because of the likelihood of endogeneity between violence and support.20 
In addition to the dynamics of violence, structural components of the state are likely 
to influence the decision-making of civilians.  For instance, insurgent groups are likely to 
experience more difficulty in mobilizing popular support in democratic states because the 
state provides alternative avenues for the redress of grievances.  Past research has 
demonstrated that democratic institutions and high levels of popular participation reduce the 
likelihood of the onset of insurgency (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Hegre et al., 2001).  
Consequently, democracy is likely to impede the recruitment efforts of insurgents and limit 
their ability to attain popular support.  Similarly, wealthier states are likely to deter insurgent 
mobilization and dampen popular support.  Wealthier states have the capability to provide 
incentives to civilians to retain their loyalty.  For instance, more developed, wealthier states 
                                                
19  Substituting the frequency variables for range variables does not alter the results 
 
20  As a check on the robustness of the regression using the PAVI scores I also test a model utilizing the Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program's (UCDP) One-sided Violence dataset (OSV) (Eck & Hultman, 2007; Kreutz, 2008).  
The results for the variables of interest remain unchanged. 
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are more likely to provide social services and other benefits that help retain the loyalty of the 
civilian population.  As a result, insurgents fighting wealthier governments should face 
greater difficulty recruiting supporters because of the high levels of resources and services 
they must provide to match those offered by the state.  Thus, I expect a negative relationship 
between both state wealth and the presence of democratic institutions and the incidence of 
insurgent recruitment.  The measure of state wealth is the log-transformed value of GDP per 
capita taken from Penn World Tables (Heston, Summers, and Aten, 2009).  The measure of 
democratic institutions is a binary adaptation of the 21-point Polity2 indicator from the Polity 
IV dataset (Marshalls & Jagger, 2006).  The measure is coded as 1 if the state received a 
score of 7 or higher and 0 otherwise.   Both measures are lagged one year because the 
ongoing processes of civil war are likely to adversely affect both democracy and economic 
development. 
The social structures and resources within the conflict area as well as the techniques 
adopted by the group may also influence the level of popular support and recruitment ability 
enjoyed by the group.21  Two factors commonly cited in the literature are pre-existing social 
and identity networks to mobilize support and the presence of loot such as gems and drugs 
that can be used to pay supporters.  With respect to the former, Eck (2009b) shows that 
ethnically motivated insurgencies escalate more rapidly from "conflicts" to "wars."  The 
theoretical justification for this argument is that ethnically-based insurgencies facilitate 
recruitment because ethnicity reduces the coordination costs among members of the group, 
produces more credible movements, and attracts more ideologically-committed rebels (373).  
Hence, mobilizing along ethnic lines should lower the cost of recruitment and control on the 
part of the insurgents.   Data on ethnic mobilization is taken from (Eck, 2009b).  The variable 
                                                
21  As noted in the previous chapter, these factors are likely endogenously related. 
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is dichotomous and takes a value of 1 if the insurgents used ethnicity as a recruitment 
mechanism and 0 otherwise. 
As discussed above, loot and war profits are also motivators for many civilians to 
support or join the insurgency (Arjona & Kalyvas, 2006; Weinstein & Humphreys, 2008).  
However, as Weinstein (2007) suggest, insurgents may turn to loot specifically because 
communal ties and other appeals fail to induce mobilization and support.  It is therefore 
likely that, all else equal, insurgencies that rely on loot and other sources of revenue to pay 
supporters and fighters do so because they lack popular support.  This suggests that while 
groups who rely on communal ties as a motivator are likely to enjoy broader support while 
those that rely on loot as a recruitment mechanism likely receive less popular support.  
Unfortunately, no dataset exists that explicitly accounts for the use of loot or war wages 
among insurgents.  I therefore use a variable that accounts for the presence of lootable 
resources in the conflict area as a proxy for this strategy.   The variable is coded 1 if any 
gems (diamonds, rubies, jade, etc.) or drugs (cannabis, opium, or coca) are located within the 
conflict zone and 0 otherwise.  Geo-spatial data on the location of gems is from Lujala 
(2009) and Gilmore et al. (2005) while drug data is from Lujala (2003).  
Finally, I control for the age of the insurgency.  The duration of an insurgency may 
contribute to civilian decision regarding support, yet the direction of effect is unclear.  On the 
one hand, as insurgencies survive they signal their strength.  As the insurgency endures this 
demonstrates that the rebels are not likely to be defeated; moreover, the longer the group 
survives the more imbedded its institutions can become, allowing it to deliver greater levels 
of benefits to civilian supporters.  As such, longer insurgencies may promote greater civilian 
support — indeed, high levels of civilian support may be necessary for the group to survive.  
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On the other hand, as the insurgency drags on civilians' belief in the likely success of the 
group may begin to waver.  I am therefore agnostic about the relationship between the 
duration of the insurgency and civilian support.  To account for the age of the insurgency I 
include the count of years since the first battle-related death associated with the group.  This 
count is taken from UCDP Dyadic Dataset. 
 
Results & Discussion  
The results from the regression analyses are presented in Table 3.2. While some differences 
exist across the various specifications, the results provide significant support for the 
hypotheses presented above.22  Specifically, according to the results shown here, greater 
levels of relative material capabilities as well as power shifts that benefit the insurgents 
relative to the government increase the incidence of rebel recruitment.  In line with the first 
hypothesis, the results below suggest that as insurgent strength increases relative to the 
government, insurgents are able to draw greater levels of support from the population.  In 
each of the models the variables that account for the relative material capabilities of the 
insurgent group is positive and statistically significant.  According to the results presented in 
Models 1 and 3, a one-category increase in the relative capabilities scale leads to an increase 
in the insurgent incidence of approximately 10 insurgents per 10,000 persons.  Similarly, 
consistent with the second hypothesis, the results show that as insurgencies gain strength 
from one time period to the next they are better capable of recruiting supporters.  In Models 2 
and 3 the variable accounting for the change in relative capabilities from the previous to the 
                                                
22  Results for models using a one-year lag of the dependent variable rather than AR1 correction techniques are 
largely similar.  Across these models the variables accounting for insurgent capabilities and change in relative 
capabilities were both positive and significant (p < 0.1), thus suggesting that stronger and strengthening 
insurgent groups enjoy both broader support from the conflict population and their support increases from one 
time point to the next  
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current period is both positive and statistically significant in each model.  This supports the 
argument that support is more forthcoming when the insurgency has already achieved 
significant capabilities or when the power dynamics of the conflict increasingly support it.  
Thus, as Wood (2003) argued, peasant participation in civil wars is largely recursive, 
building upon itself as the movement grows and survives. 
As the theory argues, this relationship is due to comparatively stronger rebels' ability 
to provide a more attractive package of benefits to potential supporters in order to acquire 
and maintain their loyalty.  Relatively weak insurgents are unable to offer competitive 
benefits to their supporters; as such, they likely face greater difficulty attracting support.   In 
addition, fluctuations in the balance of capabilities over time both leads to changes in the 
resource streams provided by belligerents and causes civilians to update their assessment of 
likely war outcomes.  Such reassessments contribute to changes in civilian decisions 
regarding loyalty.  When insurgents are perceived as strengthening and more likely to win, 
civilians are more likely to choose to support them; yet when insurgent power declines, 
civilians may defect out of fear of ending up on the losing side.  For instance, in Vietnam the 
NLF experienced increasing difficulties soliciting and maintaining the support of the 
peasants after the US intervention began to rapidly deplete its resources and civilians became 
less confident of Communist victory (Gurtov, 1967: xi, 9; Kellen, 1969: 8).  Even in those 
areas where the NLF remained strong and firmly in control peasant enthusiasm and support 
for the revolution declined (Gurtov, 1967: 28).  By contrast, when insurgents enjoy military 
gains and their odds of victory appear to improve, popular support is likely to increase as 
well.  Such was case in Afghanistan as well.  Taliban recruitment and support increased as 
their victory over the Northern Alliance looked increasingly certain (Filkins & Gall, 2001: 
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B2).  Yet, intervention by international forces in late 2001 and the subsequent change in 
power dynamics between the belligerents again shifted support away from the Taliban 
(Kennedy, 2001: 6).  By the end of 2001 the Taliban had moved to block an outflow of 
refugees from areas it held and began forcibly recruiting men and boys into its militias 
(Mackenzie & Greenaway, 2001: A3).     
 
Table 3.2: Regression Results: Incidence of Insurgents in Conflict Population  
 Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Δ  Insurgent Capability  35.389 (6.466)***    
 
34.206 (6.486)*** 
Military Capability 10.759 (3.092)***  10.147 (3.081)*** 
                
Insurgent Ranget-1  -0.287 (1.311) -0.286 (1.246) -0.349 (1.254) 
    
Government. Ranget-1 1.377 (2.130) 1.589 (1.978) 1.337 (2.011) 
    
Conflict Intensity(ln) 1.574 (0.572)*** 1.466 (0.528)***  1.458 (0.539)*** 
          
GDPpc(ln)t-1 0.334 (2.226) -0.268 (2.163)  0.088 (2.168) 
    
Democracyt-1 -6.311 (4.130) -8.017 (3.880)**      -6.029 (3.971) 
     
Lootable Resources -5.358 (4.842) -3.847 (4.130) -5.450 (4.882) 
    
Ethnic Mobilization 8.103 (5.383) 12.472 (5.019)** 8.305 (4.432) 
    
Age -0.039 (0.194) -0.043 (0.191) -0.021 (0.197) 
     
Constant -4.701 (9.635) -0.791 (8.889) -2.729 (9.549) 
    
R2 Within 0.07 0.11 0.11 
R2 Between 0.27 0.17 0.24 
R2 Overall 0.23 0.17 0.24 
Rho AR 0.46 0.52 0.52 
Wald X2 40.40 56.80 67.30 
Prob. > X2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 308 319 308 
Dyads 70 78 70 
Coefficients and standard errors from Generalized Least Squares models with AR(1) error corrections. 
***=P<0.01 *=P< 0.05  *=P< 0.10 Two-tailed test. 
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Examining the results for the control variables, the models suggest that power 
dynamics may play the most significant role in determining civilian support.  The only 
variable other than those accounting for capabilities that remains significant across 
specifications is the overall intensity of the conflict, which is also likely to be closely 
correlated to military capabilities.  As the war intensifies, the incidence of insurgents within 
the population increases.  However, turning first to the role of violence directed against 
civilians, the results suggest that neither state nor rebel violence is a significant predictor of 
the incidence of insurgents within the population.  Across the specifications presented here, 
state violence is positively correlated with increased insurgent recruitment, but it fails to 
achieve significance.  Rebel violence has the opposite relationship but it, too, fails to reach 
significance in the models.  Interestingly, in robustness checks using the UCDP One-sided 
Violence dataset (Eck & Hultman, 2007) (model not shown here), the variable accounting for 
the prior year's government-sponsored violence is statistically significant, though the effect is 
quite small.  The result suggests an increase of one insurgent per 10,000 persons for every 
250 civilians killed.   
In some ways these results would seem to contradict the assertion made above that 
insurgents might use violence as a means to compel civilian loyalty.  Rebel violence alone 
might be insufficient to mobilize support; however, it is likely that insurgent violence 
interacts with other contextual variables to enforce loyalty.  It is also possible that rebel terror 
has an indirect effect on mobilization and support.  Given the positive relationship between 
state violence and support, it is likely — as discussed above — that insurgent terror is 
intended more to goad the state into unleashing even more egregious acts of violence on the 
population.  Moreover, insurgent terror may simply be an effective tool to destabilize the 
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state, breakdown social and political order, and thereby open breathing room for insurgencies 
struggling to compete with the state.  I return to these issues in the following chapters.  
The coefficient for the variable accounting for the conflict state's recent level of 
economic development is inconsistent and switches signs between specifications.  The theory 
proposes that civil conflict is a competition between belligerents over loyalty and control; 
moreover, the side that can provide greater resources is more likely to acquire civilian 
loyalty.  Because wealthier states would presumably be better able to provide for their 
citizens and easily compete with insurgents, the theory indirectly predicts a negative 
relationship between support for the insurgency and state wealth.  However, the insignificant 
results suggest comparatively wealthy states do not necessarily deter the mobilization of 
insurgent support among the population of the conflict area.  This result seems surprising 
since past research has shown that higher levels of development deter insurgency (Fearon & 
Latin, 2003) and result in shorter insurgencies when they do occur (Collier, Hoeffler & 
Söderbom, 2004; Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan, 2009).  A plausible answer to this is 
that given the high barrier to entry for would-be insurgents in richer states those that do 
emerge are comparatively stronger to insurgents in other states.  This is simply speculation, 
however, and deserves future scrutiny.  
 The variable accounting for the presence of democratic institutions is both negative 
and statistically significant in one model, and nearly achieves significance in the others.  This 
provides some support for the dampening effect of democracy on civilian mobilization.  In 
states in which the population has an active and effective outlet for the redress of grievances 
insurgents are likely to experience more difficulty in mobilizing support and loyalty.   The 
lootable resources variable has a consistently negative relationship with the incidence of 
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rebel recruitment.  However, it fails to achieve statistical significance in any of the models.  
Regardless, the absence of a positive relationship does suggest that rebellions located in areas 
of abundant lootable resources are no more likely to attract support than other types of 
rebellions.  This generates a number of questions about the real recruitment power of loot and 
war profits in civil wars.  While pecuniary benefits may motivate some greedy rebels they do 
not seem to produce a groundswell of popular support — at least not any more than other 
relevant motivators.   
 In contrast to loot's ability to mobilize civilian loyalty, communal and identity-based 
mobilization strategies seem to have some significant purchase among civilians.  In model 2 
the variable is positive and achieves statistical significance.  While the variable is only 
significant in one of the models presented here, it provides some support for the role of 
communal ties as a source of recruitment.  The result is largely consistent with recent 
research that suggests that insurgencies mobilized along ethnic lines escalate to "wars" more 
rapidly than conflicts in which rebels use other mobilization techniques (Eck, 2009b).  This 
result may also shed light on the greed-grievance debate.  In the absence of strong communal 
ties or shared group characteristics that could help facilitate mobilization, insurgents may 
turn to profit as a means to attract greedy rebels rather than true believers.  Thus, loot may be 
a secondary mobilization tool used only when other appeals and offers fail.  This is consistent 
with some of the arguments Weinstein (2007) makes in his explanation of insurgent violence 
against civilians. 
 Lastly, the duration of the insurgency seems to have no significant statistical 
relationship to the level of civilian support for the insurgency.  Arguably, the duration 
variable is simply a proxy for the strength of the insurgency.  However, the relationship 
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between duration and strength is not completely clear.  Bapat (2005) suggests that stronger 
insurgents are better able to survive government counterinsurgency efforts and demonstrate 
strength; they are therefore less likely to negotiate with regimes once they have existed past 
the first few years.  Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2009) argue that stronger 
insurgencies (particularly those at parity with or stronger than the government)23 fight shorter 
wars because they have the military capabilities to fight the government to a standstill and 
thus force a negotiated settlement or to simply win outright.  These models neither confirm 
nor contradict either of these competing theories. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that civilians respond to the provision of benefits, security and 
stability, future conflict expectations, and control in deciding the level of support to provide 
to (or withhold from) insurgents.  In the competitive civil war environment, the ability of the 
rebels to provide these goods and service is determined in large part by the balance of power 
between themselves and the state with which they vie for civilian loyalty and control.  The 
greater the relative resources and material capabilities available to the insurgents the more 
goods and services they can provide to civilians, thereby increasing the depth and breadth of 
civilian support.  Moreover, as I discussed in the previous chapter, conflicts are dynamic 
processes and civilian often fickle — the conflict environment changes and with it change the 
relationships between civilians and insurgents.  Specifically, as the balance of power between 
the conflict actors shifts, civilians update their strategies of support, reducing their loyalty to 
                                                
23  This would admittedly be a very small proportion of insurgencies overall. 
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insurgents when their level of resources declines or when they perceive a declining 
probability of insurgent victory.   
 The statistical analysis provides support for this argument.  Principally, the results 
suggests that rebel groups with greater relative material and military capabilities are more 
like to induce a greater incidence of recruitment from the population.  Similarly, changes in 
the ratio of insurgent-government military capabilities from one year to the next lead to a 
greater incidence of insurgents among the population of the conflict area.  While, the ratio of 
insurgent fighters to the local population is not necessarily a clear proxy for the level of latent 
civilian support, it should reflect the overall support and loyalty for the insurgents among 
civilians.    
The argument and results presented and discussed in this chapter suggest a deeply 
endogenous relationship between capabilities and support.  That is, civilians are often 
unwilling to openly support insurgents when they appear weak, yet it is often difficult for 
insurgents to gain capabilities when civilian loyalty remains elusive.  This is consistent with 
Wood's (2003) assertion of a recursive relationship between civilian support and the 
insurgency's ability to signal survivability and success.  A key question, then, is how do 
insurgents break from this recursive or endogenous relationship?  That is, how would weak 
rebels or rebels facing a serious negative shift in their relative capabilities because of the 
intervention of a regime's allies, major battlefield losses, or the collapse of liberated areas 
manage to gain a foothold or stem their losses?  As the next chapter argues, violence and 
terror may be the best possible strategy, at least in the immediate sense.  Terrorism and 
violence can produce immediate gains but their effects are likely to rapidly diminish and 
even produce a boomerang-effect on the user (Davison, 1968: 28; Pike, 1969: 117).  Facing 
85 
the choice between abandoning the rebellion and using violence to break the government's 
control or cow civilians into support or neutrality, insurgents may resort to terror when they 
lack other means of rallying support.  
 
 CHAPTER 4 
 
Rebel Capabilities & the Use of Violence against Civilians 
 
 
Previous chapters argued that insurgent strategies, including their use of violence explicitly 
against civilians, vary over the course of a conflict.  The explanation for such variation 
presented in Chapter 1 was that the conflict environment is dynamic, and changes in this 
dynamic environment lead to changes in the types and levels of violence employed by 
combatants.  Specifically, the incentives for violence are heavily influenced by the loyalty 
provided by the civilian population.  Combatants desire to achieve the nominal loyalty of the 
population (if not its support), and construct strategies to enforce loyalty and deter defections 
to the adversary.  As such, they exist in what is essentially a zero-sum competitive 
environment; they adopt (and evolve) strategies that seek to maximize the level of loyalty 
from and control over the civilian population while diminishing it for their enemy.  Chapter 3 
built upon this basic logic by focusing on civilian strategies of survival and profit during war.  
Therein, I argued that both the relative organizational and resource capabilities of insurgents 
played a fundamental role in civilian decisions regarding support and collaboration.   
This chapter incorporates the logic outlined in those earlier chapters to propose a 
dynamic theory of insurgent violence.  I argue that insurgents’ violence strategies result from 
power shifts that occur within the conflict environment.  Changes in the conflict's power 
dynamics directly impact insurgent strategies of violence because they alter the willingness 
of civilians to support or collaborate with the insurgents.  As insurgent power declines, 
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civilians become increasingly reluctant to provide them with the loyalty they need to 
continue and expand their rebellion.  Facing declining resources with which to "buy off" 
civilians, insurgents turn to violence as a means to compel loyalty and acquire resources.  In 
addition, weak or weakening insurgents are also more likely to increasingly randomize 
violence as a means to deter collaboration with the regime or to undercut the streams of 
resources it provides.  This occurs because insurgents are forced to divert resources from the 
provision of benefits used to purchase the loyalty of civilians to more immediate combat 
needs, reducing both civilian loyalty and their ability to police the population.   Steep 
declines in insurgent capabilities or severe resource asymmetries also encourage insurgents 
to randomize violence as a means to undermine the resource provision of the state.  When 
insurgents are unable compete with the state in terms of resource provision, insurgents tend 
to use terrorism and other indiscriminate forms of violence to destroy these goods, punish 
civilians for using them, create instability and fear, thereby balancing the playing field. 
The chapter proceeds as follows: I first review existing literature on the motivations 
for and causes of violence against civilians in civil war, but point out the need to address the 
dynamic factors within the conflict that lead to changes in actor violence strategies.  The 
following section presents a theory of actor violence based on the competitive model outlined 
in the previous chapters.  The third section furthers this argument by explaining the type of 
violence adopted by conflict actors.  The fourth section presents the data and research design, 
while the fifth section presents the results and offers some discussion.  The results generally 
support the theory presented in the paper: when power dynamics shift against insurgents they 
experience more difficulty compelling loyalty from the population; as such, they are more 
likely to employ violence more frequently and to apply it in a more indiscriminate manner.  
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In the subsequent section I provide a short case analysis using the conflict in Vietnam 
between 1956 and 1972 to illustrate these dynamics.  The final section offers some 
concluding remarks. 
 
Incentives to Target Civilians 
Previous studies of the causes of violence directed against civilians have largely focused on 
the static environmental conditions that structure the war strategies of insurgents.  Popular 
accounts of civil wars, for example, have often argued that ethnic conflicts are bloodier and 
more brutal than other wars (e.g., Kaufman, 2001; Huntington, 1996).  More systematic 
analyses have focused on factors such as pre-existing political cleavages (Balcells, 2010), 
foreign financial support (Hovil & Werker, 2005; Weinstein, 2007), the presence of lootable 
resources, (Kaldor, 1997; Weinstein, 2007), and various social and economic factors 
(Humphreys & Weinstein, 2006) as explanations for the types of warfare that insurgents 
adopt with respect to civilians.  While such analyses help identify the environmental factors 
or the fixed characteristics of groups that make violence more likely or more severe, they 
have limited purchase in explaining escalations or de-escalations of violence from one period 
to another.  This chapter addresses this shortcoming in the literature by offering a more 
dynamic theory of insurgent violence.  
As discussed in Chapter 4, a group's violence strategy is intimately connected to the 
broader dynamics of the conflict; consequently, any explanation of the dynamics of violence 
should address the manner in which changes in the conflict environment affect insurgent as 
well as civilian decision-making.  Violence is applied strategically when certain sets of 
condition make its application more or less effective in acquiring those goals (Arendt, 1970; 
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Kalyvas, 1999; 2004).  Thus, the utility of a given strategy of violence changes as the 
conditions of the conflict environment change.  Shifts in the strategic landscape are critical to 
explaining violence dynamics because they lead insurgents (as well as states) to alter their 
war strategies in order to maximize their likelihood of survival or victory.   
Recent, more dynamic explanations for violence suggest that insurgents may adopt 
violence against civilians as a war strategy when they face major military setbacks or troop 
losses because it sends a costly signal to both the government and civilians of the group's 
intention to continue the fight in spite of mounting costs (Hultman, 2007).  Kalyvas (2006) 
suggests that changes in the level of control exerted by an actor frame the incentives for the 
type of violence applied.  When insurgents effectively control territory they are more likely 
to apply violence selectively (in that locale) because they can gather sufficient intelligence to 
differentiate those persons guilty of collaborating with the government from those who 
support the insurgency.  By contrast, where they lack control they apply violence in a more 
indiscriminate manner.   Changes in the level of control are therefore expected to correlate to 
changes in the chosen strategies of violence at the local level.  This theory provides an 
explanation for the geographic distribution of violence types but says little about violence 
levels or types in the aggregate.  Moreover, it says little about how broader changes in the 
conflict affect control and therefore violence.  A group's ability to control territory is largely 
a function of the broader power dynamics of the conflict—that is, increased recruitment, 
major battlefield losses, defections, the intervention of foreign actors, or other changes in the 
conflict environment alter a group’s ability to control territory and population.  In the 
aggregate, increases in insurgents' relative capabilities should increase their ability to control 
territory and thus reduce their incentives to use indiscriminate violence.   Conversely, loss of 
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territory, especially in significant amounts, is indicative of larger shifts in the power 
dynamics of the conflict and therefore likely to have consequences for civilian loyalty.  As 
argued in the previous chapter, power shifts matter to civilians because they alter 
perspectives regarding immediate and future payoffs.  Consequently, while the violence is in 
part spatially dependent on local levels of control (Kalyvas, 2006), it is also likely to be 
related to broader fluctuations in insurgent power relative to the government.   
Shifts in these power dynamics help explain variation in the frequency of insurgent 
violence over time.  Violence is intended as a short-term strategy used to break down 
government control, create uncertainty and chaos among the population, or enforce loyalty.  
As Pike (1969: 117) asserts, terror produces immediate but quickly diminishing benefits.  A 
consistent emphasis on violence over other types of recruitment techniques is likely 
insufficient to gain control over the population.  Just as the case with regime violence, too 
great a reliance on terror presumably forces civilians back toward the government (see 
Goodwin, 2001; Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007a).  However, given that insurgents face significant 
power and resource asymmetries, they may (at least temporarily) rely on terror to help 
compensate for these structural weaknesses (see Crenshaw, 1981).  For example, Mao, 
despite his general aversion to terrorism and violence against civilians articulated its utility, 
arguing that "it is necessary to create terror for a while in every rural area" in order to drive 
out counter-revolutionary agents and undermine state control (quoted in Shultz, 1978: 75).  
Similarly, Race (1972: 115) relates that the Party NLF used violence to help eliminate the 
asymmetry between itself and the government in rural areas of Vietnam.  Moreover, shifts in 
conflict dynamics that intensify or reify this power imbalance incentize insurgent use of 
violence as a means to (at least temporarily) re-coup losses and re-establish control.  
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Subsequent sections address the effect of change in conflict power dynamics on both the 
frequency and type of insurgent violence. 
 
Power Dynamics & Violence 
As the previous chapter demonstrated, civilian decision-making is heavily influenced by the 
balance of power in a conflict environment.  In a competitive, zero-sum environment in 
which all gains (power, territory, resources, etc.) for one actor represent a loss for the 
adversary, changes in the balance of power are important signals of expected changes in the 
streams of resources flowing to civilians and of the direction in which the conflict is moving.  
For example, when insurgents suffer a major military defeat, troops are killed or defect, lose 
territorial control, or exhaust resources, civilians (even those not in the immediate vicinity of 
the losses) are likely to judge that the flows of benefits they are currently receiving are likely 
to diminish as the insurgents redirect resource to other areas.  Moreover, if such losses are 
large enough or occur repeatedly, civilians' faith in eventual insurgent victory is likely to 
decline as well.  Civilians are often acutely aware of changes in the power dynamics of 
conflict; as a result they are likely to update their support strategies when new information is 
uncovered.24  As the power balance in a conflict shifts against the insurgents, maintaining the 
nominal loyalty of the population becomes increasingly difficult.  As insurgents become less 
capable of distributing resources to civilian supporters and as they appear less likely to 
successfully oust the regime or more likely to collapse, civilian loyalty and support are likely 
to decline (Mason, 1989; 1996; Tullock, 1971). Studies conducted by the Rand Corporation, 
for example, found that civilian support for the NLF fell as their casualty rate increased and 
                                                
24  It is for this reason that insurgents often devote so much energy to propaganda and information control. 
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as civilians became less confident of their chances for victory (Davison, 1968: ix; Gurtov, 
1967: 9). 
The willingness of the population to provide a nominal level of loyalty to the 
insurgents largely shapes the incentives for insurgents to employ violence against them (see 
Chapter 4).  Thus, to the extent that shifts in the balance of power influence civilian support, 
they also should affect change in the strategies of violence used by insurgents.  Violence 
increases as relative resources streams, security guarantees, civilian expectations, and 
control, and therefore loyalty, decline.  For instance, as discussed in the introduction, as the 
LRA weakened in the early 1990s it lost much of its popular support base; in response, it 
turned to mass violence and large-scale abductions as a means to buoy the insurgency and 
continue its war with the regime (Bevan, 2007: 348-351).25   In El Salvador, the FMLN 
proved that it could be quite ruthless when its political control in the countryside was 
threatened (Anderson, 2004: 136).  In the recent Afghan conflict, Taliban forces escalated 
violence against civilians as their power diminished, loyalty plummeted and defections 
increased (Alcorn & Perry, 2001: 10; Kennedy, 2001: 6).  Similarly, US intervention in 
Vietnam in the mid-1960s fundamentally altered the power dynamics of the conflict, 
drastically undercutting the power of the NLF.  In response, Communist insurgents adopted 
more coercive strategies of resource mobilization, including forced conscription and violence 
(Berman, 1974: 50; Joiner, 1974: 247, 250-251; see also below).  
Changes in territorial control are particularly relevant to production of violence 
(Kalyvas. 1999; 2006).  The loss of territory undermines the group's ability to provide 
essential resources to its civilian supporters.  As safe zones diminish or collapse entirely, the 
                                                
25  The LRA have used violence extensively in their war against the government.  However, this violence 
escalated significantly in the early 1990s (see Bevan, 2007; UCDP, 2009). 
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provision of resources to civilians becomes increasingly difficult.  This is particularly true of 
quasi-governmental services such as social welfare, political institutions, and security.  As a 
result, the loss of control is likely to induce rapid declines in the loyalty of the population.  
Yet, control is not the only factor affecting the provision of goods to supporters or their 
willingness to support the insurgents.  Given that control is correlated with (and often an 
aspect of) relative material and organizational capabilities, its decline often reflects a more 
general decline in insurgent capabilities.  Despite his explicit emphasis on local-level power 
dynamics, Kalyvas (2006: 257-258) alludes to macro-level power shifts affecting violence in 
his analysis of violence in the Agrolid region of Greece between 1943 and 1944. Italian 
capitulation in the fall of 1943 shifted the trajectory of the war, weakening Germany's 
position in the Eastern Mediterranean and forcing it to redistribute troops in the region.  This 
was a major boost to Greek partisans and allowed them to rapidly expand and consolidate 
control over territory.  The change in the power dynamics in turn resulted in a shift in the 
strategies of violence used by the belligerents, leading them to diminish their reliance on 
indiscriminate violence and increase their reliance on more selective forms.  Similarly, as the 
Soviet forces advanced in the Balkans in the summer of 1944, the Germans began to extricate 
themselves from Greece, giving over territory they had regained during the previous year.  
This shift in power again led to changes in the application of violence to non-combatants in 
the region (264-256).  The expulsion of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) from 
Jordan created a similar dynamic: lacking any territorial control — or even ground to fight on 
— the resistance turned from more traditional insurgent tactics to international terrorism, 
bombings, and murders (Anderson, 2004: 30).  Consequently, while the extent of control at 
the local level structures the strategies of violence employed by the actors, the shifts in levels 
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of control are driven — at least in some significant part — by changes in macro-level power 
dynamics.   
Given this relationship, weakening insurgent capabilities — with or without changes 
in effective territorial control — reduce the flow of resources to supporters.   In turn, it also 
diminishes the nominal loyalty of the population.  As established in earlier chapters, 
declining loyalty contributes to an increase in the willingness of insurgents to use violence 
against civilians. This observation provides the first set of hypothesis.        
H1: The lower the incidence of insurgents in a conflict area the greater the frequency  
       of violence insurgents are expected to employ. 
 
H2: The greater the decline in relative capabilities the greater the level violence  
       insurgents are expected to employ. 
        
 
Randomizing Violence 
The above section argued that shifts in conflict power dynamics are likely to contribute to a 
general increase in the frequency of insurgent violence against civilians.  However, power 
shifts also contribute to changes in the types of violence the group employs.  The 
combination of declining support and diminished control increases the likelihood that 
insurgents resort to more indiscriminate types of attacks (randomized violence) as well as 
more violence overall.  This occurs for two reasons.  First, as strength declines so does the 
ability to control and police territory and accurately identify collaborators and likely 
defectors.  This argument is broadly consistent with the theory articulated by Kaylvas (2006); 
however, the argument introduced here moves beyond his specifically spatial predictions and 
suggests that in general insurgents become more likely to use random or indiscriminate 
violence when they face declines in their aggregate capabilities.  Second, as the state's 
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capabilities and control expand (or those of insurgents decline or contract) insurgents have 
incentives to employ random violence or "terror" in an attempt to reduce or eliminate the 
superior resources provided by the government.  Put simply, when insurgents cannot compete 
in any meaningful way with the resources provided by the state and when they face major 
government gains in this area, they become more likely to adopt indiscriminate violence as 
means to undo those gains, destroying the resources provided by the regime, punishing 
peasants that benefit from them, and attempting to maximize fear, insecurity, and instability 
in the environment.      
As suggested above, control is often directly related to the power dynamics of the 
conflict. As insurgents weaken relative to the regime, through the loss of troops in battle or 
the intervention of foreign forces on the government's behalf, their maintenance of control 
over territory and the population declines.  The decline in effective control is often the direct 
result of the advancement of government forces, for example when they physically expel 
insurgent forces from an area.  Yet control also diminishes because insurgent forces become 
spread too thin, adversely affecting their ability to police the population they seek to control.   
Similarly, as discussed in earlier chapters, maintenance of control is more difficult when the 
loyalty of the civilian population declines.  As insurgent strength declines relative to the 
government and insurgents' ability to provide resources to the population falls civilian loyalty 
weakens, opening the window for competitors, rival political organizations, or those civilians 
sympathetic to the state to advance their agendas and challenge insurgents.  Declining 
loyalty, increased pressure from civilians, and the emergence or strengthening of competitors 
increases the perception of threat to the insurgency and provides an additional motivation for 
violence.   
96 
This situation is compounded by the declining policing capacity of insurgents.  As the 
balance of military power shifts against insurgents and toward the government, rebels are 
likely to redistribute resources from non-military resource provisions to combat capabilities.  
When faced with the existential threat of increasing government power and mounting 
military defeats insurgents divert resources from what are often considered non-essential 
services such as benefits provided to civilians and local security to more immediate needs, 
namely the movement of people and supplies to the battlefront.   
The diversion of resources from those services designed to compel civilian support to 
more pressing battle needs creates two related problems.  First, it intensifies the problems of 
declining civilian loyalty.  Second, and critical for explaining the type of violence, the 
redistribution of resources reduces the policing capacity of insurgent forces.  Insurgent 
leadership is likely to shift guard units and other reserve forces from local policing duties to 
combat service.  Hastily prepared local militias, militant youth groups, or other poorly-
trained and -organized militants often replace these more competent forces.  The 
redistribution of forces lowers the ratio of insurgents to the civilian population and increases 
the difficulty that these forces have in maintaining local order, gathering information on 
government collaborators, and otherwise policing the population and deterring threats.  In 
this increasingly information-poor environment in which insurgents face declining loyalty 
among the population and declining resources with which to police that population, 
insurgents become less selective in their targeting and increasingly employ highly visible and 
often random violence as low-cost signals of the price of defection.  For instance, in areas 
where the NLF's control weakened during the late 1960s, the insurgents increasingly carried 
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assassinations out in ways designed to have a major psychological impact on the civilians 
(Davison, 1968: 25). 
 The second explanation for the turn to more randomized violence is that insurgents 
have an incentive to destroy the provision of government resources that they themselves are 
unable to provide to civilian populations.  As insurgents lose power and loyalty declines they 
may (at least temporarily) substitute low-cost, destructive strategies for higher-cost 
constructive strategies, especially when they lack any real chance of competing with the 
government in terms of providing goods and services.  The logic here is that when rebels 
cannot compete openly with the government in terms of resources, destroying the 
government's ability to provide those resources is their next best option.   
When insurgents are weak or have lost their control over a territory they are likely to 
rely on indiscriminate attacks on the goods and services provided by the state as well as those 
civilians who choose to use them.  They thereby attempt to undercut any benefit the civilians 
expect to receive from these resources.  Moreover, these attacks may even succeed in 
convincing the population that the government's provision of benefits is an invitation to 
insurgent violence, thereby causing civilians to resist government-provided benefits.  This 
tactic attempts to directly undermine the "hearts and minds" strategy that governments often 
use to attract civilian loyalty.   
Governments with sufficient resources to do so often attempt to provide benefits such 
as schools, roads, clinics, or other social and economic development projects in order to win 
over the population (Leites & Wolfe, 1970; US Army, 2006).  Such projects then often 
become the expressed targets of insurgents who seek to destabilize and destroy any benefits 
produced by the state.  As a result, insurgents commit indiscriminate violence such as 
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attacking schools, bombing hospitals, or mining village roads.  Insurgents facing declining 
power in a conflict have frequently used such strategies.  For example, in Vietnam the NLF 
turned to terror to disrupt local elections and social programs implemented by the 
government (Pike, 1970: 11, 21).  Similarly, they adopted a campaign of terror against the 
local population in areas where government pacification plans had been implemented in an 
attempt to deprive the government forces of intelligence and support (Pearce, 1967: xi).  The 
goal of such violence is to create fear and terror and deter civilians from supporting the 
government (see Davison, 1968; 27; Pike, 1970: 21, 28). 
 In addition to targeting the more tangible benefits provided by the government, 
insurgents also have an incentive to employ random violence as a means to create instability 
and insecurity in government-controlled areas or areas into which government control is 
expanding.  As argued in previous chapters, civilians are particularly receptive to the 
provision of security and order and often follow whichever actor appears most capable of 
providing it.  As such, the ability to negate security is a powerful tool that insurgents can use 
to undermine civilian loyalty to the state.  While resorting to terror and random violence 
would not necessarily win immediate converts to the insurgency, the competitive, zero-sum 
nature of the conflict environment means that any reduction in civilian loyalty to the 
government represents a victory for the insurgency, particularly when it is weak or declining 
in power relative to the regime.   This gamble for resurrection may be viewed as the only 
practical strategy for fending off the government's progress in "pacifying" and "stabilizing" 
insurgent areas.  Thus, insurgents have an incentive to create instability and fear through acts 
of random violence, thereby creating a space within which they can attempt to establish (or 
re-establish) control (Hosmer, 1970: 8-9; Millen, 2006/2007; Thompson, 1966: 29; Vinci, 
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2005).   The shabbab (Palestinian Liberation Organization activists) targeted local Arab 
officials and policeman, and used terror in order to create a vacuum that could be exploited to 
gain control over the population (Anderson, 2004: 188-189). Communist insurgents in 
Vietnam used terror to create a "social pathology or anarchy" in the countryside of South 
Vietnam; this breakdown of social and political order was intended as a precursor to the 
general uprising that the Front envisioned would topple the US-backed government (Pike, 
1969: 111-112).  Shultz (1978: 81) likewise observes that insurgents were more likely to rely 
on terror in the early stages of the movement when the objective was the separation of 
peasants from the extant political order.  Hosmer (1970: 16) states the situation in most 
emphatic terms:  
The primary objective of [NLF terror] is the destruction of the GVN. Through 
the physical elimination demoralization, and subversion of personnel at all 
levels of the government structure, the Viet Cong seeks progressively to erode 
an eventually paralyze the GVN's capabilities to govern. 
 
Consequently, in addition to direct coercion as a means to compel loyalty, terror and violence 
are applied with the expectation that they physically detach the people from the government, 
allowing insurgents the opportunity to establish their own control systems. 
In an extension of this logic, insurgents may employ random violence with the hope 
of provoking government backlash, which is in turn expected to contribute to a collapse of 
normal order, mass state repression, and other conditions that insurgents may exploit (Lake, 
2002). This logic is clearly articulated by urban Marxists like revolutionary Carlos 
Marighela, who asserted:  
It is necessary to turn political crisis into armed conflict by performing violent 
actions that will force those in power to transform the political situation into a 
military situation. That will alienate the masses, who, from then on, will revolt 
against the army and the police and blame them for this state of things (quoted 
in William, 1989: 9). 
100 
Lacquer (1977: 185) refers to this as a "scorched-earth" strategy in which insurgents 
differentiate little between their military-political targets and civilians.  The objective is the 
creation of disorder and insecurity so as to provoke mass regime repression broadly against 
the population.  As Thompson (1966: 29) states, insurgent violence is intended to create 
chaos and instability, and if their attacks "in turn entice the government to go blundering 
around the countryside, so much the better."  
Insurgent and "terrorist" organizations have adopted this strategy with some 
frequency when their limited capabilities keep them from competing with the government in 
less violent ways.  The National Liberation Front (FLN) in Algeria (whose actions provided 
much inspiration to Marighela (see Horne, 1987: 118; William, 1989: 10) adopted this 
strategy in their war against the French Colonials.  The 1955 Philippeville Massacres 
orchestrated by the nationalist insurgents were intended to provoke exactly the type of heavy-
handed response envisioned by Marighela.   As part of a broader military offensive in the 
Constantine region FLN insurgents orchestrated attacks on civilians in area villages, killing 
dozens of French residents and nearly as many moderate Muslims in extremely brutal ways 
(Horne, 1987: 119-122).   Almost immediately, French security forces provided the expected 
response, indiscriminately killing perhaps thousands of civilians in their attempt to "regain 
order" over the area (121-121).26  News of the violent response could then be used to 
mobilize support for the insurgents. 
 Just as shifts in the power dynamics of the conflict contribute to overall changes in 
the frequency with which insurgents target civilians, declining capabilities relative to the 
                                                
26 As with most, such events numbers are disputed.  French sources claim 1273 "insurgents" were killed, likely 
including some civilians.  FLN sources claimed that as many as 12,000 civilians were killed in French reprisals 
(Horne, 1987: 122).  
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government also structure the insurgent strategies with respect to the types of violence they 
employ.  Specifically, as insurgents weaken and lose control over both populations and 
territory they become more likely to resort to random violence against civilians both because 
they lack the ability to effectively police the territory they are able to control and as a means 
to undercut the streams of resources that governments attempt to provide to civilians to attain 
or retain their loyalty.  This argument suggests two hypotheses related to those presented 
above: 
  
H3: The lower the incidence of insurgents in a conflict area the more likely insurgents  
       are to use indiscriminate violence. 
 
H4: The greater the decline in relative capabilities the more likely insurgents are to 
       use indiscriminate violence. 
 
 
Research Design 
I rely on quantitative analyses to test the hypotheses presented above.   I rely on Maximum 
Likelihood Estimation (MLE) given the ordinal nature of the dependent variables.  Herein, 
the dependent variables are categorical measures of the frequency of insurgent violence 
against civilians as well as the types of targeting adopted by the group in a given year.  All 
models reported in the tables below are ordered probit models with Huber (1967) and White 
(1980) robust standard errors clustered on the insurgent group to account for 
heteroskedasticity. 
The temporal range for this analysis includes the years 1997-2006.27  The temporal 
range is constrained by the range of the dependent variable, which was constructed for this 
                                                
27  In some models the number of observations declines significantly.  This is largely due to the military 
capabilities variable taken from Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan (2009), which only extends through 2003. 
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project and is henceforth referred to as the Political Actor Violence Index (PAVI).28  I rely on 
the UCDP Dyadic Dataset (Harbom, Melander & Wallensteen, 2008) to define the sample of 
civil wars and conflict actors for which PAVI scores are generated.  This produces a dataset 
with approximately 425 group-year observations for 120 distinct insurgent organizations.  
However, missing data across the predictors as well as the need to calculate the first 
difference or to lag some variables significantly reduces the number of observations used in 
the analysis.29  After missing values are dropped, the sample size is reduced to just over 300 
observations including some 70 groups.  The sample size varies somewhat depending on 
model specification. 
The PAVI dataset provides two separate actor-year measures of violence committed 
against non-combatants by the insurgents. Violations are considered along two dimensions: 
the frequency of violence and the range or violence (or targeting strategy).  Frequency 
pertains to the number of massacres, assassinations, or other intentional killings of non-
combatants that occur during the year.   In essence, this measure is a categorical estimation of 
the number of non-combatant deaths attributable to the group in a given year. Frequency 
includes three categories:  
1) Rare or uncommon 
2) Often  
3) Routine or Commonplace 
                                                
28  The Political Actor Violence Index (described in more detail in appendix 1), which has been constructed for 
use with the project, currently includes data for only the years listed above.  In the future, the time period will 
expand significantly.  However, the time intensive coding process has permitted me to code only the 10-year 
period mentioned. As a check on the robustness of the regression using the PAVI scores as the dependent 
variable, I also test model utilizing the Uppsala Conflict Data Program's (UCDP) One-sided Violence dataset 
(Eck & Hultman, 2007; Kreutz, 2008). 
 
29  Missing values are a significant source of frustration in quantitative studies of civil conflict.  This is 
particularly true with respect to data on insurgent groups, which have significant incentives to mask their true 
capabilities, behaviors, locations, and other relevant characteristics.  The data used here reflect a good faith 
effort to accurately account for relevant variables using the available data.  Future research, however, should 
strive to improve upon these data and to therefore improve upon this analysis.  
103 
 
Range reflects the selectivity of the violence (see Klayvas, 2006: Ch. 6).  The intuition here 
is that it is important to differentiate between persons targeted due to their political 
involvement and those targeted at random (see also Gibney & Dalton, 1996; Stohl et al., 
1986).  Range is measured as three categories accounting for the selectivity of the violence.  
In the most selective category a group targets only military personnel or political figures 
intimately connected to counterinsurgency policy.30  The three categories are: 
 1) Selective 
 2) Intermediate 
 3) Indiscriminate 
 
PAVI scores are coded from information in the US Department of State Country Reports on 
Human Rights Practices and the annual reports of Amnesty International (AI) and Human 
Rights Watch (HRW).  In addition, supplemental reports from AI and HRW are used to 
improve the coverage and reliability of the data.31  
 
Relative Capabilities & Support 
The primary variable of interest is the change in the ratio of insurgent to government 
capabilities from the previous year to the current.  As in the previous chapter I generate a 
change variable using the ratio of insurgent to government troops (RCi) as reported in the 
                                                
30   The threshold value to establish that a group employed this type of violence is multiple attacks in a year in 
which a total of at least 25 persons were injured and resulting in at least 10 deaths.  Where such specific 
information (what: was available?) the qualitative descriptors used in the human rights reports was evaluated to 
determine if a group had repeatedly employed this level (type?) of targeting.  
 
31  Some scores are also based on information included in media reports.  Media reports compiled from a search 
of the Factiva database (Dow Jones, 2010) were used when the primary documents used ambiguous language 
with relation to the insurgent groups (i.e., referring only to "insurgents", "militants", "rebels", or a title other 
than the specific name included in the UCDP Dyadic Dataset). 
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UCDP database (UCDP, 2009).32,33  To account for this change, I compute a variable 
accounting for the change in relative capabilities from the previous year to the current 
(ΔRCi).  This value is determined simply by subtracting the previous period's value of RCi 
value from the current period's value.  Hence, ΔRCit = RCit – RCi(t-1).  I employ ΔRCi in the 
statistical models to test the two hypotheses regarding change in capabilities.  The change 
variable accounts for the dynamic processes that are at the heart of the theory: as insurgent 
strength increases their reliance on violence should decrease.  The measure, of course, does 
not fully capture the balance of power in the conflict.  As discussed above, "power" is a 
multidimensional concept that incorporates military capabilities, social capital, economic 
resources, territorial control, and multiple other facets.34  The measure employed here 
represents a proxy for this complex concept.  I choose to rely on this measure of the change 
in the balance of military capabilities for two reasons. First, data for other dimensions of 
violence are simply unavailable in a cross-sectional, time-series format.  Second, and more 
importantly, the balance of forces should theoretically be an acceptable measure of the 
overall balance of capabilities because military capabilities are closely related to the other 
aspects of power.  For example, military capabilities are essential for exerting control over 
                                                
32 Troop values are often given as a range of estimates from various sources.  In these cases, averages of values 
were generally used.  When available, government-backed paramilitary forces are also included in the measure 
of government strength as well as foreign forces allied with the government or the insurgents.  
 
33 Very few measures of insurgent strength exist. This is only one way to mathematically account for the 
balance of power in a conflict.  Another strategy is to calculate the relative strength of the group by scaling 
government strength based on the strength of multiple insurgent actors within the country.  Scaling accounts for 
multiple insurgencies within a country that presumably necessitate the division of government troops. 
 
34   See Race (1972: 144-145) for a discussion of power versus force ratios.  In brief, the latter refers to the real 
ability of insurgents to muster support among the population and command loyalties, which is related as much 
to political and social organization as military capabilities.  The latter refers specifically to the military balance 
of power.  Unfortunately, currently available data does not allow for a suitable test of "power ratios;" as such, I 
rely on "force ratios" as a proxy.   Arendt (1970) also provides a useful theoretical exploration of the difference 
among, "force," "power," and "violence." 
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territory, which in turn is a precursor to the group's ability to provide security and other 
benefits.  
The second hypothesis in each pair reflects the importance of support among the 
population, used in the last chapter's analysis as the dependent variable as the "incidence" of 
insurgent recruitment among the population within the conflict zone.  The logic here in is that 
as popular support and loyalty for the insurgency increases, the rebels have less incentive to 
direct violence against the population.  Thus, it is necessary to include this measure as a test 
of a key aspect underlying the theory articulated in this manuscript — popular loyalty 
structures the violence of insurgents.  In addition to standing simply as a proxy for civilian 
loyalty, the measure is in itself a reflection of the organizational capabilities of the 
insurgency.  As the ratio of insurgents relative to the population increases the ability to police 
that population and gather information about potential defectors increases; as a result, higher 
values of this ratio should correlate to a lower likelihood of indiscriminate violence.  This 
variable is constructed by dividing the estimated number of combatants in the insurgency in a 
given year by the number of persons living in the population areas.35 
 
Other Predictors 
To account for the general relationship between overall insurgent military capabilities and the 
use of violence, I rely on the more static measure of balance of military capabilities 
constructed by Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan (2009).  The theory presents a dynamic 
argument of insurgent violence based on the manner in which shifts in the conflict 
environment structure the strategies insurgents adopt a specific time point.  However, the 
overall capabilities enjoyed by insurgents are likely to inform these decisions as well.  
                                                
35 See Chapter 3 for more details. 
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Specifically, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, more robust insurgencies that possess 
greater military capabilities are more likely to signal greater power and a higher likelihood of 
victory to civilians.  They are also more likely to be able to control territory and provide the 
resources that increase civilian loyalty.  Greater military capability should, according to the 
theory, therefore predict lower levels of violence against civilians and less reliance on 
indiscriminate violence.  This variable is chosen because of its difference from the other 
measures used to test the hypotheses (see Chapter 3).  However, it suffers from the fact that it 
is largely time invariant and therefore does not capture the dynamic nature of conflict in a 
way that is meaningful for the hypotheses herein.  An additional issue is that relative military 
capabilities are likely to produce countervailing effects on the use of violence.  Positive 
changes in capabilities and the level of support enjoyed by insurgents theoretically reduce the 
incentive to use mass violence against civilians; similarly, a relatively high ratio of 
capabilities on the part of the insurgents should likewise lessen the tendency toward violence.  
However, greater combat capabilities also provide the opportunity to inflict more violence on 
civilians.  In this sense, greater aggregate capabilities might lead to more violence generally 
but less indiscriminate violence.  The theory presented herein only touches the surface of this 
issue, and later analyses should attempt to tease out this specific relationship.  For the 
analysis at hand, I chose to focus on the specific mechanisms outlined in the theory: change 
in capabilities and civilian support for insurgents.   
Recent conflict data accounts for local features of conflicts that are diluted in larger 
aggregations.  The control variables include a combination of conflict-specific indicators as 
well as more traditional country-level variables.  Table 4.I summarizes variables used in this 
analysis. 
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Table 4.1. Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min       Max 
Δ  Insurgent Capability 0.004 0.099 -0.693     1.063 
Military Capability 0.536 0.617 0             4 
Insurgent Incidence 
 
12.326 24.830 0.050      177.271 
Insurgent Range 
 
 
 
2.219 0.823 1             3 
Govt. Range 2.236 0.525 1             3 
Ethnic Mobilization 0.738 0.44 0             1 
Conflict Severity(ln) 5.730 1.981 0             10.779 
Age 12.922 12.528 0             57 
Democracy 0.3989 0.490 0             1 
GDPpc(ln) 0.891 1.014 -1.22       3.567 
Conflict Area(ln) 11.636 1.502 6.055      14.642 
Lootable Resources 0.581 0.494 0             1 
 
Recent analyses suggest a positive relationship between government and insurgent 
violence (Bohara, Mitchell & Nepal, 2006; Heger & Salehyan, 2007).  However, 
comparative analyses of insurgent recruitment and mobilization during civil war suggest that 
massive state violence drives peasants into the arms of insurgents (DeNardo, 1985; Goodwin, 
2001).  Others have pointed out that state terror should not necessarily make civilians more 
likely to support the insurgents but simply indifferent between joining them and remaining 
neutral (Moore, 1995). To the extent that state violence against civilians does affect insurgent 
behavior, it should only be indirectly through increasing the strength of the insurgency 
relative to the government.  The critical factor, then, is not the level of violence employed by 
the government but the ability of insurgents to provide cover and aid to non-combatants 
victimized by government counter-insurgency activity.  The theory presented here is 
therefore agnostic about the independent effect of state violence on insurgent strategies.  As 
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with the analysis in Chapter 3, I rely on the range measure from the PAVI dataset 
constructed for this project.  This measure of state violence is constructed using the same 
criteria and coding rules as for insurgent violence (see above). 
Popular accounts of civil wars suggest that conflicts between different ethnic groups 
or conflicts fought over secession are bloodier, longer, and more intractable than other 
conflicts (Huntington, 1996; Kaufmann, 2001).  Ethnic conflicts may lead to 
dehumanization, making violence more brutal and more visceral.  Eck (2009b) shows that 
ethnically motivated insurgencies escalate more rapidly from "conflicts" to "wars."  The 
theoretical justification for this argument is that ethnically-based insurgencies facilitate 
recruitment because ethnicity reduces the coordination costs among members of the group, 
produce more credible movements, and attract more ideologically committed rebels (373).  
Hence, mobilizing along ethnic lines should lower the cost of recruitment and control on the 
part of the insurgents.  Eck argues that the greater mobilization that accompanies ethnic 
insurgencies produces more intense violence more quickly compared to other conflicts 
because such movements can field larger numbers of troops compared to other types of 
insurgencies.    
This relationship has theoretical application to the role of violence against civilians as 
well.  The ability to field larger forces and presence of a more sympathetic and mobilization-
conducive environment should reduce the need for the insurgents to rely on coercive violence 
or indiscriminate repression as a strategy for controlling territory and populations.  As such, 
in contrast to theories that portray ethnically delineated conflicts as being more savage and 
producing higher levels of civilian victimization, the theory presented herein predicts the 
opposite.  If ethnicity facilitates control and abets collaboration, we would expect that 
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conflicts in which the insurgents use ethnicity as a primary means of mobilization should 
produce lower levels of insurgent violence as well as well less frequent use of indiscriminate 
violence.  Data on ethnic mobilization is taken from Eck (2009b).  The variable is 
dichotomous and takes a value of 1 if the rebels originate from a different ethnic group than 
the government and use ethnicity as a mobilization strategy and 0 otherwise.  
Kalyvas (2004: 133; 2006: 168-169) suggests that indiscriminate violence should 
diminish over time as political actors slowly recognize its counterproductive effects.  To 
account for the age of the insurgency I include the count of years since the first battle-related 
death associated with the group.  This count is taken from UCDP Dyadic Dataset.  Conflict 
severity is also likely related to civilian victimization.   Intense conflicts provide incentives 
for violence against civilians because warring parties may become more desperate and focus 
violence on civilian population centers rather than better-defended military targets in order to 
wear down the adversary (Downes, 2006; 2008).  Escalating battlefield costs may pressure 
insurgents to target civilians in order to signal their resolve to continue the fight (Hultman, 
2007).  Conflict severity is the logged-value of the annual number of total battlefield 
casualties among all parties in the conflict (Lacina & Gleditsch, 2005). 36   
The size of the conflict zone may also influence the number of civilian causalities. 
Insurgents' abilities to expand the conflict outward from mountain hideouts or remote jungles 
and to penetrate the more populous areas of a conflict country are also likely to be indicative 
of their power.  As such, it is likely that as the conflict zone expands in relation to insurgent 
capabilities, the incentives for violence decline.  Conflict area is the logged value of the 
estimated area of the conflict zone in square kilometers and is constructed from geo-
                                                
36  Hultman (2007) included the number of battlefield casualties accruing to each party.  These data were 
collected from UCDP coding sheets, which are currently not publicly available.    
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referenced conflict site data available from the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo 
(PRIO) (Raleigh et al., 2006).   
 Lootable resources and foreign support for rebels have been linked to insurgent 
violence in both media accounts and qualitative analyses of conflict (Hovil & Werker, 2005; 
Weinstein, 2005; 2007).  I construct a binary indictor for the presence of lootable resources 
within the conflict area that is coded 1 if any gems (diamonds, rubies, jade, etc.) or drugs 
(cannabis, opium, or coca) are located within the conflict zone and 0 otherwise.  Geospatial 
data on the location of gems is from Lujala (2009) and Gilmore et al. (2005) while drug data 
is from Lujala (2003).  
High levels of development allow the state to provide incentives to individuals as a 
non-violent means of dissuading them from participating in rebellion.  In addition, more 
developed states are better able to institute effective anti-terror and security measures that 
can protect civilians from rebel violence.  However, wealthier states also exacerbate the 
resource disparity between insurgents and the regime.  In accord with the hypotheses, it is 
also probable that insurgents resort to more frequent or more indiscriminate violence when 
facing richer states because they lack the capabilities to compete for loyalty.  As such, wealth 
represents something of a simultaneously motivating and countervailing influence on 
violence.   The measure is the logged value of GDP per capita from the Penn World Tables 
(Heston, Summers, and Aten, 2009).  It is lagged for one year owing to the detrimental effect 
of war on national income.   
Democratic regimes may also encourage violent attacks on civilians by virtue of their 
participatory nature and the links between the preferences of the population and the actions 
of the state (Goodwin, 2006; Pape, 2005). The measure is a binary adaptation of the 21-point 
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Polity2 indicator from the Polity IV dataset (Marshalls & Jagger, 2006) The measure is 
coded as 1 if the state received a score of 7 or higher and 0 otherwise. 
 Lastly, I control for temporal dependence in the strategies adopted by a group.  For 
the models using the 3-category PAVI measures, I included lagged binary indicators of the 
dependent variable, omitting the highest category.  I use this technique because previous 
analyses have pointed out that while temporal dependence remains a significant issue in 
MLE models, simply employing a lagged dependent variable is not appropriate.  This method 
is a suitable alternative that additionally provides for easy substantive interpretation of the 
results with respect to changes in the dependent variable between t-1 and t.37  
 
Results 
Tables 2 and 3 provide the results from the regression analyses predicting the frequency and 
range of insurgent violence.38  Models 1 through 3 in Table 4.2 show the results for the 
ordered probit regressions reflecting the results for the frequency of abuse.  According to 
each model ΔRCi is negative and statistically significant, providing support for hypothesis 
1.39   This result strongly suggests that as insurgent power declines relative to the government 
between the previous and current period — as a result of pro-government intervention, 
significant combat losses or troop defections, or superior recruitment by the government — 
                                                
37 See for example Hafner-Burton (2005) and Wood (2008) for other applications of this technique to state 
repression. 
 
38  Appendix 2 provides robustness checks using the alternative dependent variable.  The results support the 
primary hypothesis regarding the relationship between changes in insurgents' relative capabilities and the 
frequency and type of violence.  The secondary hypotheses regarding the incidence of insurgent recruitment are 
not supported. 
 
39   For each model I also ran robustness checks dropping observations in which ΔRCi fell two standard 
deviations above the mean.  Results were substantively similar and the change in capabilities variable was 
consistently negative and statistically significant. 
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rebels become more likely to kill greater numbers of civilians.  Looking at Models 2 and 3, 
the result provides marginal support for hypothesis 2, which posited that greater levels of 
insurgent violence are more likely when there is a lower incidence of insurgent recruitment 
among the population.  The value for the variable is significant and negative in Model 2, but 
just passes the level of marginal significance in Model 3 (p=0.11).  The lackluster 
performance of the variable may suggest that while insurgents generally lower violence as 
their capabilities and support increase, they still frequently target persons they perceive as 
enemies such as activists for their opposition and civilians suspected of collaboration.  In 
order to evaluate this relationship it is useful to examine the results for the range of insurgent 
violence tested in models 4 through 6. 
Models 4 through 6 in Table 4.3 provide support for hypothesis 3, which argued that 
negative changes in the relative capabilities of insurgents contributed to a greater likelihood 
of indiscriminate violence.  As in the first set of models, ΔRCi is negative and significant 
across the specifications.   Consistent with the theory, these results suggest that as insurgent 
capabilities increase, rebels become less likely to resort to indiscriminate violence against the 
population.  In addition, Models 5 and 6 support the secondary hypotheses regarding the 
recruitment ability of insurgents and their support within the conflict zone.  In both models 
the coefficient on the variable achieves at least marginal statistical significance and is 
negative.  Thus, the results suggest that as the ease with which insurgents can gain support 
from the conflict zone increases and as their ability to police the population of that area 
increases, they are less likely to resort to randomized violence in order to deter collaboration 
with the regime.  This may also explain the results from the previous set of regressions in 
which the incidence of insurgents only returned marginally supportive results.  Support may 
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only have a marginal effect on overall levels of violence, but the incidence of insurgent 
recruitment clearly leads to a reduction of violence against civilians broadly.  That is, the 
range of violence falls as the incidence of recruitment increases.   
 
Table 4.2 Regression Results: Frequency of Insurgent Violence 
 Model 1 
Frequency 
Model 2 
Frequency 
Model 3 
Frequency 
Δ  Insurgent Capability 
 
-1.777 (0.476)** -1.344 (0.464)*** -1.410 (0.477)** 
 -0.004 (0.001)** -0.003 (0.002) Insurgent Incidencet-1 
    
Military Capabilities 
 
 0.021 (0.125) 
 
 0.064 (0.126) 
 
 
 0.126 (0.179)  0.174 (0.179)  0.154 (0.175) Govt. Violence Range t-1 
             
Ethnic Mobilization -0.450 (0.222)** - 0.442 (0.224)** -0.489 (0.215)** 
    
Conflict Severity(ln)  0.323 (0.049)***  0.320 (0.050)***  0.331 (0.046)*** 
    
GDPpc(ln)t-1 -0.0001 (0.006)  0.001 (0.006) -0.015 (0.106) 
    
Age -0.050 (0.103) -0.048 (0.103)  0.001 (0.006) 
    
Lootable Resources 0.243 (0.187)  0.249 (0.175)  0.275 (0.172)* 
    
Democracy  -0.235 (0.206) -0.252 (0.202) -0.260 (0.203) 
    
Conflict Area(ln) -0.198 (0.077)*** -0.204 (0.074)*** -0.237 (0.073)*** 
    
DV Category 1(t-1) -1.830 (0.275)*** -1.793 (0.278)*** -1.865 (0.267)*** 
    
DV Category 2(t-1) -1.021 (0.225)*** -1.008 (0.232)*** -1.043 (0.226)*** 
    
Log-pseudolikelihood 
 
-236.990 -235.938 -240.476 
Wald X2 134.45 156.06 161.57 
    
Prob. > X2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    
Observations 310 308  319 
Dyads 71 70 78 
Coefficients and robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses. ***=P<0.01 *=P< 0.05  *=P< 0.10  
Two-tailed test. 
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Table 4.3. Regression Results: Range of Insurgent Violence 
 Model 4 
Range 
Model 5 
Range 
Model 6 
Range 
Δ  Insurgent Capability 
 
Insurgent Incidencet-1 
 
Military Capabilities 
 
Govt. Violence Range t-1 
 
Ethnic Mobilization 
 
Conflict Severity(ln) 
 
GDPpc(ln)t-1 
 
Age 
 
Lootable Resources 
 
Democracy  
 
Conflict Area(ln) 
 
DV Category 1(t-1) 
 
DV Category 2(t-1) 
 
Log-pseudolikelihood 
 
Wald X2 
 
Prob. > X2 
 
Observations 
-1.624 (0.471)** 
 
-0.006 (0.002)** 
 
 
 
-0.026 (0.197) 
 
-0.152 (0.242) 
 
0.219 (0.042)*** 
  
0.163 (0.094)* 
 
-0.0001 (0.007)  
 
0.198 (0.166) 
 
-0.103 (0.183) 
 
-0.124 (0.070)* 
 
-1.690 (0.266)*** 
 
-0.996 (0.152)*** 
 
-247.674 
 
115.61 
0.000 
 
 
319 
Dyads 
-1.249 (0.457)***  
 
 
 
-0.114 (0.119) 
  
-0.073 (0.195) 
 
-0.105 (0.257) 
  
0.208 (0.045)*** 
 
0.189 (0.104)* 
 
-0.001 (0.006) 
  
0.215 (0.171) 
 
-0.076 (0.191) 
 
-0.108 (0.074) 
 
-1.640 (0.268)*** 
 
-0.970 (0.162)*** 
 
-244.443 
 
104.83 
0.000 
 
 
310 
71 
-1.537 (0.446)** 
 
-0.005 (0.002)** 
 
-0.054 (0.119) 
 
-0.223 (0.204) 
 
-0.111 (0.253) 
 
0.223 (0.044)***  
 
0.166 (0.096)* 
 
-0.001 (0.007) 
 
0.202 (0.170) 
 
-0.273 (0.200) 
 
-0.121 (0.075)* 
 
-1.676 (0.271)*** 
 
-0.965 (0.156)*** 
 
-240.764 
 
111.45 
0.000 
 
 
308  
70 78 
Coefficients and robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses. ***=P<0.01 *=P< 0.05  *=P< 0.10  
Two-tailed test. 
 
 In order to provide a more substantive interpretation, using the results from models 2 
and 5 I compute the predicted probabilities for the effects of ΔRCi and the incidence of 
insurgent recruitment from the conflict zone on the expected change in the frequency and 
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range of insurgent violence from t-1 to t.  Specifically, these estimations predict the 
probability of insurgent violence being in one of the three respective categories given that 
they engaged in an intermediate level of violence in the previous year.  Figures 4.1 and 4.2 
present the predictions for the frequency of violence while Figures 4.3 and 4.4 give 
predictions for the range of violence.  First, the role of temporal dependence is clear in all 
figures.  According to Figure 4.2, if an insurgent group adopted an intermediate level of 
killing in the prior year, the probability that it maintained that level of killing in the next year 
was nearly 60% regardless of the change in the capabilities.  This was similar for predictions 
using the insurgent incidence variable at all levels save for those approaching the maximum 
value.  However, in line with hypothesis 1, Figure 4.1 also shows that as insurgent 
capabilities increase relative to the government between t and t-1 they become increasingly 
likely to de-escalate violence.  For example, a two-standard deviation increase in ΔRCi above 
the mean increases the probability that insurgents switch from an intermediate level of 
violence to the lowest category by approximately 4%.  Conversely, a two-standard deviation 
decrease from the mean increases the probability of the group moving from the intermediate 
to the highest category of violence by approximately 6%.   
 Figure 4.2 shows the predictions for the change in strategy based on the incidence of 
insurgent mobilization within the conflict zone.  According to these predictions, the 
incidence of recruitment produces only small changes in the frequency of violence across 
most levels of recruitment.  Moving from the minimum level of recruitment to the mean 
leads to only a 2% increase in the probability that a group reduces its level of civilian killing 
by one category from the previous year.  Moving from the mean to twice the mean increases 
that probability by approximately 4%.  The major change in insurgent violence frequency, 
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however, comes when insurgents experience significant mobilization capacity among the 
population.  When the incidence of insurgents extends to the maximum value in the tested 
sample (~180 insurgents per 10,000 civilians for the tested sample) the likelihood of a one-
category decrease in violence frequency increases by almost 45%.  These results (as well as 
diagnostics performed on the regression results) suggest that only very high levels of 
mobilization and civilian support exert tangible impacts on changes in the frequency of 
violence adopted by insurgents.   
Figure 4.1: Predicted Frequency of Insurgent Violence by Δ  RCi 
 
 
Note: The figure shows the predicted probability of a change from the intermediate category of violence to 
another category goven the specified change in relative insurgent capabilities from t-1 to t.  Estimated values 
were simulated using Clarify  (King, Tomz & Wittenberg, 2000). Previous year's violence value set to the 
intermmediate cateogry; all others values set at their mean, median, or modal values. 
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Figure 4.2: Predicted Frequency of Insurgent Violence by Insurgents Incidence 
Note: The figure shows the predicted probability of a change from the intermediate category of violence to 
another category given the range of insurgent incidence (insurgents per 10,000 persons in the conflict area). 
Estimated values were simulated using Clarify (King, Tomz & Wittenberg, 2000). Previous year's value set to 
intermediate category; all other independent variables set at their mean, median, or modal values. 
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Figure 4.3: Predicted Range of Insurgent Violence by Δ  RCi 
Note: The figure shows the predicted probability of a change from the intermediate category of violence to 
another category given a range of changes in insurgent-government troop ratios between time t-1 and t. 
Estimated values were simulated using Clarify (King, Tomz & Wittenberg, 2000). Previous year's value set to 
intermediate category; all other independent variables set at their mean, median, or modal values. 
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Figure 4.4: Predicted Range of Insurgent Violence by Insurgent Incidence 
Note: The figure shows the predicted probability of a change from the intermediate category of violence to 
another category given the range of insurgent incidence (insurgents per 10,000 persons in the conflict area). 
Estimated values were simulated using Clarify (King, Tomz & Wittenberg, 2000). Previous year's value set to 
intermediate category; all other independent variables set at their mean, median, or modal values. 
 
 
Similar trends emerge in Figures 4.3 and 4.4, which demonstrate the effects of 
changes in insurgent capabilities and the level of insurgent mobilization within the conflict 
zone on the range of insurgent violence.  Like the simulations for the frequency of violence, 
these simulations suggest a high degree of temporal dependence — a group that adopted the 
intermediate range category in the previous period was approximately 40% likely to maintain 
that strategy in the current period.  Interestingly, unlike the predictions for the influence of 
the incidence of insurgent recruitment on the frequency of violence, the predictions for its 
relationship to the range of violence show a more consistent temporal effect, hovering around 
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40% across the values of the variable.  These simulations add additional support to 
hypothesis 2.  Figure 4.3 suggests, as predicted, that shifts in the balance of power that 
benefit the insurgents contribute to a decrease in the likelihood that the group switches to a 
more indiscriminate strategy of violence.  In Indochina, as the Vietminh's strength rose 
relative to the French colonial forces, its use of indiscriminate terror decreased (Pike, 1967: 
251).  By contrast, the more ground insurgents lose relative to the government from one year 
to the next, the more likely they are to randomize violence.  For example, in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo and Uganda in late 2008 and early 2009, the LRA dramatically escalated 
violence against random civilians following a shift in the power dynamics of the conflict as 
the rebels were nearly defeated by a multinational military force (Rice, 2009; HRW, 2010).   
Specifically, these estimates predict that a two-standard deviation decline from the mean in 
relative capabilities contributes to 9% increase in the probability that the group moves from 
the intermediate to highest range category, while a two-standard deviation increase leads that 
probability to decline by 8%.    
According to figure 4.4, as the incidence of recruitment increases, the probability of 
adopting more indiscriminate forms of violence also falls.  Much like the trend in the 
predictions for the frequency of violence, the probability of change is minor across most 
values, showing almost no change from the minimum to the mean.  However, as was the 
trend in the above predictions as well, the movement from the mean toward the maximum 
values leads to a substantial change in the probability of a shift in strategy.  Specifically, an 
increase from the mean incidence to the maximum in the sample is associated with a 26% 
chance that the group moves from the intermediate to the highest range of violence.  Put in 
other terms, both high popular loyalty as well as changes in the group's capabilities 
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contributes to a significant decline in their reliance on terrorism or random violence against 
the population. 
Turning to the other predictors, it is important to note that the power dynamics seem 
to outweigh simple power ratios in terms of the effect on violence against civilians.  While 
the level of insurgent military capabilities was generally expected to influence the severity of 
violence against civilians, this analysis suggests that when the changes in capabilities from 
one period to the next are accounted for, the influence of the power ratio alone washes out. 
Hence, the dynamic story may be more important than the static story in this case.  In all 
models for which it is accounted, the measure of military capabilities fails to achieve 
statistical significance.  Surprisingly, in the models explaining the frequency of violence the 
coefficient was positive across specifications but consistently negative in the models 
accounting for range.  
Two additional factors likely related to the ability of insurgents to mobilize support 
and loyalty among civilians return negative and significant coefficients in the models.  First, 
the variable accounting for ethnic mobilization is negative in all models, though it only 
achieves marginal significance in models accounting for the frequency of violence.  
Consequently, this suggests that it has a significant effect on decreasing the frequency of 
violence but no significant effect on the range of violence.  Based on the rationale presented 
above, if ethnic ties facilitate loyalty and attract more dedicated, higher quality recruits, it 
stands to reason that — in contrast to many popular theories — conflicts in which insurgents 
mobilize along ethnic lines may lead to a lower frequency of civilian victimizations if not 
more selective violence.   
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Second, the size of the conflict area is negative and significant across all models 
though it is only marginally significant in most of the models accounting for the range of 
insurgent violence.  This generally suggests that as the size of the conflict area increases the 
frequency and range of civilian targeting declines.  While this variable technically accounts 
for only the size of the area in which conflict occurred, it is possible that it also picks up on 
the level of control exerted by insurgents over territory.  In this sense, it would provide 
support for Kalyvas's (2006) theory regarding control and violence.  In addition, it would 
generally fit with the arguments in this a manuscript that as power dynamics favor 
insurgents, the group has less incentive to target civilians for violence because capabilities 
should be correlated with the size of the conflict area. 
The effect of government violence on insurgent violence is inconsistent in these 
models. In all but one of the models accounting for the frequency of insurgent violence the 
frequency and range of government violence exerts a positive but insignificant effect.  In the 
first set of models the measure of insurgent violence is positive while in the second set it is 
negative; neither achieves statistical significance.   
 Consistent with all past studies of anti-civilian violence, the overall severity of the 
conflict in terms of battlefield deaths is a significant predictor of the severity of insurgent 
violence toward civilians.  State strength as proxied by the natural log of GDP per capita is 
insignificant and changes signs in the three models examining the frequency of insurgent 
violence; however, it reaches marginal significance in the models accounting for the range of 
insurgent violence.  This suggests, perhaps, that insurgents facing stronger states are more 
likely to use random violence and acts of terrorism in an attempt to destroy the superior 
resource flows that strong states are likely to provide to their citizens.  As such, it is 
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somewhat consistent with the theory presented herein.  As the capabilities and wealth of the 
state increase it becomes harder for insurgents to mobilize support; as such, they may employ 
random violence and terror as a means to undercut the benefits provided by the state.   
The variable accounting for the age of the conflict is negative but insignificant across 
most specifications, suggesting the lack of a relationship between the duration of the 
insurgency and the level of type of violence.  Lootable resources have a consistently positive 
relationship to insurgent violence, yet the effect is significant — and marginally so — in only 
one of the models.  As such, it largely fails to support theories (e.g., Kaldor, 1997; Weinstein, 
2007) that argue that lootable resources such as diamonds and drugs produce greedy and 
therefore brutal rebel groups.  Similarly, the age of the insurgency is positively correlated 
with both the range and frequency of violence but never produces significant results.  Lastly, 
democracy has a generally negative relationship across the models but fails to achieve 
significance, thus failing to support theories (e.g., Goodwin, 2005) that insurgents are more 
likely to use terrorism or indiscriminate violence against populations in democratic states. 
 
NLF Violence in Vietnam: A Case in Brief 
 
In order to illustrate the mechanisms elucidated in the theory more clearly I examine these 
dynamics within the context of the Communist insurgency against the government of South 
Vietnam.  The case is a useful illustration for several reasons.  First, both the levels of 
insurgent killings as well as the relative balance of power between the conflict actors vary 
notably over the conflict.  Importantly, the changes in both are easily tracked over time, and 
can be compared using a number of available proxies.  The detailed statistical data compiled 
by the US government during the war allows for convenient tracing of these dynamics; 
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similarly, the wealth of survey research and contemporary analyses of the case conducted as 
it unfolded facilitate examining the relationship between the central variables.  Lastly, despite 
the likely criticism that Vietnam was an internationalized conflict rather than a true civil war, 
the international dimension make it a particularly useful case to for illustrating the expected 
theoretical relationships.40  Because the "foreign" interventions occurred at different time 
points in the conflict and after the conflict had already been active for a number of years, the 
changes in the power dynamics they wrought are illustrative of the broader theory painted 
here.  That is, as articulated in this and previous chapters, broader changes in the relative 
balance of power between the two sides of the conflict contribute to changes in the violence 
strategies they adopt.  Moreover, these interventions help to demonstrate that the magnitude 
of the power shift is often related to the change in violence strategy.  As shown below, for 
example, while NLF violence varies notably during the period prior to the direct involvement 
of US ground forces, the major changes in the levels of violence correspond to the US 
buildup and subsequent departure.  Arguably, this is the case because it represented the 
largest shift in the relative power balance between the Communists and the GVN and its 
allies during the conflict.  Consequently, the case is useful starting point for exploring and 
illustrating the general dynamics of the theory presented above. 
In brief, the theory fits the Vietnam case quite well.   During periods of sustained or 
increasing relative capabilities, civilians revise upward their opinions of insurgent victory 
and shift support to the insurgents.  The expansion of NLF control in rural areas during the 
late 1950s and early 1960s demonstrated the strength of the rebellion. The perception of 
growing insurgent strength coupled with the relative capacity of revolutionary institutions in 
                                                
40  In truth, few if any civil conflicts are wholly domestic affiants.  A review of civil wars of the 20th century 
shows that the vast majority experienced foreign intervention, crossed over international borders, or otherwise 
actively and explicitly involved governments or armed groups beyond the conflict state.  
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rural communities encouraged recruitment and lessened the need to rely on terror against the 
peasantry (Joiner, 1974: 181-183; Tanham, 2006: 66-67).   However, increased US 
involvement in Vietnam and improvements in GVN counterinsurgency strategies throughout 
the mid- and late-1960s weakened the relative capacity of the insurgents and forced them to 
adopt more coercive strategies of resource mobilization, including forced conscription and 
greater violence (Berman, 1974: 50; Joiner, 1974: 247, 250-251).  The major drawdown in 
US troops that began in 1969-1970 and continued until through 1973 again altered the 
balance of power in the conflict. As US troop strength declined, the relative military 
capabilities of the Communist forces increased.  During this period, intentional insurgent 
violence against civilians began to decline as the rebels (with the assistance of NVA forces) 
increasingly asserted control over many southern provinces.   
 Figure 4.5 shows the annual number of intentional civilian killings through acts of 
terrorism and the assassination of local officials committed by the NLF insurgency for the 
years 1961-1972.41  In accord with the summary in the last paragraph, violence was 
comparatively low in the early years of the conflict but underwent significant escalation as 
US troop stocks began to alter the power dynamics of the conflict.  In 1964 the US had 
roughly 20,000 troops in Vietnam, largely in support and special operations roles. The 
following year this number more than doubled, and the troops began to engage in direct 
combat with Viet Cong forces.  These numbers grew rapidly between late-1965 and 1968, 
culminating in approximately a half-million US troops in the country.  This surge of foreign 
forces resulted in a shift in the power balance and the movement of control away from the 
                                                
41   Data on civilian killings as well as other data compiled either by the US military or for it should be treated 
with some caution as definition, data sources, and coding methods change at various points throughout the 
conflict and as different agencies or departments were charged with accumulating and analyzing data (see 
Shcultz, 1981). 
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NLF/NVA.  As demonstrated in the figure, this shift corresponded to an increase in the 
number of civilian killing conducted by the Communist forces.  After 1968, however, US 
forces were withdrawn from the country.  As US troop levels declined (and as NVA 
infiltrations from the North increased), the power balance shifted back toward the communist 
insurgents who then began to constrain acts of terror against the population.  The details of 
the case, even as presented briefly here, reflect the dynamics of the conflict that led to 
changes in the level of insurgent violence.  However, a more slightly more nuanced 
articulation of events provides additional support.   
Following the division of the North and South, as many as 100,000 of the Vietminh 
cadres fled to the North.  Perhaps 10,000 remained in the South to establish an infrastructure 
for future action (Pike, 1967: 77-84; Zasloff, 1968: 1).  In the mid-1950s those who had left 
for the North began to infiltrate back in order to launch the insurgency against the Diem 
regime.  These cadres represented a rising threat to the stability of the Diem regime; as a 
result, it launched a campaign of repression against the infiltrators, remaining cadres, and 
former Vietminh (many who had been aligned with the anti-Communist wing of the 
movement during the insurrection against colonial rule).  This repression quickly expanded 
and intensified and the government began to detain, torture, and often execute suspected 
collaborators as well as their family members, friends, and associates (Fall, 1966: 237-238; 
Pike, 1967: 79; Zasloff, 1968: 9-11).    
While the regime's repressive campaign initially dealt a blow to the cadre's 
organizational efforts, in the longer term it created the conditions that allowed the movement 
to expand.  Simply put, many former Vietminh and others who the regime perceived as 
collaborators or sympathizers felt they had little choice but to join the rebellion (Zasloff, 
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1968: 13-16, 26).   As one NLF cadre related to a reporter in the early-1960s, he (and many 
other cadres) joined the Front because the Diem regime had begun arresting and executing a 
great many former and suspected Vietminh resistance members, even those with no 
association to the NLF (Oka, 1968: 337).  These cadres became the "backbone" of the future 
NLF movement.  By the late 1950s they had established safe zones in the swamps and 
mountains of the South within which they could train recruits and amass resources and from 
which to launch military attacks and lay the groundwork for large-scale rebellion, including 
both political and social organization in rural villages (Fall, 1968: 237-239; Zasloff, 1968: 
16).  For example, the NLF enjoyed some notable success in mobilizing support among 
highland tribes on the periphery of the state.  During this period Vietminh from these areas 
who had remained in the North after partition infiltrated back to these tribal regions and 
began to mobilize support.  Herein, previous anti-Colonial organizations were reactivated 
and the returnees relied on both their significant organizational capabilities (including the 
construction of public health facilities, education, and governance) as well as tribal 
discontent with the Diem regime to gain a secure foothold in the country (Joiner, 1968: 352-
353).  These highland areas became sanctuaries and refuges where the NLF could train 
guerrillas and from which they could launch attacks. 
A vital part of this initial growth period included a violence program intended to 
separate the population from government control.  To that end the guerillas initiated a 
campaign of "terror" in the countryside.  However, while the Front escalated violence during 
this period, it remained largely selective and targeted local administrators, youth movement 
leaders, local security force members, and other agents of the state (Clodfelter, 1995; 38-39; 
Fall, 1966: 185).  Arguably, the selectivity of the violence and its comparatively limited 
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nature (especially as compared to later conflict years) were related to the relative power the 
movement enjoyed in the countryside.  Despite the limited number of troops they could field 
in comparison to the government (Thompson [1966: 48] estimates a 50:1 ratio during this 
time frame), they enjoyed significant capabilities in rural areas in terms of mobilization, 
indoctrination, and movement because the Diem regime could exert little effective control on 
the population outside of Saigon (Pike, 1967: 80).  Moreover, the insurgents enjoyed 
significant sympathy among the population because of widespread discontent in rural areas 
(Zasloff, 1968: 22).  As such, the newly re-organized cadres were able to grow and expand 
while using violence and terror in a selective and judicious manner (Davison, 1968: xi; 
Leites, 1969: 65; Shultz, 1978: 80-84).   
In 1958-1959 the Diem regime expanded its reliance on repression, more broadly 
targeting the population, thereby creating resentment and fertile ground for the proto-
guerrillas to mobilize support (see Pike, 1967: 79-80).  The increasing repression of the Diem 
regime contributed to support for the insurgents and offers a partial explanation for the more 
limited use of violence by the guerrillas during this period.  During this period the Front 
relied much less on violence than the regime, which translated into a more positive image 
among peasants (Shultz, 1978: 84).  Thus, while the guerillas employed terror to expel 
village officials and security personnel, destabilize the countryside, and create the conditions 
necessary to establish Communist control, they had limited incentive to employ large-scale 
or indiscriminate violence against the peasantry.  
 By 1960 the rebels had become entrenched within the population.  In response the 
government slowly began to construct a counterinsurgency strategy that could at the least 
halt the rapid expansion of the insurgency.  In response to widespread unrest and increasing 
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instability in the countryside (and with increasing military aid from the US), the Diem regime 
expanded its counterinsurgency efforts, employing civic actions such as land reform and 
rural development programs (see Pike, 1967: 61-64) to supplement military components.  
These programs were intended to counter the expansion of the political and social reforms 
and programs promised by the Communist insurgents.  However, the work of the regime's 
civic actions teams as well as policies such as rural development initiatives and land tenure 
programs were slow-moving, poorly implemented and invited only a tepid response from the 
population in terms of gaining support (Scigliano, 1968: 596-597; Ladejinsky, 1968; Pike, 
1976: 64-68).  Moreover, the general inability of the regime to provide security and the 
competing (and often superior) programs instituted by the Front negated any real success 
from the government programs.   
During this period, particularly between 1960 and 1961, the Front's popularity grew 
significantly and it was increasingly able to mobilize support and recruit new guerillas from 
the rural populations (Leites, 1969: 40), particularly those areas under its direct control (Pike, 
1969: 113-114).  Following Tet in 1960, a large number of persons moved into Party-
controlled areas because the Front had effectively limited the government presence in many 
rural areas and established itself as the de facto government (Race, 1972: 116).  Bernard Fall 
(1966: 283), for example, citing a US military adviser, reported that by early 1962 80% of 
the countryside was under the nominal influence of the Viet Cong. The rising support for the 
Front and its growing capabilities allowed it to maintain a relatively selective application of 
violence.  Moreover, during these years, the number of assassinations and intentional killings 
of civilians stabilized to just over 1000 per year (see Figure 4.5) — a high figure but still low 
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relative to the damage being inflicted by indiscriminate ARVN violence (Leites, 1969: 84-
85).    
In 1962 the situation began to change, albeit only slightly, to the benefit of the 
government.  The recognition of the recalcitrance of the insurgency and its rising support 
among the population prompted the regime and its US allies to undertake a significant 
change in its counterinsurgency strategy.  First, US troop strength had increased to more than 
10,000 and began engaging the Viet Cong in combat. In addition, US Special Forces troops 
organized local resistance to the NLF, including arming Montagnard units and training local 
defense militias to provide security to rural hamlets (Clodfelter, 1995: 44-45).  More 
importantly, The Diem regime (with increasing US support), implemented the Strategic 
Hamlet program.  Based in part on the successes of the British counterinsurgency effort in 
Malaya the decade before, Strategic hamlets were constructed with the intent of separating 
the people from the insurgents (or conversely, the fish from their sea) by providing physical 
security as well as a civic program designed to win "hearts and minds" (Dunn, 1981: 4-7; 
Pike, 1967: 64-68).  This program began in earnest in early 1962 and met with some initial 
success.  Despite its eventual failure and the poor press it received, the initial response of the 
insurgency was to back off and regroup (Dunn, 1981: 9).  At least in the immediate-term, the 
fortified hamlets increased the difficulty with which the NLF insurgents could gain access to 
supplies, build revolutionary infrastructure, and they slowed the momentum of the 
movement.  The aggressive activity of US special forces in the highlands and the (albeit 
limited) efforts of the Strategic Hamlet and rural development schemes provided some 
success in deterring NLF expansion in the rural highlands, making mobilization more 
difficult and protecting civilians from NLF violence (Joiner, 1968: 354-355).  This shift in 
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the dynamics of the conflict — as the US slowly built up its forces in the country, as its 
support for the regime increased, and the government experimented with new counter-
revolutionary strategies — led to changes in the level of support for the guerillas.  While 
support was broadly forthcoming in the previous years, it began to waver in 1962 (Leites, 
1969: 40).  As popular support for the insurgents receded in 1962 and into 1963, the 
insurgents escalated the number of assassinations and killings they used in an attempt to 
undermine the government-built Strategic Hamlets.  They also adopted increasingly coercive 
recruitment strategies, including the use of violence and kidnapping (Donnell, 1967: 11).  As 
shown in Figure 4.5, during this period insurgent violence against civilians increased by 
approximately 50% between 1961 and 1962 and by 1963 was nearly double the levels of 2 
years earlier. 
 The effect of the Strategic Hamlet Program (SHP) was short-lived.  As with previous 
government programs, the benefits promised to the people failed to materialize and the 
government was unable to provide sufficient security to the population (Dunn, 1981: 12).  
While defection in the first few years of the SHP had increased (at least nominally), by late 
1963 they were declining; moreover, desertions from the ARVN were steadily increasing 
(Dunn, 1981: 10).  While in 1960 the force ratio between the government and insurgents was 
greater than 50:1, the disparity had been cut in half by late 1963; by the beginning of 1965 
(prior to major US intervention), the ratio had fallen to less than 10:1 with some estimates as 
low as 5:1 (Burchett, 1968: 468; Thompson, 1966: 48).  Moreover, by 1964 the SHP was in 
complete disarray, the dynamics of the war had again shifted away from the regime, and the 
NLF stood on the verge of victory (Dunn, 1981: 19-23).  While the Saigon government had 
increased its forces dramatically (by nearly 50%) between 1960 and 1963, the Front had 
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grown at a more rapid pace, quickly whittling away at the numerical superiority of 
government forces (Burchett, 1968: 466).  Furthermore, the NLF took advantage of the 
collapse of the Diem regime in a coup and the increased instability in Saigon brought by 
widespread protests (which spurred the coup) to significantly expand their power and 
authority during 1963-1964 (Clodfelter, 1995: 49-50).   
Figure 4.5: Annual NLF Civilian Killings 
 
 
Annual killing data are median values compiled from multiple sources: Fall (1966), Hillsman (1967), Pike 
(1967); Thayer (1985). 
 
 
Consistent with the theory outlined above, the significant expansion of the NLF's 
capabilities and support during this period translated into a notable decline in the level of 
violence employed by guerillas.  Following the collapse of the Diem regime, NLF killings 
fell to their lowest levels since the onset of major violence in 1959.  According to the 
numbers compiled for Figure 4.5, the number of intentional killings and assassinations 
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declined by nearly 70% between 1963 and 1964; while they climbed again in 1965 they still 
remained significantly below the levels recorded in 1961 and 1962.   
The slight uptick in the violence in 1965 and the continued trend for the next 5 years 
is in large part related to the most significant shift in the war's strategic balance during the 
decade: the major buildup of US forces.  At the beginning of 1965 the US had some 25,000 
troops deployed in Vietnam; over the course of the year, however, this number grew rapidly 
to more than 180,000 (Clodfelter, 1995: 66, 75).  By the end of 1967 this number had risen to 
nearly half a million.  This dramatic shift in the power balance of the war presented a major 
strategic setback for Communist forces.  Despite the increasing infiltration of NVA troops 
from the North, the tide of the war rapidly turned against the insurgents (Pike, 1969: 121).  
Pressure from the intensity of combat meant that the Communists had to divert resources 
away from infrastructure and political organization toward combat.  For example, Pike 
(1969: 117) reports that while the ratio of resources devoted to political compared to military 
efforts was roughly 10:1 at the beginning of the decade, this ratio had fallen to 2:1 by the 
middle of it.  Thus, the insurgents were increasingly focused on the military aspects of the 
conflict and less on the provision of goods and resources to civilians such as infrastructure, 
propaganda, and civilian mobilization.  These pressures also required the front to increase its 
resource extraction from the areas under its control, both in terms of taxation and recruitment 
(Oka, 168: 340-341).  By the middle of the decade tax collection had become more difficult 
as peasants increasing resisted the Front and resented the high price they paid for the ongoing 
conflict; in response, the Front employed increasingly coercive methods to maintain the 
resource needs (Davison, 1968: 28; Oka, 1968: 342-344). 
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By 1968-1969 the US had deployed more than half a million forces in the country and 
the combat forces of the GVN totaled more than 800,000.  This compared to approximately a 
quarter million VC/NVA forces.  While numbers differ as to the actual force ratios between 
the belligerents, the trend clearly suggests that until the end of the decade the balance of 
power was moving away from the Communists.  While the estimated balance (of combat 
forces) was roughly 2:1 against the insurgents in the middle of the decade, this ratio had risen 
to approximately 4:1 in 1969 (in Thayer, 1985: 97).   Consistent with the theory outlined 
above, this shift in resources and the declining faith in insurgent victory led to a reduction in 
support from the civilian population and increased difficulties in resources mobilization.  
While during earlier periods the Communist insurgents could easily attract the support of 
villagers, by the mid and late 1960s support waned and resistance to the Viet Cong increased 
among the population (Davison, 1968: xvi, 17, 165; Gurtov, 1967: xi, 9; Kellen, 1969: 8).   
The change in civilian support that began in the middle of the decade correlates to a shift in 
the balance of power in the conflict.  However, the change in civilian behavior resulted 
primarily from two factors: the declining ability of the insurgents to provide security and 
declining optimism regarding insurgent victory.  With respect to the former, US airpower 
played a dramatic role in this dynamic as Viet Cong forces could not protect peasants from 
the mounting "collateral damage" inflicted by US/GVN air and artillery strikes, leading many 
to flee Communist-held areas and find refuge in the comparatively safer government-
controlled urban centers (Gurtov, 1967: 23-24; Race, 1972: 215).  Prior to 1965 many 
peasants viewed support for the NLF as safer than service with the GVN; however, as the 
balance of power shifted, more youths began opting to join the GVN rather than be drafted or 
kidnapped by the guerillas (Davison, 1968: 18).  Second, the period saw a declining belief 
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among peasants in the likelihood of NLF victory now that the US, with its vast resources and 
firepower, had actively intervened on the side of the South Vietnamese government 
(Davison, 1968: ix).  This effect extended to the ranks of guerrilla fighters as well.  Between 
1965 and 1967 the desertion rate among the Peoples' Liberation Front (the army of the NLF) 
more than doubled (Pike, 1969: 124).  In addition, the village infrastructure built in earlier 
years fell into disarray and the financial situation came under increasing strain (124-125).  As 
such, the NLF lost much of the control they had gained in the earlier years of the decade.   
 
Figure 4.6: NLF Civilian Killings and Level of Population Control 
 
 
 
Bars represent the annual numbers of civilians killings committed by the NLF.  Line represents the population 
living outside of GVN control according to the evaluations of the Strategic Hamlet Program and the Hamlet 
Evaluation System. Killing data are median values taken from several available sources. Data compiled from 
Thayer (1985). 
 
 
Also as predicted by the theory presented above, the change in the conflict's power 
dynamics provoked changes in the rebels' use of violence as a means to garner resources, 
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control territory, deter defection, and enforce loyalty.  Figures 4.6 and 4.7 plot NLF violence 
along with the level of control exercised by the insurgents and the annual number of 
defections respectively.  These graphs illustrate a strong correlation between these measures 
of insurgent capabilities/support and the level of violence the rebels employed.  During this 
period the guerrillas increased the use of violence against peasants and adopted more 
coercive recruitment techniques, kidnapping or forced recruitment with the threat of violence 
(Denton, 1968: 7; Goure, 1965: 4).   
 
Figure 4.7: NLF Civilian Killings and Defections to GVN 
 
 
Bars represent the annual numbers of civilians killings committed by the NLF.  Line represents the number of 
annual defections from the NLF to the GVN.  Killing data are the median values taken from several sources. 
Control data compiled from Thayer (1985). 
 
 
In some areas — such as those that enjoyed nominally successful pacification 
schemes — during this period insurgents resorted to terror and intimidation of the local 
population (Pearce, 1967: xi; Pike, 1969: 129).  As the GVN and US forces increasingly 
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pushed the Communist forces out of populated areas in the late 1960s, the NLF became 
increasingly responsible for civilian casualties (Thayer, 1985: 129).  The most significant use 
of violence came in 1968 during the Tet offensive: in Hue NLF insurgents killed thousands 
of civilians and local officials.  While some scholars (Shultz, 1978: 89; Hosmer, 1970: 50) 
assert that the level of the violence and its lack of discrimination was rather uncharacteristic 
of the Front, the violence seems like less of an aberration given the trajectory of insurgent 
violence during the previous years.  As illustrated by Figure 4.5, the level of violence 
employed by the NLF rapidly escalated between 1965 and 1968 as the balance of forces 
shifted increasingly against the NLF/NVA and improved pacification projects began to have 
an effect on the loyalty of villagers.  
 1968 represented the high point of US troop involvement; in 1969 troop levels 
dropped to 400,000 by mid-year; by the end of 1971 they had fallen to approximately 
150,000.  While the official troop ratios remained static from approximately 1968 through 
the early 1970s because of increased recruitment on the part of the GVN, the reduction in US 
forces represented a major blow to the military capabilities of the South.  The strategy of 
Vietnamization adopted by the Nixon regime called for a quick de-escalation of US troop 
involvement and a turnover of security and combat roles to the native Vietnamese forces; by 
August of 1971 all ground combat operation has been handed over to the ARVN.  At nearly 
the same time, the NVA had geared up for a conventional military conflict and had 
superseded the guerillas as the major combat player in the conflict.  By 1971 the GVN 
counted nearly a million men in arms, while the combined forces of the NVA and VC stood 
at roughly 250,000.  The figure is somewhat misleading, however, as only half of the GVN 
forces were regular combat troops — a notable drop from 1968 — while the rest were local 
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guard and other irregular forces (Clodfelter, 1995: 196-197).   Thus, while the force ratio 
between the belligerents appeared to be roughly the same as during the 1967-1969 period, in 
reality it had moved again toward the benefit of the Communist forces in the wake of US 
withdrawal.  Thayer (1985: 34) reports that anti-Communist force strength fell by 25% 
between 1969 and 1972.    
The shift in power following the US departure translated into a modest decline in the 
number of civilians intentionally killed by Communist forces from 1970-1972.  While the 
figures for 1970 are roughly similar to those for the previous year, by 1971 killing had fallen 
by 40% from their peak two years before.  In 1972 the value increase slightly, but still remain 
much lower than for the 1967-1969 period.  Consequently, as the regime weakened and the 
NLF and North Vietnamese forces made significant gains42 against the ARVN, the level of 
violence they committed against civilians began to decline. 
 
Conclusion 
The statistical results presented above support the theory constructed in this manuscript.  
Moreover, they jibe with existing theories of population control (Kalyvas, 2006) and the role 
of military setbacks (Hultman, 2007) in structuring rebel violence against civilians.  
Similarly, the more detailed analysis of the Vietnam conflict in the 1960s and 1970s 
illustrates that macro-level changes in the power dynamics of the conflict lead to changes at 
the micro-level, increasing or diminishing the incentives for insurgents to use violence 
against civilians.   
                                                
42   According to Clodfelter (1995: 199) US air and sea power was largely responsible for averting the collapse 
of the ARVN in summer 1972.  Thus, while the war dragged on for nearly another three years, the ARVN was 
largely incapable of competing with the VC/NVA in terms of ground combat and the ability to control territory. 
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The theory locates violence in the changing power relationships between insurgent 
and government forces and argues that macro-level power shifts structure the strategies of 
violence adopted by insurgents.  Specifically, power dynamics influence the incentives for 
violence because they alter the underlying distribution of civilian loyalty that abets or 
frustrates insurgent control.  As insurgent power declines, the probability of civilians 
defecting increases, leading rebels to escalate and randomize violence to restore deterrence or 
undermine the gains made by the government.  While violence may at face value appear 
antithetical to the insurgents' goals, resorting to these tactics at least temporarily may be the 
best of bad options for an insurgent organization.  Increasing coercive repression is likely to 
cow civilians and prevent them from defecting to the government, providing immediate (if 
temporary) gains (Pike, 1969:117).   Random violence is especially likely to be 
counterproductive if used frequently or for long periods (Kalyvas, 2006).  Yet, as 
government forces consolidate control over a conflict environment it becomes increasingly 
difficult for insurgents to recruit supporters or compel the loyalties of civilians even if they 
are sympathetic to the insurgents' goal.   
Given that civilian preferences are often weak, changing, and heavily determined by 
immediate security concerns and expectations regarding outcomes, they may become loyalty 
to the government if it is able to provide nominal security, order, social services, and other 
resources.  Facing these conditions, insurgents have an incentive to destroy what resource 
flows have been implemented by the government, bombing clinics, schools, government 
building and randomly targeting civilians for violence.  In this sense, the insurgents' goal is to 
change the more ordered systems established by the regime into something more closely 
resembling the Hobbesian anarchic world.  Thus, in a perverse way, destroying government-
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constructed order and randomizing violence puts insurgents on better footing for recruiting 
civilians and compelling their loyalty.  
The brief case analysis of the Communist insurgency in Vietnam provides a slightly 
more nuanced illustration of these relationships.  As the case demonstrates, during period of 
expansion and when the insurgency appeared strong relative to the government, they 
generally enjoyed a positive (or at least neutral) relationship with the aggregate civilian 
population.  Because they could provide significant benefits to civilians in terms of land 
reforms, redistributive tax policies, educational and medical resources, and security, the 
population nominally supported the NLF; as a result, the insurgents had little incentive to 
direction violence against the population.  By contrast, when the GVN implemented new 
counterinsurgency strategies that impeded NLF control or recruitment, insurgents escalated 
violence against civilians.  The escalation in violence was steepest during the late 1960s 
following the massive build up of US forces and the slow whittling away of control that the 
NLF had established during the previous years.  As the group's level of control in the 
countryside declined and more supporters defected to the GVN, the insurgents rapidly 
escalated violence as a mean to deter defections and undercut the advances made by he US 
and GVN forces.  
 
 CHAPTER 5 
 
Enter the State: Variations in State Violence during Civil War 
 
 
The theory of civil war violence detailed in this manuscript incorporates the behaviors and 
interactions of three central characters: insurgents, civilians, and state forces.  Thus, while the 
primary focus has been insurgent decision-making regarding violence against civilians, 
failing to explicitly address government violence strategies would appear as an obvious 
oversight.  To that end, this chapter identifies and unpacks the motivations for government 
violence perpetrated against civilians.  It does so by applying the theoretical insights 
elucidated in the previous chapters to the behaviors of state repressive forces during civil 
wars. 
As with insurgencies, government violence varies both across cases and over time.  
Insurgencies are invariably met with some manner of repressive response, yet not all 
insurgencies provoke the same level of government-sponsored violence, and not all regimes 
target civilians broadly or indiscriminately.  Some regimes respond to violent dissent or 
insurrection with death squads or mass killings while others utilize more precision 
counterinsurgency tactics.  Britain responded to the insurgency in Northern Ireland primarily 
with a police-style counterinsurgency that resulted in comparatively few civilian deaths while 
government forces in El Salvador engaged in widespread and systematic killings of rural 
peasants and organized death squads to assassinate—in extremely graphic and brutal ways—
urban activists and political opponents.   Furthermore, as with insurgents, the violence 
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strategies adopted by state forces change over time.  Guatemalan security forces primarily 
engaged in comparatively selective violence against urban political activists and members of 
leftist organizations throughout the 1970s, but they dramatically escalated the level and 
broadened the scope of state repression in the early 1980s, elevating it to the level of mass 
killing and scorched earth tactics following the coup that installed Rios Montt as president in 
1982.  However, by the middle of the decade the body count had fallen significantly.  From 
its peak in 1982 (~18,000), the number of killings fell to roughly 2000 the following year and 
then to a few hundred a year by the middle of the decade; moreover, the killings became 
increasingly selective (Ball, Kobrak & Spirer, 1999: 24, 62). This chapter attempts to explain 
this variation in the levels and types of targeting adopted by incumbent regimes over the 
course of a conflict.  
In line with the previous chapters, this chapter argues that regime violence is a 
function of the balance of power in the conflict; moreover, changes in this power relationship 
contribute to changes in the levels and types of violence adopted by the regime forces at 
different time points.  This argument is similar to existing theories that posit a direct 
relationship between regime threat perception and levels of repression and violence (e.g., 
Davenport, 1995; Gurr, 1985; Poe, 2004; Valentino, 2004).  However, this analysis adds two 
additional components that more directly link the observed empirical relationship between 
"threat" and violence within the context of civil war.  First, as discussed in previous chapters, 
the conflict is modeled as competition between the insurgents and state over the loyalty and 
support of the population within the conflict zone.  As insurgent strength rises and the group 
is better able to compete with the regime in the provision of resources to supporters, the 
government may escalate violence (sometimes to obscene levels) as a means of undermining 
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the provision of rebel benefits and to sever the interdependent relationship that guerrillas 
have built with the population.  Second, I locate threat perception within the context of a 
bargaining process that unfolds between the insurgents, civilians, and the regime over the 
course of the conflict.  These processes alter the costs of civilian expectations regarding the 
likely outcome of the conflict as well as the goods they can demand from the conflict actors.  
As the cost of the conflict generally and of the resources required to "buy off" civilians 
increases, regimes look toward violence as a rational strategy of war termination.  
This chapter proceeds as follows.  I first review pertinent literature on state-sponsored 
terror and violence in counter-insurgency operations, namely the body of repression literature 
that has located state violence in the perception of threat from opposition.  Next, I briefly 
recount the rationale for violence outlined in early chapters but reciprocally apply it to 
governments.  As with insurgents, I argue that regime violence is related to the competition 
over the civilian collaboration and loyalty.   As rebel strength increases, deterring civilian 
collaboration with the group becomes both more difficult and more costly, making civilian 
victimization a more appealing option.  I further argue that indiscriminant repression is more 
effective than commonly asserted in the literature; put simply, scorched earth and mass 
killing strategies sometimes work. Thus, depending on the costs associated with buying off 
civilians through resource provisions, reform, or selective counterinsurgency policies, 
political elites may view mass violence as a reasonable gamble under certain conditions.   
Just as more durable insurgencies demand greater concessions from the regimes they 
challenge, civilians that perceive these shifts in the power dynamics expect greater and more 
credible levels of resources from governments in exchange for resisting the pressures to 
support the rebels.  The combination of the increased threat from the insurgency and the 
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rising costs that would result from acquiescing to insurgent demands lead elites to view the 
gamble on mass violence as potentially less costly than the alternative of reforms and 
resource provisions to attract civilian loyalty.  In the following section I discuss the research 
design and present the results of the statistical analysis.  The results largely support the 
theory suggesting that changes in conflict power dynamics structure regime violence 
strategies.  The final section provides a discussion of the results and a few concluding 
remarks. 
 
Threat & the Magnitude of State-sponsored Violence 
The state terrorism and state-sponsored repression literature has consistently demonstrated 
that domestic unrest, communal violence, and insurgency contribute to state terror (e.g. 
Davenport, 1995, 2007; Gurr, 1986; Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe. et al, 1999).  The logic 
underlying such theories has predominantly focused on threat as a motivator for state 
violence.  Gurr (1986: 51) explicitly argued that the existence of groups perceived as a threat 
to incumbent ability to rule is a necessary condition for state terror.  Furthermore, the 
(perceived) depth of the latent support for rebels, as well as the active participation of the 
civilian population in the guerrilla's campaigns, structures the incentives for violence against 
the population at large (Gurr, 1986: 52; Wickham-Crowley, 1990: 226).  Other scholars have 
echoed this theoretical relationship and adapted it to the study of state-sponsored mass 
killings and genocides (see Valentino, 2004; Valentino et al., 2004).  In these models, the 
threat to the regime's goals posed by recalcitrant elements of the polity and the cost of 
selectively removing the threatening group lead elites to believe that mass terror is the best 
option for attaining their goals.   
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Poe (2004) presents a more formal model of the relationship between opposition 
threat and regime violence using an adaptation of Most and Starr's (1989: 126-128) model of 
domestic governance. 43   According to this model, leaders are principally concerned with the 
maintaining or recovering their superiority in the relationship between their political strength 
and the strength of domestic challengers.44  When faced with an internal threat, the response 
chosen by the regime is structured by the perception that the challenge will succeed in 
altering the status quo (see also Valentino et al., 2004).  As the probability that the "threat" 
will succeed in dramatically altering the status quo increases, regimes become increasingly 
likely to ratchet up repression as means to deter it. 
 While threat is certainly a powerful force that contributes to the willingness of 
regimes to resort to high levels of repression and violence against civilians, existing theories 
do little to locate threat in the dynamics of the conflict and largely neglect to explain the 
factors that contribute to changes in the level of threat perceived by the regime.  Explaining 
threat requires unpacking the power dynamics within the conflict.  In part, threat originates in 
the government's inability or unwillingness to successfully compete with insurgents (or 
dissidents) over popular loyalty.  The declining ability of the government to deter civilians 
from collaborating with insurgents induces the sense of threat.  Restoring deterrence can be 
accomplished by either increasing benefits to civilians as a reward for resisting insurgent 
pressures or by increasing the sanctions employed against civilians when they are believed to 
support insurgents.  Previous theories have not fully explained the microfoundations of the 
                                                
43   See also Poe et al. (1999), Enterline and Gleditsch (2000) for various related applications. 
 
44   According to Most and Starr (1989), rational leaders are motivated to take actions to establish either of the 
following inequalities: 1) (Snt > Tnt) or 2) [(Snt/Tnt) > (Snt-1/Tnt-1)], where S=the strength of the regime and T 
represents the Threat posed by a challenger.  That is, the incumbent desires either to possess capabilities greater 
than the perceived threat or they wish to improve the ratio of their capabilities to internal threats over time and 
will initiate policies designed to accomplish this whenever they have the opportunity or capability to do so. 
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relationship between threat and violence or why states choose mass killing and repression 
rather than accommodation.  As with the previous chapters, I assert that incorporating the 
competition over civilian loyalty is important to explaining these theoretical relationships.  
 
Competition & Power Dynamics Re-dux 
As Poe's (2004) model illustrates, "threat" is a function of the power relations between 
opposition and government forces.  As such, these power relationships structure the regime's 
perception of threat.  Shifts in the power dynamics of the conflict should then result in 
changes in the strategies of violence adopted by the regime.  As demonstrated in previous 
chapters, power shifts are endogenously related to the competition between insurgents and 
incumbent regimes over the loyalty, support, and control of the civilian population.  Like 
insurgents, states rely on the collaboration and loyalty of civilians.  The relationship between 
states and civilians, however, is in some ways distinct from that between insurgents and 
civilians.  While insurgents often rely extensively on civilians for material resources (Mao, 
1961; Mason, 1989; Wickham-Crowley, 1987: 482-483), governments are comparatively less 
reliant on such resources (Valentino, 2004: 197-199).  They depend primarily on civilians for 
intelligence or on the willingness of civilians to refuse to overtly support guerillas.45  
Government strategies are therefore typically constructed with the primary goal of preventing 
civilians from supporting or collaborating with insurgents rather than eliciting their overt 
support or sympathy.  That said, the competition model still applies; both sides are concerned 
                                                
45   Governments are often reliant on civilians for tax revenues and for the recruitment or conscription of 
soldiers.  That said, in a comparative sense they are often less reliant than insurgents because they have already 
amassed significant resources prior to the conflict.  As such, they are most concerned with denying insurgents 
access to resources rather than adding to their own resource base.  This relationship may change over the course 
of the conflict, however, which may change the nature of the competition.  This is discussed in more detail 
below. 
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with the distribution of loyalty within the conflict because it influences the likelihood of 
different conflict outcomes.  
In order to deter defections, governments apply a mixture of positive incentives and 
punitive measures.  Governments generally assume the role of the primary provider of 
benefits to citizens.  In the most basic sense they provide rudimentary economic and social 
benefits such as roads, schools, medical facilities, public sanitation, order and security, etc.  
While such provisions may be of poor quality or extremely limited in the least developed 
countries, they typically dramatically exceed those provided domestic rivals.46  The 
rudimentary benefits provided by the state, coupled with their ability to inflict significant 
sanctions on persons suspected of collaboration, serve as a significant deterrent to civilian 
defection.  However, as demonstrated in previous chapters, sufficient capabilities on the part 
of insurgents alter this relationship and represent an increasing challenge to regime 
deterrence.  This shift forces the regime to either provide additional benefits or increase 
sanctions in an effort to restore deterrence. 
 
Power Dynamics, Loyalty & Violence 
As discussed in previous chapters, the balance of resources in a conflict is not static.  
Coercive violence, ideological motivation, the assistance of foreign allies, superior 
organizational capacity, or tactical successes over poor-quality or underpaid and demoralized 
government forces can (and often does) shift the balance of power and resources in the 
conflict away from the government and towards insurgents.  When insurgents demonstrate 
                                                
46   Some exceptions exist: the FMLN in El Salvador, TPLF in Ethiopia, NLF in Vietnam, SPLM/A in southern 
Sudan, the Karen National Union (KNU) in Burma.  In virtually all cases, however, the superior or equivalent 
resources provided by the insurgents exist more because the state has chosen not provide resources to people 
than because it simply cannot provide resources. 
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military capabilities, construct a developed social and political apparatus, exert control over 
territory, or provide other pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits to potential supporters, the 
willingness of civilians to provide loyalty to the rebels increases (see Lichbach, 1995; 
Mason, 1989; 1996; Migdal, 1974: 254; Wood, 2003: 238-240).  In the competitive civil war 
environment any gain in civilian loyalty for insurgents equates to a loss for the regime.  
Moreover, any increase in civilian loyalty to the insurgency impedes the ability of 
government forces to extract information regarding the activities of insurgents, reducing the 
ability of the government to quash the insurgency.  Moreover, insurgent strength and civilian 
support are related to one another through an endogenous recruitment process—as civilian 
loyalty for the insurgency grows, the base from which insurgents extract resources and 
information expands, which translates into increased military capabilities on the part of the 
insurgency.   
Declining civilian loyalty and the concomitant increase in their rivals' military 
capabilities induces a sense of threat among political elites.  This sense of threat in turn 
increases the regime's incentive for violence (Gurr, 1986; Poe, 2004; Valentino, 2004; 
Valentino et al, 2004).   More importantly, as the distribution of power moves away from the 
government the likelihood of insurgent defeat declines, and the probability that insurgents 
overturn the status quo increases.  Thus, as the balance of power shifts away from the 
government and as civilian loyalty declines, the regime becomes more likely to rely on 
violence against civilians as means to restore deterrence and enforce loyalty among the 
civilian population.  Just as insurgents may employ terrorism to undercut the stability and 
security provided by the state to its citizens, governments may dramatically escalate the 
attacks against civilians in order to demonstrate that insurgents lack the capability to 
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effectively protect their supporters.  In Vietnam, for example, widespread US and ARVN 
(Army of the Republic of Vietnam) bombing and artillery fire at rebel-held areas had the 
effect of forcing many people out of liberated zones and into GVN-held urban areas (Gortov, 
1967: 23).  Such violence weakened the relationship between the people and the Front and 
made recruitment and resource mobilization much more difficult for the rebels, often leading 
insurgents to employ harsher methods (Davison, 1968: xvi, 92).  Finally, by increasing 
violence and escalating the costs of combat, governments may hope to force insurgents to 
divert resources away from the provision of benefits to their supporters and toward the war 
effort.   
As discussed in the previous chapter, this situation often contributes to an increase in 
rebel coercive violence against the population.  Thus, state-sponsored violence against 
civilians can serve the dual purpose of deterring civilian collaboration with the rebels and 
forcing rebels into a position that incentivizes their own escalation of violence, thus 
alienating the population.  This situation might appear superficially to lead to a stalemate; 
however, because the government can win simply by deterring support for the insurgents and 
does not necessarily require overt civilian support, the balance of the interaction nominally 
benefits the regime.  Provided this case prevails and the government is able to reduce the 
threat presented by the insurgency by reducing the level of support among the population, the 
regime should then de-escalate violence.  That is, in line with previous research, the 
reduction in threat in turn reduces the motivation for mass violence against civilians.     
 Empirically, this scenario occurs with some frequency as governments unable to 
thwart the guerillas living and thriving among the population (as Mao instructed) attempt to 
separate the fish from the water by targeting peasants in guerrilla-sympathetic areas.  In 
150 
Guatemala, President Romeo Lucas Garcia slowly escalated and broadened violence against 
the population from the late 1970s to the early 1980s.  However, this more selective (but 
increasingly brutal and widespread) strategy of repression failed to stop the expansion of the 
insurgency (and may have contributed to its growth) (Schirmer, 1998; Valentino, 2004: 209).   
By the early 1980s the largely Mayan Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP) counted to as many 
as 16,000 troops, enjoyed the active support of nearly a half million peasants, and controlled 
nearly half of the country's provinces (see Manz, 1988: 15; Schirmer, 1998: 41).  In response 
to the failures of more selective repression strategies to deter collaboration and active support 
for the insurgency among the peasants, the newly installed Rios Montt regime adopted a 
scorched earth policy with the intent of smashing the insurgency by literally draining the sea 
around the rebels—the military depopulated rural villages through violence and destruction, 
treated civilians as if they were combatants, and exterminated as many as 75,000 peasants in 
less than 18 months through sustained, systematic brutality (Rubenstein, 1987: 221-222; 
Schirmer, 1998: 45; Valentino, 2004: 210). 
 In this case, brutality was successful in diminishing if not completely deterring the 
rebel threat.  The mass killing and scorched earth tactics depopulated large swaths of rebel 
territory, thus undercutting the insurgents support base.  By 1988, the government re-
established control through most of the countryside and the estimated number of active rebels 
declined from a peak of more than 6,000 fulltime troops to approximately 1,000 (Arbuckle, 
1988).47  With the threat nominally controlled, the Guatemalan regime began to slowly 
ratchet down violence.  By the end of the decade regime violence had fallen to levels at or 
below that undertaken by the government of Rios Montt.  While abductions, assassinations, 
                                                
47  This number refers only to full-time, active rebels.  As cited above at peak strength the guerrillas counted as 
many as 16,000 troops.  That figure includes up to 10,000 armed local irregulars. 
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and political murder were still employed frequently by the "civilian" government, the raw 
number of killings as well as their scope paled in comparison to the mass killings and 
scorched earth approach of the earlier years.  
 
Counter Offers 
Violence is only one option available to the state.  While insurgents often struggle to amass 
any set of benefits that could compete with the basic resources provided by even poor states 
to their citizens, states typically have comparatively large resource bases.  Consistent with 
the model of combatant competition proposed in earlier chapters, an increase in material 
benefits to peasants represents one strategy available to governments seeking to undercut 
rebel support and increase collaboration with state forces.  Governments often substitute or 
supplement repressive strategies with both public and private benefits or what Valentino 
(2004) terms "civic actions".  Such efforts are at the core of the "hearts and minds" strategy 
outlined in recent Western military counterinsurgency manuals and numerous analyses of the 
effectiveness of counterinsurgency (see for example Hunt, 1995; Johnson, 1962; 659-660; 
United States Army, 2006: Chpt. 2).   In Guatemala, beginning rather paradoxically shortly 
after the initial wave of mass killings in the rural highlands, the Rios Montt regime proposed 
a number of benefits to entice peasants to support the government.  This "guns and beans" 
strategy included the construction of civil affairs units to provide benefits such as roads, 
medical facilities, electricity, sanitation and food to rural villages (Valentino, 2004: 215).  
Indeed, the government contended that nearly 70% of its counterinsurgency program was 
devoted to "beans" (Schirmer, 1988: 62).  In Vietnam, it was frequently noted by both 
foreign advisers and many GVN officials that the loyalties of peasants flowed to whichever 
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"group, faction, party, religious sect, or local warlord" provided for their welfare (Scigliano, 
1968: 598).  This observation was a primary motivator for the reforms and civic action 
programs the regime implemented (albeit with limited finances and enthusiasm) in the late 
1950s and early 1960s. 
 In addition to the simple extension of resources, regimes facing real threats from 
insurgents often undertake additional economic and political reforms in an attempt to 
diminish the "demand" for insurgency (see Leites & Wolf, 1970).  Political elites as well as 
counterinsurgency experts recognize that lack of access to the political system is often a 
major grievance that insurgents use to mobilize support (and often counter with more 
democratic systems within their liberated zones).  Thus, incumbents at times undertake 
liberalization policies designed to encourage peasant participation or to at least signal 
movement in the direction demanded by more moderate opposition groups.  The 1984 
election in El Salvador, which was heavily promoted by the United States and installed the 
Duarte government, was the first democratic election held in the country in more than 50 
years (though only right and center right candidates participated).  This reform represented 
something of a weak compromise compared to the demands of the insurgents and the desires 
of many of the country's poor peasants at that time.  However, it was intended largely to 
recapture the declining support of the urban middle class that had become increasingly 
frustrated with the slow pace of reforms and rising regime violence.  During the Malaya 
Emergency the British undertook several reforms to undercut the popularity of the Chinese 
communist insurgents.  Non-Communist Chinese leaders were encouraged to participate in 
government and plans for national elections and independence were announced (Johnson, 
1962: 659).  Nagl (2002: 102) reports that with British decision to lift war-time restrictions 
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on movement and civil liberties in various parts of the country in 1953-1954 significantly 
increased local support for the counterinsurgency effort and reduced loyalty to the insurgents. 
Similarly, states, at times, undertake economic reforms or provide direct benefits to 
peasants in an effort to undercut support for the insurgency.   For example, the rightist 
military government of El Salvador initiated one of the most comprehensive land reform 
programs in the region as a means to lure peasants back from the leftist insurgency (Mason & 
Krane, 1989:189-190).48   Similarly, in the wake of rapidly rising support for the Mujahadeen 
the Soviet-backed Afghan regime reversed many of its hard-line communist policies in an 
attempt to improve support among Afghans.  In the early 1980s the Karmal regime (under 
Soviet pressure) began granting land to peasants in exchange for assistance in fighting the 
rebels and building mosques across the country where they had previously confiscated 
private property and repressed organized religion (Valentino, 2004: 225-226).  In Malaya, the 
British government provided "good" land to Chinese squatters to address the community's 
grievances and mitigate support for the insurgents (Johnson, 1962: 659; Nagl, 2002: 97-98).  
The US and the South Vietnamese government later adopted elements of this strategy in 
response to rising peasant support for the NLF.  Much of the government's pacification 
scheme focused on the provisions of land and property, access to educational resources, 
medical facilities, sanitation, and other key benefits (Pearce, 1965: 19-24).  
 Given the resource disparities between the government and insurgents, incumbents 
should be capable of providing superior benefits to civilians.  Moreover, since most analyses 
suggest that peasants are primarily apolitical and loyalty is largely a function of security and 
resource provisions (see Chapter 3), such policies should be capable of offsetting the 
                                                
48   It is important to note, as will be discussed below, that such reforms often lead to the ouster of more 
moderate regimes and their replacement committed political elites.  
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comparatively meager benefits provided by rebels and deterring collaboration with 
insurgents.  At least in some cases government programs do succeed in preventing civilians 
from supporting insurgents or at least stem rising support for insurgents.   Thus, it is 
somewhat surprising that incumbents often choose violence when moderate concessions or 
the provision of benefits would appear prima facie to be a superior counterinsurgency 
strategy.  The decision to resort to massive violence against peasants is particularly surprising 
given that much of the extant literature suggests that indiscriminate violence is 
counterproductive and drives civilian into the arms of the rebels (DeNardo, 1985; Goodwin, 
2001; Kalyvas, 2006: 151-153; Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007a).  The answer to this puzzle lies in 
the endogenous relationship between the increasing strength of insurgents and the 
willingness of regimes to meet both escalating insurgent demands and changing civilian 
expectations about the outcome of the conflict. 
 
Capabilities, Incentives & Constraints 
The section above shows that regimes can and (at times) do offer benefits as well as 
sanctions to entice the collaboration of civilians and deter them from supporting the regime.  
Yet, given that regime violence is often counterproductive, the question remains as to why 
governments choose indiscriminant or widespread violence against civilians rather than the 
provision of resources or a negotiated settlement with insurgents.  The answer comes in two 
parts: first, the history of indiscriminate violence is not as replete with failures as the 
literature suggests—it works under some circumstances.  Since the success of mass violence 
is a probabilistic outcome, incumbents are willing to weight their expectations for its success 
against the immediate and more concrete costs of providing sufficient benefits to prevent 
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civilian collaboration with the rebels.  Second, expanding insurgent capabilities and rising 
civilian expectations complicate the provision of resources or accommodations in quantities 
sufficient to 'buy off" civilian support or satisfy demands.  Put simply, when power dynamics 
shift, increasing insurgent capabilities, insurgents (and their supporters) can demand greater 
concessions from incumbents (see Bapat, 2005).  Furthermore, as argued in Chapter 3, rising 
insurgent capabilities lead to rising civilian expectations about the likelihood of insurgent 
victory and the value of future rewards.  As with the bargaining relationship between rebels 
and the state, civilians expect and can demand greater reforms or benefits from incumbents in 
exchange for their nominal loyalty.  This in turn drives up the costs of the goods that regimes 
have to provide to induce defections from insurgents or to deter collaboration with them.  
Facing this dynamic, incumbents become more likely to gamble on the success of targeting 
civilians as insurgent strength (and civilian demands) increase.  
 
The Effectiveness of Mass Killings 
Much of the past literature on regime violence suggests that civilian targeting on the part of 
the regime drives peasants into the arms of the rebels (DeNardo, 1985; Goodwin, 2001; 
Kalyvas, 2006: 151-153; Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007a).  However, as Kalyvas (2006: 167) 
notes, indiscriminate regime violence is likely to only be effective (and therefore most likely 
employed) when insurgents are weak and unable to protect civilians.  Once the insurgency is 
strong enough to defend its territory and protect its supporters, mass government violence 
may become a selective incentive that insurgents use to promote support among peasants 
(Mason, 1996; Migdal, 1974; Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007a).  Consequently, the effectiveness of 
regime brutality is intimately tied to the extant strength of the insurgency.   
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Mass killing or other widespread targeting of civilians is something of a gamble 
undertaken by the regime.  If the insurgents prove capable of protecting civilians or offering 
some other set of benefits that can offset the costs of support, the strategy fails and may be 
the undoing of the regime.  The GVN strategy of violence in Vietnam reflects this scenario, 
and likely, the rightist regime in El Salvador had the US not buoyed the government with 
nearly a billion dollars of aid and military supplies.  However, as in Guatemala, if the 
insurgents are weak enough or the regime can successfully "drain the sea" the strategy may 
pay off, effectively eliminating the rebels’ existing support base and deterring future 
challengers.    
While numerous scholars have argued against the utility of mass regime violence in 
thwarting insurgencies, there exists significant evidence to the contrary. Downes (2007), for 
example, makes a compelling argument for the effectiveness of targeting civilians in civil 
wars as an effective counterinsurgency strategy given specific conditions.  This is 
particularly true, he argues, when the population of the conflict area and size of the conflict 
population are relatively small or when they have fewer options for escaping violence.  
Sustained indiscriminate violence may fail in the long-term because peasants see "no other 
way out" (Goodwin, 2001); however, in the short-term mass violence is often quite effective 
at undercutting the power of opponents (Arreguin-Toft, 2001).  More importantly, the 
effectiveness of indiscriminant violence is contingent on the goals of the user with respect to 
the target population.  That is, indiscriminant violence is comparatively less effective when 
the goal is gaining the support or loyalty of the population; yet, when the goal is the control 
of territory governments may have more freedom to act violently (Downes, 2007: 422).   
Compared to guerrilla insurgencies, regimes are less directly reliant on civilian populations 
157 
for resources (and so less interested in overt support from civilians).  They therefore seek 
primarily to deter collaboration; thus, the direct costs they incur from violence against the 
population are likely to be lower, at least in the near term.  This provides them some latitude 
to adopt violence that may not exist for insurgents. 
 While targeting the civilian population may fail in the long-term, and may perhaps 
drive peasants away from the regime, at times it functions successfully as a low-cost 
alternative to either selective violence or the more sustainable alternative of resource 
provision and accommodation.  As such, particularly in low-information environments or 
when the regime misjudges the real capability of the insurgents to protect civilians, 
governments seeking to make short-term gains in the reduction of threat are likely to gamble 
on civilian victimization as means to deter defection and undercut the support base of their 
adversaries.  This strategy is likely to be particularly appealing when the mounting costs of 
conflict with stronger insurgents constrain the options available to incumbents, leaving them 
to choose between major revisions in the status quo or the gamble of mass violence.        
 
 Expectations & Costs 
Insurgent demands are endogenous to the dynamics of the conflict and specifically to the 
capabilities attained by the group.  As insurgents demonstrate their ability to withstand 
regime counterinsurgency efforts they (as well as civilians) update their beliefs about their 
ability to achieve their desired goals. This processes of updating leads them to increase the 
minimum level of concessions they are willing to accept from the regime in exchange for 
terminating the conflict.  As such, the stronger the insurgency grows the more difficult it 
becomes for the regime to satisfy rebel demands and the lower the probability that they 
158 
accept a negotiated solution (Bapat, 2005).  Put simply, past a certain strength threshold the 
insurgents will simply not accept moderate concessions.  This relationship has consequences 
for the level of violence applied by the government.  Because stronger insurgents demand 
more from the regime, regimes are more likely to resort to violence rather than to 
accommodate demands (Gartner and Regan, 1996; Regan and Henderson, 2002; Valentino, 
2004).  Where governments have the ability to meet the opposition's demands without 
dramatically altering the status quo, they are less likely to employ severe repression.  Taken 
together, these observations suggest that conflicts both become longer and more violent as 
the balance of power shifts against the incumbent regime.   
A similar logic also applies to the bargaining relationship between civilians and the 
incumbent regime.  As insurgent capabilities expand, the group can credibly offer more to its 
supporters.  In turn, the government must counter the provision of insurgent resources with 
its own basket of incentives.  In addition to the benefits provided by the rebels in the 
immediate term, ascendant insurgents are able to make increasingly convincing promises to 
supporters regarding future payoffs.  As discussed in Chapter 2, when insurgent capabilities 
increase, civilians update their beliefs about the likelihood of insurgent victory over the 
regime as well as their beliefs about the future payoffs associated with supporting either side.  
As such, civilians are likely to expect greater levels of benefits from the government in order 
to offset the increasing probability of insurgent victory (as well as the increasing flow of 
benefits from insurgents).  As the expected benefits necessary to compel civilian support 
increases, regimes are increasingly likely to view violence against the population as a 
preferable strategy to the distribution of benefits.  In short, rising insurgent capabilities 
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increase the costs necessary to lure civilians away from collaboration with rebels and make 
violence more appealing.   
Given the increased costs, incumbent regimes are increasingly willing to gamble on 
the effectiveness of escalating violence against civilians.  While it might be technically 
possible for incumbents to simply buy off civilians, the costs of such resources are likely to 
outweigh the probability of success with the comparatively low cost strategy of violence.  
This rationale is particularly likely in non-democratic systems (the states most likely to 
experience civil wars) in which the incumbents are beholden to small winning coalitions (see 
Bueno de Mesquita et al, 2003; Heger & Salehyan, 2007).  Democratic states might adopt a 
similar rationale in cases where the violence is targeted at a specific group or community 
with little power in the political sphere and when the incumbents can shield their winning 
coalition from violence.  For example, democracy has not greatly restricted the violence 
committed by Israel against Palestinians, Russia (in the early 1990s) against Chechnya, or 
India against Kashmiri separatists.  Consequently, incumbents are often more willing to 
accept the risk of backlash or failure associated with the strategy than to pay the immediate 
and more certain costs associated with concessions or resources significant enough to draw 
popular support away form insurgents. 
 
Hypotheses on Choosing Violence 
The above discussion models civil war as a competition between governments and insurgents 
over the nominal loyalty of the civilian population.  Both offer civilians packages of benefits 
as well as the threat of sanctions to accomplish this goal.  However, because insurgents are 
more directly reliant on the population for support and depend on their loyalty while 
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governments predominantly seek deterrence, the relationship is somewhat asymmetrical.  
Increased insurgent capabilities and high levels of civilian support for the insurgency induce 
a sense of threat among incumbent political elites and incentivize the use of violence.   
Shifts in the power dynamics of the conflict increase both the goods available to 
insurgents with which to buy off civilians and increase the expectations among civilians of 
insurgent victory and of future resources flows following the ouster of the regime.  
Consequently, they demand greater benefits from the government in exchange for their 
loyalty to the regime.  Faced with rising expected costs from the provision of resources that 
would threaten to destabilize the status quo, regimes are increasingly likely to resort to mass 
violence against peasants as an inexpensive short-term strategy of threat reduction.  While 
this strategy represents a gamble for the incumbent regime, so long as their belief in the 
probability of success exceeds the excepted value of the costs necessary to buy off civilians, 
violence against the population may appear to be the most "rational" solution available given 
the rising threat. 
 This discussion, then, produces several testable hypotheses regarding the relationship 
between threat and incumbent violence against civilians.  As threat increases—measured as 
either the changes in military capabilities of the insurgents or as the incidence of insurgent 
support—incumbents are more likely to escalate both the magnitude of civilian killings as 
well as the range of violence employed against the population:   
 
H1: The greater the incidence of insurgents among the population the greater the  
        frequency of state violence against civilians. 
 
H2: The greater the incidence of insurgents among the population the greater the 
       range of violence states are expected to employ. 
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H3: The greater the growth in insurgent relative capabilities the greater the  
        frequency of state violence against civilians 
. 
H4: The greater the growth in insurgent relative capabilities the greater the range of 
        violence states are expected to employ. 
 
Research Design  
As with analyses conducted in the previous chapters, I rely on quantitative analyses to test 
the relationship between the various components of regime "threat" perception and the 
likelihood that incumbents increase or expand the level of violence they employ against 
civilians during civil conflicts..   I rely on Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) given the 
ordinal nature of the dependent variables.  In the following models the dependent variables 
are categorical measures of the frequency of government violence against civilians as well as 
the types of targeting adopted by state forces in a given year.  All models reported in the 
tables below are ordered probit models with Huber (1967) and White (1980) robust standard 
errors clustered on the country to account for heteroskedasticity. 
While the previous analyses were conducted at the insurgent group level, these 
models take the state as the unit of analysis.  This construction produces some 267 country-
year observations for the period 1997-2006.  However, because of missing data and the need 
to lag the dependent variable, the number of observations used in the regression models falls 
to approximately 200.   
 
 Power Dynamics 
Ideally, this analysis would test the relationship between the threat of any given insurgency 
within the state and the level of violence used by the state against that group or the 
population within that specific conflict area.  However, no cross-national measures that easily 
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disaggregate the level of violence committed by states in different conflict zones currently 
exist. Using the same dataset applied in previous analyses and simply flipping the 
independent and dependent variable would lead to severe redundancies in the dependent 
variable for all cases in which a state experienced more than one insurgency in a given year.  
The dataset used here takes the state as the unit of analysis and collapses measures for 
multiple insurgencies into one aggregate measure.  For example, the primary independent 
variables that were originally taken at the insurgent-group level have been transformed into 
aggregate measures of the combined relative capabilities for all insurgents groups active 
within the state in a given year, the total insurgent incidence among the combined population 
of all conflict areas, and the change in the combined insurgent capabilities from t-1 to t.  The 
relative capabilities measure and the insurgent incidence measure are lagged for one year to 
control for endogeneity.  The sources for these measures were discussed in previous chapter 
and do not need to be recounted here.  Table 5.1 presents the summary statistics for the 
variables used in the analysis. 
 
Other Predictors 
The control variables included in this analysis are drawn from past studies of state repression, 
genocide, and civilian victimization during civil wars.  These variables include: the intensity 
of the conflict, the level and range of violence employed by insurgents against civilians, the 
state's regime type and level of development, and the population size of the conflict state, and 
whether the conflict was organized around identity.  As in Chapter 4, I also include lagged 
binary measures of two of the three categories of the dependent variable in order to account 
163 
for the change in violence from one level or type to another between the previous time period 
and the current. 
 
Table 5.1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min       Max 
Δ  Insurgent Capability 0.002 0.158 -0.8         1.113 
Military Capability 0.798 0.605 
 
 
0            4 
Insurgent Incidence 
 
23.008 31.905 0.193     182.708 
Insurgent Range 
 
 
 
2.416 0.783 1            3 
Govt. Range 2.119 0.605 1            3 
Govt. Frequency 2.221 0.694 1            3 
Ethnic Conflict 0.782 0.41 0            1 
Conflict Severity(ln) 6.019 1.930 0            10.779 
Age 15.812 14.069 0            57 
Democracy 0.255 0.436 0            1 
GDPpc(ln) 0.891 1.014 -1.228    3.567 
Distance(ln) 5.334 1.335 0           7.673 
 
In addition to the absolute or relative size of an insurgency, the ability of a rebel 
group to inflict costs upon the incumbent regime figures prominently in its perception of 
threat (Valentino et al., 2004).  Effective rebel groups need not be large in numerical terms to 
present a significant threat to the regime.  The real cost of an insurgency to a regime is 
difficult to assess.  One way to gauge this cost, however, is by assessing the losses incurred 
by the regime during battles with insurgents.  Effective insurgent groups are able to impose 
heavy costs on the regime if during battles they are able to inflict heavy causalities on the 
incumbent's forces.  The loss of troops during battle imposes multiple costs on the regime.  
First, lost troops require replacement as does their equipments, which is often appropriated 
by the guerillas.  Thus, as the number of soldiers killed in battle increases, the regime must 
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spend an increasing amount of resources to match the insurgent threat.  Second, higher 
numbers of casualties are likely to increase dissatisfaction with the regime among both the 
public and the coalition of regime supporters.  Falling support from these groups increases 
the threat perception of the incumbent because it increases the likelihood of coup or other 
internal ouster.  As this pressure increases, incumbent leaders become more likely to ramp up 
their level of violence against perceived enemies of the state.  Similarly, intense conflicts 
provide incentives for violence against civilians because warring parties may become more 
desperate and focus violence on civilian population centers rather than better-defended 
military targets in order to wear down the adversary (Downes, 2006; 2008).  Escalating 
battlefield costs may pressure insurgents to target civilians in order to signal their resolve to 
continue the fight (Hultman, 2007).  Conflict severity is the logged-value of the annual 
number of total battlefield casualties among all parties in the conflict (Lacina & Gleditsch, 
2005). 
Recent analyses suggest a positive relationship between government and insurgent 
violence (Bohara, Mitchell & Nepal, 2006; Heger & Salehyan, 2007). The previous analyses 
presented in this manuscript, however, have found a rather ambiguous relationship between 
the two.  That said, given that previous theories have argued that mass state violence may be 
counterproductive, it is possible that indiscriminate rebel violence also pushes civilians back 
toward the government.  If this is the case, we might expect that strategically minded 
incumbents would use the escalation in rebel violence against civilians to their advantage, 
reducing their own level of violence as a lure for civilian loyalty.  The measure is the range 
of rebel violence taken from the PAVI dataset and explained more fully in the previous 
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chapters, and, as with reciprocal measures used in previous chapters, it is lagged for one 
year.49 
Ceteris paribus, rising existential threat may increase an incumbent's desire to resort 
to strategies of mass repression.  However, political institutions are a complicating factor in 
the relationship between dissident threat and repression.  Political institutions constrain or 
permit leaders to carry out repression (Davenport, 1995; 2007; Davenport and Armstrong, 
2004; Poe and Tate, 1994) and mass killing (Rummel, 1994; Valentino, et. al, 2004).  
Arguably, autocratic regimes are more likely to resort to indiscriminate repression in order to 
"restore deterrence" because they are not constrained by public opinion but rather are 
concerned with the effect of policy choices on their core supporters and with their ability to 
maintain the stability of their regime (Bueno de Mesquita et al, 2003; see also Heger & 
Salehyan, 2007).  However, a notable selection effect is in play given that most democratic 
regimes manage to circumvent insurgency and civil war by nature of their more inclusive 
political process (Hegre et al, 2001).  As such, democratic institutions may be successful at 
preventing revolutions but less effective at constraining violence.  Davenport (2008) shows 
that while the components of democracy still reduce the physical integrity violence within 
the context of civil wars, the effect is muted.  That said, based on the balance of empirical 
evidence I expect democracy to diminish the likelihood that the regime escalates or expands 
violence.  I include a measure of regime type adapted from the Polity IV dataset (Jaggers and 
Marshall, 2002).  The measure is coded 1 if the state’s combined Polity score was greater 
than 6 and 0 otherwise.  
                                                
49  Tests using the frequency of rebel violence return similar results.  Only one measure is used here to avoid 
overburdening the model. 
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The timeline of the insurgency may also impact the regime's decision to escalate 
violence against civilians.  While the theory above primarily focuses on the balance of power 
in the conflict, it in part taps into its duration.  The theory asserts that as insurgents survive—
which the theory folds into the strength of the rebels—regime violence becomes more likely.  
As such, longer insurgencies may contribute to more violence.  On the other hand, Kalyvas 
(2006: 168-169) has argued that over time violence is likely to become more selective as 
regimes slowly realize that it is counterproductive.  As such, I am agnostic about the affect of 
insurgency duration, largely because power relationships should be at the core of the decision 
to resort to violence.  The measure of war duration is simply the natural log of the count of 
years since the start of the longest running insurgency in the state.  The count is taken from 
the UCDP database (UCDP, 2009).     
Several studies have identified a relationship between economic development and 
state-sponsored violence against civilians (e.g. Poe and Tate, 1994).  These studies suggest 
that higher levels of economic development, measured in GDP or GDP per capita, produce 
lower levels of physical repression.  With respect to this analysis, the inclusion of this 
variable accounts for the ability of wealthier, more developed regimes to both undertake (and 
pay for) more costly strategies of selective repression against rebels and suspected 
collaborators.  It likewise accounts for the ability of the regime to either make greater 
concessions to insurgents or to prosecute a more restrained—yet costly—counterinsurgency 
while simultaneously providing sufficient resources to the winning coalition to prevent 
defections to a challenger.  That said, like democracy, high levels of development might 
function more to prevent the onset of violence or the outbreak of civil war than as an 
impediment to the use of violence by the state once the civil conflict has begun.  Arguably, 
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among the states likely to experience conflicts (the vast majority of which are developing 
states), greater levels of resources may permit the incumbent to more efficiently kill greater 
numbers of civilians and with less discrimination.  For example, the use of air power for 
strategic bombing and access to more advanced missile systems or large amounts of heavy 
artillery may dramatically increase the killing potential of comparatively wealthy regimes. 
The measure is the logged value of GDP per capita taken from Penn World Tables (Heston, 
Summers, and Aten, 2009); it is lagged for one year because of the effects of war on national 
wealth.   
Previous analyses have also found that population size is positively correlated with 
repression and mass killing (e.g., Poe & Tate, 1994; Valentino et. al, 2004).  I therefore 
control for the size of the country's population.  The measure is taken from updated data 
found in Gleditsch (2002).  I take the natural log of the total population.  Lastly, I control for 
the effects of conflicts driven by identity on regime violence.  Popular accounts of civil wars 
suggest that conflicts between different ethnic groups or conflicts fought over secession are 
bloodier, longer, and more intractable than other conflicts (Huntington, 1996; Kaufmann, 
2001).  Ethnic conflicts may lead to dehumanization, making violence more brutal and more 
visceral.  The measure of identity-driven conflicts is updated from the measure constructed 
by Gates & Buhaug (2002). 
I also control for the distance between the capital city and the site(s) of conflict.  
Previous research has suggested that the distance between the center of power and the sites of 
rebel strongholds is related to the capabilities of insurgents, their objectives, and the 
likelihood of their success and survival (Buhaug, Gates & Lujala, 2009; Buhaug, 2006).  The 
greater the distance between the government's power base and the insurgents' enclave, the 
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more resources the government must expend in moving troops and overcoming other 
logistical dilemmas; as such, greater geographic distances diminish the positive power 
balance the governments frequently enjoy (Buhaug, Gates, & Lujala, 2009: 550).  Based on 
the theory outlined herein, this decline in power gradient should result in an increased 
incentive for the government to use violence.  Additionally, great distances between the 
government's seat of power and the insurgency are likely to exacerbate information gathering 
and the ability to accurately locate and punish defectors.  In line with Kalyvas' (2006) 
theories on information asymmetries and violence, this suggests that insurgencies far 
removed from the capital may engender more violence from the regime.  The measure of 
distance is taken from geospatial data compiled by Buhaug, Gates, & Lujala (2009), which 
measures distance as the natural log of the distance between the capital city and the conflict 
area.  Since the data structure used here is at the state level, I use the distance of the conflict 
that was taking place furthest from the capital during the year. 
 Previous research has determined that recent practices shape current strategies (e.g. 
Poe and Tate, 1994).  A similar effect is likely at work here.  In addition to the standard 
bureaucratic inertia argument, it is likely that regime forces may become enmeshed in tit-for-
tat exchanges with insurgent forces.  That is, is rebels adopt strategies of violent repression 
against civilians in government-held areas, regime forces may be tempted to respond in kind 
by escalating violence against populations in rebel-dominated regions of the country or to 
resort to more violent acts of repression against suspected dissidents or rebel sympathizers in 
areas under regime control.  Once this process has been initiated, both sides may continue to 
employ high levels of repressive violence in order to punish the other for past abuses.  
Employing a lagged dependent term is also a useful way of controlling for autocorrelation 
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(Beck and Katz, 1995).  Based on these arguments, I include lagged measures of the 
dependent variables.  
 
Results & Discussion 
Tables 2 and 3 present the results of the statistical analyses.  In general, the results provide 
significant support for the theory outlined above—as threat increases governments escalate 
and broaden violence against civilians.  However, the results also show some notable 
differences between the mechanisms driving the frequency of government violence and the 
range of government violence.  First, the incidence of insurgents within the population is 
statistically significant across specifications in both the models examining the effect of 
covariates on the frequency and range of violence.  In models 1 through 6 the coefficients for 
the variable capturing the ratio of insurgents to the conflict area population are both positive 
and statistically significant, suggesting that increases in relative capabilities lead incumbents 
to both intensify and broaden violence from t-1 to t.  
 The results for shifts in the balance of power of the conflict—a measure that attempts 
to capture more directly the dynamic nature of civil conflict—are less robust across the 
model, but generally provide support for the theory.  With respect to changes in the 
frequency of government violence (Table 5.2), Models 2 and 3, the coefficients for the 
change variable are both positive and statistically significant.  These results are consistent 
with the theory presented in this chapter—as with the overall theory of this manuscript—that 
argues that violence is a function of the dynamics of power within the conflict.  Turning to 
the range of regime violence, however, the results are less robust.  In Models 4 and 5 (Table 
5.3) the results for the change variable fails to achieve statistical significance and the 
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coefficients switch sign between the models.  In tests using models without the other 
measures of rebel capabilities and support, the variable returns a positive but insignificant 
result.50  Consequently, these results fail to support the role of shifts in relative capabilities 
and changes in the levels of violence.  
Still, the results suggest that power dynamics play a large role in the construction of 
regime violence strategies with respect to the frequency of violence committed against 
civilians.  More importantly, the general theory finds support in these models.  As the 
number of insurgents within the population increases, governments perceive a threat to the 
status quo, making them more likely to resort to higher levels of violence; in addition, this 
rising threat leads them to adopt more indiscriminate forms of repression, targeting civilians 
more broadly.  Theoretically, this effect is driven by the regime's declining ability to compete 
with insurgents over the loyalty of the population.  As the insurgency grows and attracts 
more members, it is better able to offer greater benefits to their supporters.  This increases the 
costs of resources that must be supplied by the regime as a counteroffer.  As the price of the 
counteroffer increases, regimes are more likely to choose higher levels of violence as well as 
more broadly targeted violence as a means to undercut civilian support and eradicate 
insurgent threat.  The results also suggest the regimes are sensitive to smaller, more short-
term shifts in the balance of power, but only with respect to the frequency of violence.  As 
power shifts toward the insurgents between the previous and current periods, regimes are 
more likely to kill greater numbers of civilians.  However, the effect does not carry to breadth 
of targeting: shorter-term changes in the power dynamics do not notably alter the scope of 
the violence carried out.  
                                                
50   Testing other variables individually produce results consistent with those presented in 
Tables 5.2 and 5.3. 
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Table 5.2: Regression Results, Frequency of Government Killing 
 
 Model 1 
Frequency 
Model 2 
Frequency 
Model 3 
Frequency 
Insurgent Incidence(t-1) 
 
 0.0178 (0.006)*** 
 
 0.019 (0.007)*** 
 
  
 
  1.174 (0.607)**  0.885 (0.545)* Δ  Insurgent Capability 
    
Military Capability 
 
 0.138 (0.264) 
 
 0.108 (0.268) 
 
 0.325 (0.252) 
 
Insurgent Range(t-1) -0.429 (0.186)** 
 
-0.421 (0.188)** 
 
-0.434 (0.171)** 
 
Age  0.010 (0.007)  0.010 (0.007)  0.009 (0.007) 
    
Conflict Severity(ln)  0.346 (0.057)***  0.320 (0.057)***  0.289 (0.069)*** 
    
GDPpc(ln)t-1  0.041 (0.146)  0.032 (0.144)  0.063 (0.149) 
    
Democracy -0.128 (0.435) -0.067 (0.435) -0.111 (0.384) 
    
Identity Conflict -0.021 (0.267)  0.085 (0.290)  0.241 (0.277) 
    
Distance(ln)  0.053 (0.104)  0.045 (0.103)  0.023 (0.097) 
    
DV Category 1(t-1) -2.190 (0.104)*** -2.239 (0.461)*** -2.400 (0.437)*** 
    
DV Category 2(t-1) -0.830 (0.332)*** -0.893 (0.343)** -1.111 (0.340)** 
    
Log-pseudolikelihood 
 
-121.584 -119.145 -129.092 
Wald X2 111.31 113.90 85.89 
    
Prob. > X2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    
Observations 187 187  191 
Countries 35 35 35 
    
    
Coefficients and robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses. ***=P<0.01 *=P< 0.05  *=P< 0.10  
Two-tailed test. 
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Table 5.3: Regression Results, Range of Government Killing 
 
 Model 4 
Range 
Model 5 
Range 
Model 6 
Range 
Insurgent Incidence(t-1) 
 
 0.022 (0.006)*** 
 
 0.022 (0.006)*** 
 
  
 
  0.144 (0.325) -0.450 (0.405) Δ  Insurgent Capability 
    
Military Capabilities 
 
 0.121 (0.162) 
 
 0.116 (0.160) 
 
 0.319 (0.192)* 
 
Insurgent Range(t-1) 
 
 0.090 (0.133) 
 
 0.093 (0.132) 
 
 0.043 (0.132) 
 
Age  0.021 (0.007)***   0.021 (0.007)***  0.019 (0.007)*** 
     
Conflict Severity(ln)  0.246 (0.069)***  0.243 (0.068)***  0.218 (0.062)*** 
    
GDPpc(ln)t-1  0.205 (0.140)  0.203 (0.140)  0.241 (0.162) 
    
Democracy -1.038 (0.361)*** -1.029 (0.363)*** -1.011 (0.338)*** 
    
Identity Conflict -0.216 (0.026) -0.206 (0.264) -0.090 (0.232) 
    
Distance(ln)  0.187 (0.081)**  0.181 (0.081)  0.153 (0.089)* 
    
DV Category 1(t-1) -1.760 (0.647)*** -1.760 (0.647)*** -2.038 (0.694)*** 
    
DV Category 2(t-1) -1.570 (0.319)*** -1.597 (0.318)** -1.814 (0.322)*** 
    
Log-pseudolikelihood 
 
-100.045 -100.025 -109.474 
Wald X2 77.17 76.55 85.12 
    
Prob. > X2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    
Observations 187 191  191 
Countries  35 35 35 
    
    
Coefficients and robust standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses. ***=P<0.01 *=P< 0.05  *=P< 0.10  
Two-tailed test. 
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Interestingly, when also accounting for other aspects of insurgent threat, the overall 
military capabilities of the insurgency do not significantly alter regime strategies of violence.  
While the coefficient is positive in each model, it fails to attain conventional levels of 
significance in all but one model (Model 6).  When the variable is included without other 
aspects of threat (not shown) it is marginally significant in models accounting for the 
frequency of regime violence and statistically significant in the model accounting for the 
range of violence.  One explanation for this result is that the control variable accounting for 
the overall intensity of the conflict mutes it independent effect.  Recent research suggests that 
conflicts with comparatively stronger rebels produce greater numbers of battlefield casualties 
(Lujala, 2009).  In models removing the severity variable, the generally static measure of 
insurgent military capabilities yields significant results in almost every specification.  As 
such, somewhat poor performance of the variable in this analysis should not necessarily be 
seen as contrary to the theory presented. 
As with the other chapters, in order to more clearly demonstrate the substantive 
effects of these variables, I compute the predicted probabilities for select models.  The 
predictions for the frequency of civilian killings are based on the results from Model 2 (Table 
5.2) while predictions for the range of killings are based on the results from Model 5  (Table 
5.3).  Because of the insignificant results for the change variable in the models accounting for 
range, I do not calculate predicted probabilities for its impact on the range of violence.  As 
with the models presented in the previous chapter, the values of the regime violence in the 
previous time period are held constant at the intermediate level.  Thus, the predictions reflect 
the probability that the regime escalates or de-escalates violence from its previous levels.  
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Figure 5.1: Predicted Frequency of Government Violence by Insurgent Incidence 
 
 
Note: The figure shows the predicted probability of a change from the intermediate category of violence to 
another category given the range of insurgent incidence (insurgents per 10,000 persons in the conflict area).  
Estimated values were simulated using Clarify (King, Tomz & Wittenberg, 2000). Previous year's value set to 
intermediate category; all other independent variables set at their mean, median, or modal values. 
 
 
Figure 5.1 shows the predicted likelihood of changes in the frequency of government 
killing of civilians from t-1 to the current period give various values of the insurgent 
incidence measure.  According to these predictions, an increase in the incidence of insurgents 
from 50% below the mean value (~12 insurgents per 10,000 citizens) to 200% above the 
mean (~50 insurgents per 10,000 citizens) increases the likelihood that the incumbent regime 
escalates violence from the intermediate value to the highest category of violence by 
approximately 20%.  Conversely, a regime fighting a relative low threat insurgency is 
predicted to reduce its application of violence.  Lowering the insurgent incidence by the same 
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level increases the probability that the state reduces violence from the intermediate to the 
lowest level of violence increases by about 10%.  A particularly powerful insurgency—one 
that enjoys the active participation of nearly 1 in ever 50 citizens in the conflict area 
(Chechnya in 2000)—increases the probability of a shift to high levels of violence by about 
90%.  Thus, as predicted by the theory, as the level of threat posed by the rebels increases 
incumbents are increasingly likely to resort to more frequent killing of civilians in an attempt 
to mitigate the threat and undercut support for the insurgency.  By contrast, as threat levels 
fall, regimes are more likely to de-escalate violence, killing comparatively fewer civilians. 
 
Figure 5.2: Predicted Frequency of Government Violence by Δ  Insurgent Capabilities 
 
 
Note: The figure shows the predicted probability of a change from the intermediate category of violence to 
another category given a range of changes in insurgent-government troops rations between time t-1 and t. 
Estimated values were simulated using Clarify (King, Tomz & Wittenberg, 2000). Previous year's value set to  
intermediate category; all other independent variables set at their mean, median, or modal values. 
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Figure 5.3: Predicted Range of Government Violence by Insurgent Incidence 
 
 
 
Note: The figure shows the predicted probability of a change from the intermediate category of violence to 
another category given the range of insurgent incidence (insurgents per 10,000 persons in the conflict area). 
Estimated values were simulated using Clarify (King, Tomz & Wittenberg, 2000). Previous year's value set to 
intermediate category; all other independent variables set at their mean, median, or modal values. 
 
Figure 5.2 shows the predictions for the relationship between the one-period change 
in insurgent capabilities and the change in the level of regime violence over the same period.  
This variable is intended to capture more directly the dynamic processes of the conflict.  
Compared to the overall balance of power in the conflict, the year-to-year fluctuations in the 
conflict's power dynamics exert a smaller substantive effect.  For instance, according to the 
predictions from the model, if the strength of the insurgency grows from one standard 
deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above (a growth rate of approximately 
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20%) over the course of the year, the likelihood that the regime escalates violence by one 
category increases by 10%.  Again, the converse holds as well.  As the strength of the 
insurgency declines by the reciprocal rate over the year, the likelihood of the incumbent 
reducing violence from the intermediate to the lowest category increases by approximately 
7%.  These predictions suggest that while the aggregate threat observed in a given year is 
probably the more significant factor affecting regime decisions regarding the level of 
violence inflicted upon civilians, the more short-term changes in the dynamics of the conflict 
likewise contribute to changes in regime strategies of violence. 
Lastly, Figure 5.3 illustrates the effects of the incidence of participation in the 
insurgency on the range of violence chosen by the regime.  Again, according to the figure, as 
the threat posed by the insurgency increases, the regime becomes increasingly likely to 
broaden the targets of its violence.  For example, increasing the level of active participation 
in the insurgency from 50% of the mean to 200% increases the likelihood that the regime 
expands the targets of violence from politically active civilians or suspected collaborators to 
the population broadly by approximately 21%.  The reciprocal also holds, but only very 
weakly: as the threat posed by the insurgency decreases from the mean to one standard 
deviation below, the likelihood that the incumbent regimes applies violence more selectively, 
tightening it from politically active civilians to more conventional military targets increases 
by only roughly 3%.  As these predictions show, in general, states seldom reduce the 
violence to the most selective type, which avoids intentional civilians causalities almost 
entirely, once they have expanded violence to include politically active civilians.  Even when 
the threat level declines tremendously state are by far the most likely to continue using the 
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same strategy of violence.  This suggests the strong effects of path dependence or 
bureaucratic inertia on state violence strategies (see Poe & Tate, 1994 among many others).  
 These predictions are largely consistent with the dynamics observed in historical 
cases.  For instance, in El Salvador the growth of the strength of the FMLN constituent 
organizations in the late 1970s and early 1980s contributed to rising regime violence.  Their 
military growth was suggestive of a shift in peasant loyalties as well as a broader shift in the 
power dynamics of the conflict.  By the early 1980s the insurgents maintained an active force 
of some 8,000 troops as well as 100,000 part-time militia forces and irregular troops.  
Moreover, they received support in the form of food, intelligence, and other resources from 
almost one quarter of the country's population (Leiken, 1984: 118).  This shift in the power 
dynamics in turn corresponded to a significant increase in the level of indiscriminant 
violence employed by the regime's repressive apparatus.  This violence, while supplemented 
with moderate reform and resource provisions, continued at high levels until the mid-1980s 
(Mason & Krane, 1989: 188).  During this period government pressures forced the insurgents 
to largely abandon their "liberated zones" and return to a more mobile strategy of insurgency 
(Valentino, 2004: 229).  Moreover, while the available evidence does not point to a serious 
decline in rebel troop levels, recruitment stabilized during the period as the combination of 
government violence and modest reforms began to have effect—the land reform program that 
had inched along for the previous few years began, as well as the moderate political reforms 
of the mid-1980s, began to incrementally return dividends in terms of slowing the rise in 
FMLN sympathies and restoring a measure of popular support for the government (Mason & 
Krane, 1989: 190-191).  As a result, regime violence fell as the threat to the government 
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diminished from its high point in the early 1980s when the insurgents were making great 
strides and the government seemed to be teetering on the verge of collapse. 
 Turning to the controls, in general rebel violence seems to have some impact on the 
formation of government violence strategy.  The range of insurgent violence negatively 
affects the frequency of regime violence.  This relationship is intriguing as it suggests that as 
rebels increasingly adopt terrorist attacks, governments reduce the frequency of civilian 
killing.  This suggests that terrorism may on balance fail to result in the backlash that is often 
expected by smaller insurgent organization (e.g., Lake, 2002).  That is, while indiscriminant 
insurgent violence is at times intended to increase the level of violence employed by the 
government, it might actually create the opposite effect, leading regimes to de-escalate 
violence.  However, it seems to have little bearing on the range of government violence. 
 As anticipated, the greater the intensity of the conflict the more likely regimes are to 
both escalate violence and engage in more indiscriminant violence against civilians.  This 
result fits with the theory because more intense conflicts induce more intense feelings of 
threat among political elites.  Moreover, as the intensity of the conflict increases, regimes 
must divert greater levels of resources to the conflict, diminishing the resources available to 
police the population and gather intelligence that allows for the accurate identification of 
collaborators and rebel agents.  As such, it should reduce the ability of the regime to attract 
the nominal loyalty of peasants through the provision of benefits and limit the regime's 
ability to apply more selective violence. 
  The duration of the insurgency is positively correlated to regime violence in all of the 
models tested, and it attains significance in Models 4 though 6.  Thus, there is partial support 
for the notion discussed above that the longer the insurgents survive the more threatening 
180 
they appear to the regime and thus the more repressive the regime response.  However, as 
noted above, the duration of the conflict is related to the extant strength of the insurgents in 
complex ways that over-ride the direct effect of the duration of the rebellion.  While Bapat 
(2005) suggests that as insurgencies survive they become stronger and demand greater 
concessions, other studies have shown that stronger insurgent groups fight shorter wars 
(Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan, 2009; Buhaug, Gates & Lujala, 2010).  As such, the 
duration of the conflict is likely less important than the balance of capabilities in the conflict 
in terms of structuring regime violence.  That said, this analysis fails to provide support for 
Kalyvas' (2006) assertion that violence falls as wars drag on and combatants slowly realize 
the supposed counterproductive nature of indiscriminant violence.  
The variable accounting for democratic institutions provides some interesting results. 
Consistent with past analyses, the democracy variable is negative across all specifications.  
However, it is only significant in the models accounting for the range of violence.  This result 
is unsurprising given that institutional and political constraints should theoretically impede 
high levels of violence or indiscriminant violence against the populations.  What is surprising 
is that the presence of democratic institutions does not necessarily exert an independent 
effect on the frequency of regime violence.  Hence, democracies may be more selective in 
their targeting, but the institutions do not necessarily constrain them from committing 
violence against civilians with frequency. 
The distance between the capital and the conflict zone shows some similar trends.  
While it is in the expected direction across all specifications, it is only significant in the 
models for the range of violence.  Consequently, as the distance between the capital and the 
conflict zone increases, regimes tend to use more indiscriminate forms of violence against 
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civilians.  In part, this may be because such acts can be done with greater secrecy given the 
distance to population centers.  However, as stated above, it is also likely related to the effect 
of distance on power ratios and on its negative effects on the ability of security forces to 
accurately identify active participants in the insurgency and collaborators from neutral 
civilians.  Hence, the result is at least partially consistent with the theory presented here and 
lends some tangential support for Kalyvas' (2006) theory of information asymmetry and 
violence. 
Finally, the conflict country's level of development is statistically unrelated to the 
regime's level or type of violence according to these models.  This result is contrary to 
studies of regime repression and mass killing that include states in times of peace as well as 
war.  This result is also surprising given that wealthier regimes should possess greater 
resources with which to buy off civilians, thereby lowering the incentive to use violence.  
The results for the identity conflict indicator are also somewhat surprising in that many 
extant theories suggest that ethnic, religious, or other identity-based conflicts are more 
savage and produce greater numbers of civilian causalities.  However, these results fail to 
support this notion.  Finally, as with all previous studies of repression or mass violence, there 
is large and substantial effect exerted by recent behavior.  As clearly depicted in the figures 
above, the decisions made by the regime in the previous period are highly predictive of the 
decisions made in the current period. 
 
Conclusion 
While a number of previous studies have asserted the relationship between regime threat 
perception and the strategies of repression adopted by the regime, few have made a serious 
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effort to unpack the underlying causal mechanisms that drive regime threat or to elaborate on 
the processes that drive regimes to respond to threats with violence.  This chapter has 
attempted to address these issues in order to provide a clearer and more thorough explanation 
of the escalation and de-escalation of regime violence that occurs over the course of a civil 
war.   To that end, I adapted slightly the model of insurgent violence outlined in the previous 
chapter and reciprocally applied it to states.  In both cases, the belligerents are interested in 
deterring collaboration and promoting loyalty.  However, as I note, the competition is 
somewhat asymmetrical.  While insurgents often rely significantly on civilians for active or 
tacit support, government forces are typically less interested in active support and simply 
expect civilians to withhold their support from insurgents.  That said, just as the case with 
rebels, governments must provide some mix of benefits and sanctions to promote loyalty and 
deter defections as these are the primary stimuli to which civilians respond.  The balance of 
these tactics is largely related to the power dynamics within the conflict.  As rebel strength 
increases, deterring civilian collaboration with the group becomes both more difficult and 
more costly, making civilian victimization a more appealing option.   
Facing declining civilian loyalty and the concomitant increase in costs associated 
with less violent deterrence strategies, incumbents may see the escalation and broadening of 
violence as an increasingly appropriate option.  Despite criticisms regarding its frequent 
failure and the likelihood of backlash, indiscriminant repression is effective in some 
instances.  Incumbents weigh their subjective expectations about the likelihood of failure 
against the more concrete and immediate costs associated with less violent counterinsurgency 
strategies.   In order to thoroughly unpack the logic of the "gamble" on violence, it is 
important to incorporate the manner in which rising insurgent capabilities alter the bargaining 
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space, thereby changing the costs associated with various strategies.  Just as stronger, more 
durable insurgencies demand greater concessions from the regimes they challenge, civilians 
that perceive these shifts in the power dynamics expect more credible and greater levels of 
resources from governments in exchange for resisting the pressures to support the rebels.  
The combination of the increased threat from the insurgency and the greater costs that would 
result from acquiescing to insurgent demands and/or proving greater benefits or 
accommodations to civilians lead elites to view the gamble of mass violence as potentially 
the less costly option. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CONCLUSION 
 
 
During the late 1960s, and particularly in early 1968 with that year's Tet Offensive, 
Communist insurgents in Vietnam made significant revisions to their war strategies.  The 
aspect of this strategic revision related to the broader military tactics employed by the Front.  
The NLF attempted to move the insurgency into a new phase of revolutionary warfare: the 
General Offensive and General Uprising.  According to this plan, the NLF would shift its 
focus from guerrilla attacks and low-level, isolated strikes against military targets, to 
coordinated, larger-scale offensives against GVN installations in towns, cities, and villages.  
The hope of this more conventional offensive was that the force of the attacks would weaken 
and demoralize the GVN government and convince the population of the strength of the 
NLF, thereby sparking a general insurrection among the people that would quickly bring 
about the collapse of the GVN and the departure of its US allies.  
The second aspect of the strategic shift undertaken by the Front reflected a change in 
the types and levels of repression it chose to employ.   As the discussion and examples in 
previous pages illustrated, Communist insurgents consistently used repression and terror as a 
means to control the population and disrupt government authority.  However, whereas in the 
previous years the NLF's violence strategy had emphasized relative restraint, flexibility, and 
the selective use of violence that was closely crafted to the political and social situation of a 
given area, beginning in 1968 violence became central tool used with the intent of hastening 
the collapse of the GVN in both urban and rural areas.  As such, the scale and the scope of 
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NLF violence against perceived enemies and agents of the state intensified throughout the 
country (Hosmer, 1970: 32, 36-37).   
The massacre of more 3,000 civil administrators, perceived GVN sympathizers, 
Catholics, and other civilians in Hue following the Tet Offensive is often cited as the most 
extreme example of NLF violence during this period.  Yet, as the graph of NLF violence 
presented in Chapter 4 demonstrates, the violence in Hue was hardly an outlier, at least in 
terms of intensity.  The last years of the 1960s and early 1970s reflect a general trend toward 
increased violence against civilians by the Communist insurgents.  Moreover, during this 
period the NLF apparently became increasingly broad in its targeting criteria.  While it had 
most frequently targeted civilian administrators, defectors, and other agents of the 
government or known traitors, during earlier periods, the NLF broaden its definition of 
traitors, spies and enemies to include not only those persons working with the GVN 
administration but also persons who remained in contact with family members in the ARVN, 
persons suspected of sympathizing with the GVN, and even peasants who had been 
involuntarily relocated by the government or who otherwise "complied" with government 
orders (Hosmer, 1970: 27-28).  
Like the example of the LRA used to introduce this manuscript, the example 
presented here and detailed in Chapter 4 illustrates the variability of insurgent war strategies.  
Both the combat strategies adopted by rebels as well as their strategies of violence and 
repression employed against civilians shift during the course of a civil conflict.  During some 
periods of a conflict insurgents act with relative restraint toward the civilian population, 
intentionally killing few civilians and/or limiting violence to selective targets such as 
government officials, politically active civilians, or known collaborators.  At other moments 
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in the war, they may dramatically escalate violence, increasing the frequency of killing and 
broadening the targeting criteria to include any persons suspected sympathizing with the 
enemy or simply to the population writ large. 
Despite the appalling nature of many of the acts committed against civilians during 
civil wars, this manuscript adopts a rationalist approach to violence consistent with the 
assumptions and theories outlined by other recent works (Downes, 2008; Kalyvas, 2006; 
Hultman, 2007; Valentino, 2004).  Like these works, it views violence—even mass killing 
and other atrocities—as a strategic choice adopted by armed actors when they believe that 
such actions can effectively and efficiently assist them in attaining their goals.  Specifically, 
the theory presented herein argues that violence strategies are largely shaped by fluctuations 
in the power dynamics between the armed political actors within the conflict.   
In both the Vietnam case as well as the LRA example, the insurgent organizations 
revised their war strategies, including the frequency and range of violence against civilians, 
following major shifts in the balance of power in the conflict.  In both cases insurgents 
escalated violence when they faced significant declines in their capabilities relative to their 
adversary.  For the NLF, the steady buildup of US forces in the country and improved GVN 
counterinsurgency strategies throughout the mid- and late-1960s inhibited the ability of the 
insurgents to mobilize support among rural villages, protect supporters from US/GVN 
violence, and control rural hamlets.  In an attempt to halt this loss of control and support and 
to undercut the rising strength of the Saigon government, the NLF intensified violence and 
began to target the population more broadly.  In the case of the LRA, very near defeat by 
their adversary resulted in a strategy shift among the battered remnants of the insurgency.  
Following both operation "Iron Fist" in 2002 and operation "Lightning Thunder" in 2008, the 
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severely weakened LRA rebels dramatically escalated violence, massacring hundreds of 
civilians and abducting perhaps thousands more during the weeks that followed.  Thus, in 
line with the theory proposed in previous chapters, as insurgents weaken, thereby losing their 
ability to control territory and command popular loyalty, they are increasingly likely to resort 
to greater and more indiscriminate violence as a means to restore deterrence and regain or 
maintain control. 
To recapitulate the argument, power asymmetries and resource disparities fluctuate 
over the course of the conflict; so to do the levels and types of violence adopted by armed 
groups.  I model the conflict as a competition over the nominal loyalty of the civilian 
population.  Both the state and the insurgent group attempt to entice civilian loyalty by 
providing a mixture of benefits and sanctions.  The outcome of this competition largely 
structures the strategies of violence the group adopts.  Civilian support produces negative 
incentives for violence—such action would simply undermine and punish an existing 
resource.  By contrast, when civilians withhold loyalty insurgents have an incentive to use 
violence and terror to undermine the resources provided by the regime, thereby attempting to 
reduce the extant resource asymmetry and to deter civilians from collaborating with the 
regime.   
An additional and complicating feature of civil wars is the often-fickle loyalty of the 
population.  Popular loyalties fluctuate over the course of the conflict; in turn, this variation 
produces changes in the strategies of violence the armed group employs from one time point 
to another.  All else equal, civilian loyalty is predicated on the ability of the insurgents to 
provide material and non-material benefits to supporters in order to offset the risk of 
collaboration with or participation in the rebellion.  Consequently, the side that provides 
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civilians with the largest credible level of goods compels the loyalty of the target population.  
Civilians' subjective assessment of the likely outcome of the conflict represents an additional 
factor in determining loyalty and support.  The ability of the insurgents to provide sufficient 
benefits to the target population as well as the populations' perceptions of likely war 
outcomes depend on the capabilities of the group relative to the regime.  Thus, changes in the 
in the power dynamics of the conflict contribute to changes in the level and depth of civilian 
loyalty to the insurgents.  Civilians are sensitive to shifts in the balance of power in the 
conflict and update their strategies in response to changes in them.  When insurgents face 
battlefield setbacks, when foreign powers intervene on the behalf of the government, or when 
other factors cause a decline in the insurgents' relative capabilities, civilians become more 
likely to defect and support the government.  The increased threat of defections and a general 
decline in civilian loyalty creates an incentive for insurgents to use violence against the 
population as means to deter collaboration with the government and to enforce civilian 
loyalty.  Consequently, the incentive for violence is driven by the shifting loyalties of the 
civilian population, which are in turn responsive to fluctuations in the relative capabilities of 
the conflict actors.  The general prediction, then, is that when a group is declining in power it 
becomes more likely to escalate violence as a means to enforce loyalty among civilians and 
prevent them from defecting to the adversary.   
The statistical results as well as the case analysis of the Vietnam conflict provided 
support for this theory.  Chapter 3 addressed the predictors of civilian support for the 
insurgency, and found that more militarily capably insurgent organizations and those whose 
relative capabilities were increasing from the previous period to the current enjoyed a higher 
level of participation from the conflict population.  In chapter 4 I examined the factors 
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contributing to the frequency and range of insurgent violence.  The results supported the 
theoretical assertion that changes in the broader power dynamics of the conflict contribute to 
changes in insurgent violence strategies.  Specifically, as a group's relative capabilities 
decline from one period to the next, they are more likely to both escalate the frequency and 
broaden the targets of violence; by contrast, rising insurgent capabilities contribute to a 
reduction in violence.  Also as anticipated, the greater the incidence of insurgent troops 
within the conflict population, the lower the likelihood of violence escalation.  This chapter 
also presented a brief analysis of the relationship between power dynamics and violence in 
the Vietnam War between 1956 and 1972.  Chapter 5 assessed the applicability of the general 
theory and model to the dynamics of state violence.  Merging the competition model 
presented here with existing threat-based theories of repression and mass killing, this chapter 
argued that stronger, more durable insurgencies raise the cost of the benefits and reforms that 
regimes must pay to "buy off" insurgents and their supporters.  As these costs increase, 
regimes increasingly view indiscriminate violence and mass killing as "rational" policy 
substitutions to pay offs that might dramatically alter the status quo within the state.  As with 
previous chapters the results generally supported the theoretical propositions.   
By focusing on power dynamics, the theory presented herein departs from those that 
look primarily at static aspects of the conflict such as initial endowments, ethnic enmity, 
ideology, organizational characteristics, or pre-war political alignments. As asserted in 
Chapter 2, arguments based on static factors largely ignore the often-significant variation in 
actor violence over the course of a war.  While initial conditions or pre-war socio-politico 
relationships may act as a constraint or propellant to violence, these features seldom change 
over the course of a conflict.  As such they have limited purchasing power in terms of 
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predicting the escalation or de-escalation of violence within the conflict.  In order to address 
such variation, I argued—and thus employed—for a more dynamic model actor violence that 
incorporates the more fluid features of the conflict environment.  Moreover, the theory 
presented herein also acknowledged the interdependence of actor strategies within this 
environment and attempted to integrate this aspect of conflicts into the theory of violence. 
This project likewise departs somewhat from recent theories that assert violence can 
only be understood by examining it theoretically and empirically at the micro-level and 
focusing wholly on local power dynamics (e.g., Balcells, 2010; Kalyvas, 1999; 2006).  While 
local contestation and control figure prominently in the formation of violence strategies in a 
given geographic locale, they may only figure marginally in terms of shaping the general 
strategies adopted by a group.  For example, declining control in a few villages or a similarly 
defined small geographic area might well result in an escalation in indiscriminate violence 
within that locale.  All else equal, however, it is unlikely that such a minor loss would result 
in large-scale violence that would be clearly reflected in the aggregate violence strategy of 
the group.   
In one sense, Kalyvas's (2006) points regarding more micro foci are correct: the 
change in strategy at the local level would be largely overlooked by more macro-level 
analyses such as this one.  Yet, this argument misses the larger point, which is that local 
levels of control are largely reflective of power dynamics in the aggregate.  As mentioned in 
earlier, the larger strategic shifts within Eastern Europe during World War II large defined 
the power dynamics between the Nazi occupation force and Greek partisans.  As German 
forces faced increasing Allied pressure on the Eastern Front and elsewhere in the Balkans, 
they redeployed troops throughout the theatre, raising the relative ability of the Partisans to 
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control territory and command the loyalty of the population.  True, this translated into 
changes in insurgent and occupier violence at the local level, but these changes were largely 
driven by the effect of macro level power dynamics.  The LRA and NLF cases reflect similar 
dynamics.  While geographic variation in both the intensity and the selectivity of violence no 
doubt exists, focusing solely on that dimensions runs the risk of ignoring the bigger picture.  
As I articulated in this manuscript, changes in the more macro-level power relationships 
between the conflict actors contributes to changes in the aggregate level and types of 
violence they adopt.  In this sense, micro and macro theories of violence should be seen as 
complimentary rather than competitive because only through the application of both lenses 
will scholars fully understand the dynamics of violence in civil wars.  
This analysis joins a small but growing body of theoretically informed analyses of 
conflict violence dynamics that produce policy relevant predictions.  Despite the wealth of 
research on terrorism, genocide, and civil war onset and duration, until quite recently very 
little theoretical or empirical research considered the construction of violence strategies vis-
à-vis civilians within the context of civil wars.  Arguably, this omission has been to the 
detriment of peacekeeping, nation building, or humanitarian missions within conflict 
countries.  With respect to this analysis, practitioners and policy makers that neglect the 
manner in which their entrance into or interference in the conflict environment alter the 
power dynamics between the actors may inadvertently affect changes that result in (at least 
temporary) violence escalation.   
The cases discussed in this manuscript quite readily illustrate the relationship between 
armed foreign intervention and changes in actor violence strategies.  Despite the eventual 
failure of the US to protect its Southeast Asian ally, the US military buildup in Vietnam 
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succeeded in exerting tremendous pressure on the military, political, and administrative 
apparatus of the Communist insurgency.  From its high point in the early- to mid-1960s, from 
which the collapse of Saigon appeared all but given, US military power, aid, and strategy 
helped to whittle away the gains made by the NLF, reversing its decade-long advance and 
fighting it to a standstill by the end of the decade.  With the shift in these power dynamics, 
however, came a change in the strategies of violence employed by the insurgents.  
Throughout the late 1960s the NLF escalated and intensified violence, killing many times 
more civilians than it had in its earlier years when it enjoyed broad control over most of the 
countryside and the loyalty of much of the rural population.  In a similar way, while the 
complete annihilation of the LRA in either the 2002 or 2008 would likely have saved 
thousands of lives, the failure of these operations may have inadvertently caused even more 
deaths.  Following both campaigns, the weakened group resorted to mass violence, 
abductions, and atrocities against the population.  Both cases suggest that potential 
interveners should carefully consider the likelihood of such outcomes and adopt strategies 
that can mitigate the fallout against the population in the event that they fail in the primary 
military objective.   
This analysis therefore fits with other recent studies that suggest that intervention may 
create an unanticipated backlash of violence.  Analyses of NATO's intervention in Kosovo 
and France's intervention in Rwanda in 1994 suggest that despite the interveners' intention of 
preventing or reducing abuses against civilians, the entrance of the third party led 
perpetrators to escalate violence (see for example Kuperman, 2001; 2008).  This effect is 
likely not limited to armed intervention as the entrance of even well intentioned or neutral 
actors may likewise alter power dynamics in unforeseen ways.  At least one recent analysis 
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suggests an interaction between humanitarian aid and violence (Hoffman, 2004).  According 
to this analysis, insurgent groups may precipitate humanitarian crises (including mass killings 
and other atrocities) in order to provoke good-willed international agencies and states to 
deploy humanitarian resources to the conflict zone, which the group(s) can then pillage and 
exploit.  In many ways this argument shares similarities with the theory elucidate here.  As 
argued herein, the structural and resource weaknesses of the group are a strong contributor to 
the group's use of violence as a strategy of resource acquisition.  The additional cautionary 
note sounded by this analysis, however, is that the good will of the international community 
may inadvertently provide additional incentives for violence.  Arguably, weak actors can 
only gain so much from pursuing violence—eventually the population is depleted either 
through death or flight.  The influx of aid resources, however, prevents the attainment of 
what is likely a natural equilibrium in civilian-insurgent violence interaction.  That is, so long 
as aid flows, the perpetrator continues to gain from violence.   
These observations should not be taken as a call to halt the provision of international 
aid to conflict-stricken populations or to avoid intervention intended to prevent conflict or 
abuse.  Rather, it should simply be seen as an additional complexity to which international 
agencies and organizations and national governments should attend when devising 
intervention strategies.  If anything, the observation that power dynamics play such an 
important role in the construction of violence strategies suggests the need to carefully design 
armed and humanitarian interventions that do not radically alter the extant balance of power.  
In this sense, neutral interventions that can maintain the balance of power while 
simultaneously providing a security umbrella under which both parties can negotiate an end 
to the conflict may therefore offer a superior strategy for halting conflicts and reducing 
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violence compared to interventions that explicitly attempt to challenge the perpetrator or 
provide overt protection to the weaker conflict party.  Future research should therefore 
consider the role of power dynamics in affecting changes in levels of violence within the 
conflict and apply the theoretical arguments articulated herein to determine empirically the 
most effective strategies for protecting civilians during war or resolving civil wars.  
Future research should likewise focus on constructing new and improving existing 
measures of conflict violence and the relevant characteristics of the conflict actors.  The 
measures used herein are admittedly blunt; however, they represent among the best—and 
often only—cross-national data available with which to test group-level theories of insurgent 
behavior.   With respect to violence data, the UCDP (2009) One-sided Violence dataset 
mentioned briefly in previous chapters was a major first step in measuring violence against 
civilians; however, it lacks information about the identity of the targets or the context of their 
targeting.  The PAVI measures constructed for this project represent a first cut at further 
improving violence measures; to the extent possible, I have attempted to identity the 
selectivity of the violence in addition to its frequency.   
Doubtless, improvements could be made in both measures.  First, killing is only one 
type of violence employed by armed political actors; they may also resort to torture, 
mutilation, abduction, rape, or other types of violence.  Recent efforts have been made to 
collect data on some of these abuses, but a unified dataset incorporating measures of each 
would represent a major advancement in the study of conflict violence.  In addition, measures 
of conflict violence should, in the future, attend to the spatial dimensions of the conflict as 
well.  Theories regarding the geographic distribution of violence (e.g., Balcells, 2009; 
Kalyvas, 2006) are important to the understanding conflict dynamics, but thus far they have 
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only been tested in single case analyses.  Developing cross-national datasets that capture this 
dimension of violence would assist researchers to bridge the gap between spatial and 
temporal theories as well as between micro- and macro-level theories and analyses. 
 Lastly, insurgent groups, particularly their organizational structures and capacity, 
represent one of the great black boxes of cross-national civil war research.  Research within 
this area demands reliable measures of insurgent capabilities, territorial control, leadership 
and command structures, administrative structures, recruitment strategies, resource 
endowments, and other factors associated with the manner in which insurgents construct their 
organizations and sustain themselves.  To date, only one measure has been constructed that 
attempts to capture information on these features of insurgency (Cunningham, Gleditsch & 
Salehyan, 2009).  While this effort deserves much credit, the existing measure is extremely 
limited in that it is largely temporally invariant, providing just a snapshot of a portion of 
group characteristics.  Moreover, it lacks information on recruitment strategies, 
organizational capacity, and many other important facets of insurgent organizations.  Indeed, 
creating the measures that would facilitate the study of many of the theoretically interesting 
questions about insurgent behavior is no small order; yet, real advancement in the 
understanding of conflict and violence dynamics is likely to be slow coming in its absence. 
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Appendix 
  
Summary of Dataset 
 
Recently, scholars of political violence, conflict processes, and human rights have begun to 
systematically examine the patterns of violence that occur within civil conflicts.  Specifically, 
much important research has been devoted to violence against civilians during conflicts, 
target selection by insurgent forces, and the evolution of state counterinsurgency strategies.   
Most existing datasets on violence committed against civilians are state-centered 
(Gibney and Dalton, 1996; Cingranelli and Richards, 1999; Harff, 2003; Rummel, 1994).  
Yet insurgent groups, paramilitaries, local militias, and/or other non-state actors (NSA) rather 
than (or in addition to) government security forces perpetrate much of the violence observed 
in civil conflicts.  The notable absence of NSA-centered violence measures therefore 
hampers large-N empirical research on coercion and repression during civil conflicts.   
The dataset used for the analysis in this manuscript includes both non-state and state 
actors violence against civilians using an approach drawn from the conceptual core of the 
well-known Political Terror Scale (PTS) (Gibney and Dalton, 1996; Gibney et al., 2010). 
Specifically, it captures how frequently the groups employ tactics such as abduction, torture, 
and killing against civilians as well as what segments of a society fall victim to them.51    
 
Conflicts, Conflict Actors, and Dyadic Relationships 
 
The unit of analysis for this dataset is the conflict group year.  A complicating factor in 
analyzing violence against civilians is that states may experience multiple conflicts within 
                                                
51  This appendix only includes information on rebel and government killings as those are the only violations 
considered in this manuscript. 
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their border, and some states engage multiple non-state actors within the same conflict.  As a 
result, datasets on civil war violence must extend beyond the state or even the conflict as the 
unit of analysis to the conflict actors.  Analyses of violence in civil wars require a dyadic 
framework that allows researchers to differentiate which violent actors commit acts of 
violence and in what context.  Consequently, this dataset uses the recently released Uppsala 
Armed Conflict Data Project (UCDP) Dyadic Dataset (Harbom et al., 2008) to identify the 
relevant dyads for which violence against civilians is coded.  The UCDP Dyadic Dataset 
includes conflicts occurring over territory or governance that involves the state and at least 
one violent, armed organization that result in a minimum of 25 battle-related deaths per year 
(Harbom et al., 2008).52  This relatively low threshold allows for the inclusion of small-scale 
insurgencies or early periods of insurgent movements. 
 
Defining Non-Combatants  
 
The definition of civilians or non-combatants has received only cursory attention in existing 
datasets, and indeed by most scholars of political violence.53  This conceptual oversight is a 
significant theoretical impediment given that civil war actors do not divide neatly into 
categories of insurgent, state, and civilian (see Downes, 2008; Walzer, 1977).  Civilians are 
conventionally perceived as innocent bystanders.  I take as given that fine distinctions over 
who cooperates with insurgents or the regime is generally unknowable to researchers in most 
                                                
52  The UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD) (Gleditsch et al. 2002) uses similar criteria. 
 
53  For example, Eck and Hultman (2007) make repeated references to civilians.  However, no clear, substantive 
definition of civilian is found in their codebook.  The definition of one-sided violence used by the creators is 
‘the use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organized group against civilians which 
results in at least 25 deaths per year’ (Eck, Sollenberg and Wallensteen,2004, 136). 
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cases.  It is, however, possible to draw valid distinctions between groups that engage in 
combat-related activities and those that do not.54 This project specifically adopts the 
definition for noncombatant populations employed in the Geneva Convention (IV) (1949): 
 
Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces 
who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, 
detention, or any other cause…(Article 3)55 
 
 
For this dataset, the noncombatant population therefore includes health workers, journalists, 
NGO workers, public employees, political representatives, bureaucrats, and other 
representatives or associates or employees of state or dissident groups that do not actively 
participate in a violent manner in armed conflicts.  It also includes soldier, police, security 
forces, insurgents, and other violent actors that have been wounded, detained, or surrendered 
to opposing forces.  It also includes such security-related persons killed when they are off 
duty or not participating in security duties at the time they are attacked (e.g., off duty 
policemen or soldiers on leave).   
 
Defining Violence 
For this project, the scope of violence is limited to the killing non-combatants during war.56  
The dataset includes killings that result from indirect but intentional actions such as siege, 
                                                
54 Many “noncombatant” actors such as aid workers, political activists, government officials, and bureaucrats 
perform their duties in or around conflicts zones.  Governments and NSAs often view these actors as legitimate 
targets despite the protections afforded to them by the Geneva Convention.  In El Salvador, for example, 
government forces frequently targeted health workers because they believed that they provided aid and comfort 
to the insurgents (or to their supporters).  Similarly, Maoist insurgents in Nepal and the Philippines have 
targeted elected officials as well as public sector employees for violence.  Lastly, support personnel such as 
those civilians that collaborate with insurgents by providing intelligence or supplies or the workers employed in 
factories that produce war-related equipment or munitions have often been viewed as legitimate targets by 
belligerents during civil conflicts (see Walzer, 1977). 
 
55 See also the 2nd and 3rd Protocols (1977; 2005) associated with the Geneva Convention (IV) (1949). 
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internment, forced labor, and indiscriminate shelling of civilian populated areas.  It does not 
include unintentional actions such as disease caused by infrastructure collapse, or starvation 
from crop failure.  “Collateral damage” is a particularly complicated occurrence.  It is often 
difficult to separate accidental death and damage from intentional abuse.  In many cases 
evidence of intent is difficult to locate; moreover, actors often have incentives to mask mass 
violence as collateral damage in order to avoid condemnation or interference by the 
international community.  Both intentionally targeting civilians for violence and acting with 
depraved indifference toward civilian populations in pursuit of military goals are prohibited 
under the Geneva Convention.  As such both types of violence are included in this dataset. 
This does not suggest that any civilian casualty is included.  Rather, contextual elements of 
the story are used to differentiate collateral damage from indifference to civilian security. 57   
For instance, an errant missile that kills several noncombatants in a village nearby a conflict 
zone is likely to be coded as collateral damage.  However, sustained bombing of a residential 
area would be considered intentional violence against non-combatants and therefore coded in 
this dataset.  
The PAVI dataset provides two separate actor-year measures of lethal violence 
committed against non-combatants by the insurgents and state forces. Violations are 
considered along two dimensions: the frequency of violence and the range or violence (or 
                                                                                                                                                  
56 This dataset captures common modes of intentional violence committed by warring parties against civilians 
during war.  Killings may be the most obvious and most frequently reported abuse of civilians, yet other types 
of violence are also common during civil war.  Notably, torture, mutilation, rape, and abduction have been used 
routinely in civil conflicts.  In addition to killings, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) amputated victim’s 
limbs; the Janjaweed militias in Darfur have used systematic rape; and Serb-backed militias employed sexual 
mutilation, rape, and other forms of torture against Muslims during the civil war.  An extension of the data used 
here includes measuring other types of physical integrity violations committed by state and non-state actors. 
The specific categories of violence addressed in the larger data project include: torture and physical abuse, rape 
and sexual abuse, and political imprisonment, unlawful detention and kidnapping. 
 
57 Other datasets use similar contextual criteria in an attempt to ascertain the motive of actors (see for example 
the Global Terrorism Database codebook, Appendix A). 
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targeting strategy).  Frequency pertains to the number of massacres, assassinations, or other 
intentional killings of non-combatants that occur during the year.  In essence, this measure is 
a categorical estimation of the number of non-combatant deaths attributable to the group in a 
given year.  Because the true number of civilian deaths is often unknowable, the measure 
used here is a subjective accounting of the scale of deaths.  Specifically, it is based on the 
coder's assessment of the frequency with which the actor used intentional lethal violence 
against non-combatants. Frequency includes three categories:  
1) Rare or uncommon 
2) Often  
3) Routine or Commonplace  
 
Range reflects the selectivity of the violence (see Klayvas, 2006: Ch. 6).  The intuition here 
is that it is important to differentiate between persons targeted due to their political 
involvement and those targeted at random (see also Gibney & Dalton, 1996; Stohl et al., 
1986).  Range is measured as three categories accounting for the selectivity of the violence.  
In the most selective category a group targets only military personnel or political figures 
intimately connected to counterinsurgency policy. The three categories are: 
 1) Selective 
 2) Intermediate 
 3) Indiscriminate 
 
Collecting and Coding the Data 
PAVI provides yearly information on the types, levels, and targets of violence for political 
groups involved in organized opposition to the state as well as for the states these groups 
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challenge.  This means that scores are constructed with the group-year as the unit of 
analysis.58  
The primary sources for evaluating the level of violence committed by political actors 
are the US Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices and news 
reports from various agencies.  Lexis-Nexis searches are used to generate a sample of news 
reports with information relevant to the actions of political actors. These stories are used in 
addition to the State Department reports because of the tendency of these reports to use terms 
such as "rebels" or "antigovernment forces/militants" rather than the names of specific rebel 
groups in their descriptions of violence. In addition, annual reports from Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch are added to improve the coverage of these events.  
Various scholars have used these and similar documents to generate empirical measures of 
state respect for human rights or violations of physical integrity rights (Cingranelli and 
Richards, 1999; Gibney and Dalton, 1996; Poe and Tate 1994) as well as counts of terrorist 
events (GTD, 2009) and instance of civilian killing (Eck and Huktman, 2007).  This dataset 
builds upon these efforts to produce an accurate measure of the frequency, types, and targets 
of state and rebel violence against non-combatants during civil conflict.  
Reports are accessed at various websites.  While retrieving USDS, HRW, and AI reports 
is relatively straight forward, accessing news stories is more complicated.  This section 
explains how and where to access relevant source data. 
 
                                                
58   One important note should be made about the unit of analysis.  Because states sometimes experience many 
conflicts in a given year we would ideally wish to know the extent and variations within state violence across 
conflicts or to differentiate "conflict-related" violence from other acts of state abuse.  However, two problems 
prevent this fine separation of the scores.  First, the source data often do not provide sufficient detail for 
accurate coding.  Second, it is often difficult if not impossible to determine whether state actions are specific 
responses to insurgency or the result of other motivations.  
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• The USDS reports can be accessed at two websites:59   
 
Reports for years 1996-1999 can be accessed here: 
http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/hrp_reports_mainhp.html 
 
Reports for1999-2008 can be accessed here: http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/ 
 
 
• Amnesty International no longer maintains an easily accessible website of past 
reports annual reports.  However, the UNHCR retains past reports on their website.  It 
can be accessed here: 
 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,AMNESTY,ANNUALREPORT,,,0.htm 
 
 
• Human Rights Watch maintains their reports on their website.60  They are accessed 
here: 
     http://www.hrw.org/en/node/79288 
 
After accessing the reports coders should read the report fully one time.  Information on 
physical integrity violations by state and non-state political actors are most often detailed in 
the Section 1 of the USDS reports.  Conflict specific information is typically included in 
Section 1g, and coders should particular attention to this information.  In some cases, 
pertinent information is located in section 5, particularly in the subsections regarding national 
religious or ethnic minorities.   
                                                
59 Most of the relevant information for non-state actors will be included in sections 1a-1g of the United State 
Department of State Country Reports; however, some may be included in sections related to ethnic or national 
minority rights or similar sections. 
 
60   The 2004 annual HRW report is constructed on a thematic rather than country basis.  There is therefore little 
information about specific countries, and it can be excluded from coding. 
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After reading the report, coders should record notes on the relevant actions for each 
actor on the coding sheets.  Coders should be as detailed as possible and are encouraged to 
use the exact language from the reports or news stories whenever possible. It is acceptable to 
copy and paste passages from the source documents onto the coding sheets. 
 
Non-combatants 
 
Determining who counts is a civilian can be extremely difficult during civil wars.  For this 
project we will rely on the definition of "non-combatant" outlined above.  In more practical 
terms, violence against the following types of persons should be considered: 
 
• Security forces not involved in combat, security, or other routine duties or 
operations.  This generally applies to only off-duty security personnel. 
• Soldiers, insurgents, and other persons that have been wounded, disarmed, 
detained or surrendered. 
• International/UN peacekeepers 
• Politicians, political activists, community leaders, protesters. 
• Aid workers and medical personnel. 
• Journalists, lawyers, NGO workers 
• Other non-political, non-violent persons. 
 
Persons not considered non-combatants or not coded 
• Soldiers killed in combat, on patrol, or otherwise in the course of duty. 
• Police or other security forces acting in official capacity. 
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• Civilians killed in crossfire or as collateral damage (though see below for 
more information). 
Coders should make their best and most informed decision as to whether victims of abuse are 
non-combatants or otherwise.  If the coder cannot make a decision or if there is insufficient 
evidence the coder should assume that the victims were legitimate targets, thus giving the 
group the benefits of the doubt.  These cases, however, should be noted and the project 
manager should be informed. 
 
Extra-legal killing and disappearance likely resulting in death  
 
Extra-legal killing includes any extrajudicial execution, political assassination, assault 
leading to death, or any other arbitrary deprivation of life.  It does not include, however, 
executions following formal judicial proceedings, regardless of their fairness according to 
international norms or laws.  This can be a tricky issue given that many states conduct 
political executions following some form of formal trial.  For example, countries like Iran 
and China have reputations of routinely executing dissidents following trials that are 
questionable in terms of fairness and due process.  It is not the intention of this dataset to 
measure the validity of trials; consequently, when trials are conducted through an established 
legal system and in accordance with the laws of the state in question, these killing should be 
excluded.  However, killings should be included when prisoners are summarily executed 
without due process or without a minimum level of access to formal legal proceedings. 
Other types of killing such as political assassinations, summary executions of 
detainees or captured combatants, deaths resulting from the "unlawful" use of force or use of 
"excessive" force should be included.  In general, non-combatant deaths resulting from the 
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direct actions of security forces or insurgents should also be included.  In some cases, this 
may include deaths that would otherwise be viewed as "collateral damage".  For example, if 
insurgents set off a car bomb on a busy urban street all the casualties would easily be 
included in their score.  However, a bomb detonated outside of a police barracks in which 
some civilians were killed would not be coded unless there is evidence that civilians were 
also intended as targets.   
In some cases, this information is impossible to locate and the violence must be seen 
as collateral damage.  In other cases, contextual information can help determine the targeting 
criteria of the violent group.  For example, if the bomb were place next to a busy market area 
or otherwise in a manner meant to maximize civilian casualties, the ensuing civilian deaths 
would be included.  Similarly, if a secondary were timed to detonate while rescue workers 
and bystanders gathered at the scene of the first explosion, the ensuing casualties would be 
included. By contrast, a suicide bombing against a security patrol in which no civilians were 
harmed would not be included.  As another example, a government airstrike on a rebel 
encampment that causes some civilian casualties would not be included. However, an 
airstrike that broadly targets a residential area or entire village would be included even if the 
stated target were military in nature.  This is because such broad targeting strategies reflect 
little effort to control collateral damage and show a general disregard for civilian casualties.  
If the report or article simply states "civilians were killed during combat operations" or "were 
killed in crossfire" and offers no more detailed information, these cases should not be coded.   
Explicit attacks on medical and humanitarian workers, peacekeepers, off duty security forces 
or police would also be included.   
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Lastly, deaths resulting from indirect actions would not be included.  Thus, if heavy 
artillery bombardment led to the destruction of a town water treatment facilities, which in 
turn caused outbreaks of disease that killed dozens of residents, it would be not be coded.   
Similarly, looting, the destruction of crops, residences, and infrastructure should not be coded 
unless the act itself directly caused deaths.  When government agents torch huts in a village, 
burning many residents alive, this counts as a direct act.  When military forces loot property 
and destroy crops, contributing to disease, malnourishment and death, this not coded. 
 
Scoring Abuse Frequency 
 
The categories for all abuses are: 
 
1) Rare/ uncommon 
2) Common 
3) Routine or widespread 
 
In category (1) the abuse occurs rarely and a few cases per year would be observed. The 
political actor does not appear to rely extensively on this type of abuse but it may occur at 
times during the year.  Adjectives used to describe this level of violation often include: at 
times, sometimes, a few occasionally, rarely.  Other descriptions, such as numerous or a 
number of will require a closer reading of the text to determine whether the actions was rare 
or whether it was more of an established pattern of behavior for the group.  When a report 
simply states that a political group used a type of abuse or that there "were reports of" a type 
of abuse but no figures or further description is provided, this category should be assigned.  
While the intensity of the abuse should be based primarily on descriptions rather than actual 
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numbers (as accurate counts are seldom available), the number of abuses in category (1) 
should not normally exceed 10 to 15.  
In category (2) the frequency of abuses has been extended.  In this category actors 
more commonly use the act in question, but do not make extensive use of it.  This is an 
intermediate category between the rare or infrequent use of a type of a type of abuse and its 
routine usage.  Adjectives commonly associated with category include multiple, numerous, 
often, some, a number of, etc.  Other descriptors such as frequently, many or common should 
be examined closely to determine how frequently is frequent.  For instance, one report may 
describe 15 killings of suspected collaborators by government forces as frequent while 
another describes the killing of 125 with the same language.  As a general rule, category (2) 
violations should reflect a pattern of abuse where agents of a political group make common 
usage of violence but do not use it in a routine or systematic way. This means that violations 
may occur several times during a year, but that the group does not use this type of violation 
in all or most cases.  While actual numbers should not make up the basis for coding, in 
practice category (2) violations will not be less than a dozen and no more than "scores" (e.g. 
less than 100). 
In category (3) the group has adopted a form of violence as a routine strategy.  The 
type of violence reflects a pattern of behavior that is widespread, routine, regular or 
systematic.  Coders should pay special attention to language such as common, frequent, or 
significant number.  These could reflect category 2 violations or category 3 depending on 
context.  While numbers do not define the category, this level of abuse will often reflect 100s 
or 1000s of killings by the group per year.      
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Scoring Selectivity (Range) 
 
The most difficult—but perhaps most important—element of PAVI is the range indicator.  
This variable accounts for the segment of the population that is targeted for or intentionally 
exposed to violence.  In short, it accounts for the selectivity of the violence—who is the 
victim?  Range has three categories, ranging from highly selective violence to indiscriminant 
violence.  This variable is intended to capture the patterns of targeting in a conflict—that is, 
do armed political actors generally target selectively, limiting violence to conventional 
military targets and the assassination of specific, high profile opponents (e.g., political 
leaders), or do they target large swaths of the population, making no apparent distinction 
between elites and apolitical peasants? 
Range is captured in two ways.  First, the illegal killings discussed in the previous 
section are disaggregated by the selection criteria used to target the victim.  There are three 
categories of killings based on the range of violence used by the violent actor: selective, 
intermediate, and indiscriminant.   Coders should separate the count of total non-combatant 
killings into the three categories described below. 
In category (1) violence is directed explicitly and almost exclusively at military 
targets.  Non-elites and non-combatants NOT actively engaged in politics are not targeted or 
are targeted very infrequently.  For example, if an insurgent group routinely targets military 
bases, police stations, and security patrols for attacks, this behavior is consistent with 
category (1).  This is the case even the attacks—for example, suicide bombing—is 
considered "terrorism" in the article or report.  A caveat to this is when civilians are also 
killed in the attack as a result of the explicit indifference, negligence, or intention of the 
armed group. 
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In category (2) the range of violence extends beyond attacks on military targets to 
political elites and politically active non-combatants.  For instance, government forces 
opening fire on a group of protesting students or assassinating opposition political activists, 
rival politicians, or local community leaders are examples of this category.  While the act is a 
clear violation of physical integrity rights, the targets are clearly non-combatants, and act 
may be characterized as indiscriminant in the report or article, the targets of the violence 
were selected on the basis of the observable actions or associations of the victim.  This 
distinction is intended to differentiate between violence inflicted upon those who voluntarily 
participate in politic and those that attempt to avoid violence by remaining neutral.  It should 
be noted that family members of activist civilians are not considered political targets unless 
they also exhibit political behavior.  Thus, the detention and killing of an activist's husband 
or the murder of her parents is considered indiscriminant violence (category 3) because the 
victim was not politically active (at least not simply based on their association with the 
activist).  This category also includes the execution of prisoners or war or combatants 
otherwise detained by the armed actor. 
*Killings of non-combatants counted in this category include: politicians (mayors, 
governors, etc.) suspected collaborators, politically active civilians, protesters, 
community leaders, activists, journalists, lawyers, or detained or incapacitated 
security force members, or other persons whose allegiances are visible to belligerents 
through their actions or voluntary associations. 
 
*This category also includes any case in which the victim is named and specifically 
targeted because of their presumed associations.  An example of this is when violent 
actors use "lists" of names to identify victims or when specific individuals are 
targeted as the result of information previously information attained by the 
belligerents.  
 
Category (3) reflects arbitrary or indiscriminant violence.  This type of violence affects 
persons regardless of their political involvement, inclination, or associations.  It often is 
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observed in the context of "mopping up", "search and destroy," or "scorched earth" 
campaigns.  It is also common in terrorist campaigns (though caution should be used to 
differentiate among terror targets).  These attacks are often described as indiscriminant, 
arbitrary, or random.  
A word of caution: reports often refer to an attack as indiscriminant even when it is 
directed against specific persons on the basis of their association or action.  For example, 
police firing on a crowd of protesters may be described as indiscriminant in a press report; 
however, for the purposes of this dataset this action does not warrant coding as 
indiscriminant because the protesters were voluntarily choosing to involve themselves in 
political action.  Again, this does not suggest that the action is less reprehensible, simply that 
the targeting as more selective than compared to government forces summarily executing all 
of the residents of a village because its inhabitants were from the same ethnic group as the 
insurgents.  
A note on collateral damage:  Collateral damage or unintentional deaths resulting 
from armed conflict deserve special consideration.  It is often impossible to ascertain the true 
intention of an armed actor, thus coding such acts are difficult because it is simply not known 
whether a group intended to victimize civilians or whether the deaths were the result of 
accidental targeting or because the group was unaware of the proximity of civilians to the 
target area.  Coders should use as much contextual information as possible to code the range 
of violence.  However, a few guidelines will be helpful.  As a general rule, when the 
perpetrator cannot be identified, the deaths should not affect any party's score. For instance, 
when the report states that civilians were killing in crossfire, these deaths should be excluded.  
When a report or article states that an actor fired artillery or rockets into civilian areas, the 
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coder should attempt to determine if the intended target was the civilian population or a 
military target located in or near the civilians.  If the context suggests the former then the 
action is coded as category (3).  If it is the latter, then the coder should determine whether the 
actor acted with gross negligence or indifference to the civilian population. This is often 
difficult to determine and in questionable cases the actor should be given the benefit of the 
doubt and the deaths should not be included in the actor's score.  However, if an actor 
repeatedly directs attacks toward a civilian area with little apparent consideration for civilian 
victims, this actor should receive an intermediate score of (2).  This is an effort to reflect a 
pattern of indifferent if not indiscriminant targeting.   
Lastly, the range variable is intended to capture patterns of targeting.  As such, a 
single act of violence, even indiscriminant violence, does necessarily relegate the actor to a 
specific score.  Therefore, it is useful to establish a minimum threshold for abuse.  
Specifically, the group's actions must cause at least 25 casualties, with at least 10 deaths.  
This lower bound is intended to reflect a pattern of violence rather than outlying instances.  If 
an actor does not meet the minimum threshold for a higher category, the casualties may be 
counted toward a lower category.  For example, if a rebel group assassinates 12 rival political 
activists, executes 10 suspected collaborators, and also ignites a car bomb in front of a police 
state resulting in the deaths of 10 bystanders, the group should be assigned a score of (2).  
This reflects that in general the group targeted specific persons.  However, if the car bomb 
had killed 25 persons or the insurgents had detonated several bombs killing and injuring 10 
persons, the coder should assign a score of (3) because the pattern of abuse would reflect 
more indiscriminant attacks. 
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